Stephen L. Elkin – författare

In The New Constitutionalism, seven distinguished scholars develop an innovative perspective on the power of institutions to shape politics and political life. Believing that constitutionalism needs to go beyond the classical goal of limiting the arbitrary exercise of political power, the contributors argue that it should—and can—be designed to achieve economic efficiency, informed democratic control, and other valued political ends. More broadly, they believe that political and social theory needs to turn away from the negativism of critical theory to consider how a good society should be "constituted" and to direct the work of designing institutions that can constitute a "good polity," in both the economic and civic senses. Stephen L. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan begin with an overview of constitutionalist theory and a discussion of the new constitutionalism within the broader intellectual and historical context of political and social thought. Charles Anderson, James Ceaser, and the editors then offer different interpretations of the central issues regarding institutional design in a constitutionalist social science, consider various ways of performing the task, and discuss the inadequacy of recent political science to the job it ought to be doing. The book concludes with essays by Ted Lowi, Cass Sunstein and Edwin Haefele which apply these themes to the American regime.

Stephen L. Elkin deftly combines the empirical and normative strands of political science to make a powerfully original statement about what cities are, can, and should be. Rejecting the idea that two goals of city politics—equality and efficiency—are opposed to one another, Elkin argues that a commercial republic could achieve both. He then takes the unusual step of addressing how the political institutions of the city can help to form the kind of citizenry such a republic needs. The present workings of American urban political institutions are, Elkin maintains, characterized by a close relationship between politicians and businessmen, a relationship that promotes neither political equality nor effective social problem-solving. Elkin pays particular attention to the issue of land-use in his analysis of these failures of popular control in traditional city politics. Urban political institutions, however, are not just instruments for the dispensing of valued outcomes or devices for social problem-solving—they help to form the citizenry. Our present institutions largely define citizens as interest group adversaries and do little to encourage them to focus on the commercial public interest of the city. Elkin concludes by proposing new institutional arrangements that would be better able to harness the self-interested behavior of individuals for the common good of a commercial republic.

James Madison is the thinker most responsible for laying the groundwork of the American commercial republic. But he did not anticipate that the propertied class on which he relied would become extraordinarily politically powerful at the same time as its interests narrowed. This and other flaws, argues Stephen L. Elkin, have undermined the delicately balanced system he constructed. In Reconstructing the Commercial Republic, Elkin critiques the Madisonian system, revealing which of its aspects have withstood the test of time and which have not. The deficiencies Elkin points out provide the starting point for his own constitutional theory of the republic-a theory that, unlike Madison's, lays out a substantive conception of the public interest that emphasizes the power of institutions to shape our political, economic, and civic lives. Elkin argues that his theory should guide us toward building a commercial republic that is rooted in a politics of the public interest and the self-interest of the middle class.He then recommends specific reforms to create this kind of republic, asserting that Americans today can still have the lives a commercial republic is intended to promote: lives with real opportunities for economic prosperity, republican political self-government, and individual liberty.

The purpose of this volume is to help develop, through a variety of exploratory essays, the art and science of institutional design. The authors look at a variety of good societies as artifacts, as products—at least partly—of design, and consider how such societies can be crafted. They identify themselves with the New Constitutionalism movement, which aims to develop and promote the knowledge necessary for institutional reform and institutional creation through understanding the designer's, creator's, founder's, or reformer's perspective. The first part of the volume considers some of the boundaries of what is humanly possible in politico-economic designs and the role in them of deliberation and the processes of adapting to limits. The second part considers different ways of exercising constitutionalist judgment analyzing a variety of cases, including general visions of the good society. Looking at whole societies, and at complexes of institutions, complements and informs the picture of the institutional microscale. Understanding the microscale, on the other hand, often makes the difference between empty slogans and realistic political proposals. Contributors are Karol Edward Soltan, Elinor Ostrorn, Viktor J. Vanberg, James lvi. Buchanan, John S. Dryzek, Charles 'X". Anderson, Stephen U. Elkin, Car Alperovirz, and Philip Green.

Bringing together new work from many of the leading experts on democratic citizenship, this volume presents both normative argument and empirical analysis to help deepen our understanding of the various competences that citizens require if there is to be a flourishing democratic political order in our present age.The essays explore the following themes: (1) the essential components of democratic citizenship and how these can be fostered; (2) the state of citizen competence in various democratic regimes; (3) civil society as a crucial site for the exercise and development of democratic citizenship; (4) new findings that show democratic citizens to have more political information and behave more rationally than hitherto supposed; and (5) the theory and practice of new institutional forms for democratic deliberation and democratic control.The final section of the book explores new and revitalized forms of democratic participation as well as the kind of participation that is likely to foster a wide variety of citizen competences. The discussion runs from what we know and can expect from town meetings, to the value of public work in fostering a democratic citizenry, to entirely new forms for expressing citizen judgment.The Contributors are Benjamin Barber, Harry C. Boyte, Frank M. Bryan, Michael A. Dimock, Stephen L. Elkin, James S. Fishkin, Norman Frohlich, John Gaventa, Elizabeth Gerber, Alan Kay, Robert E. Lane, Arthur Lupia, Jane Mansbridge, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Benjamin Page, Samuel Popkin, Nancy Rosenblum, Robert Shapiro, Karol Edward Soltan, Marion Smiley, and David Steiner.

This book was originally published in 1974. At the time of publication, studies of the politics of planning generally emphasized the difficulties planning agencies face and the way in which political patterns impede planning efforts. This view particularly characterized the analysis of city planning in the United States. London presented a different picture and this study sought to analyze the nature of the differences, their sources and their consequences. The principal focus is on political patterns and planning in London as they appeared in the post-war period up until the middle sixties. Even though the London planning authority had few political problems, it had limited success in shaping the development of London. The study traces the source of the authority's difficulties to the manner in which planners and other members if the organization conceived the problems of choice they confronted. In general, the study seeks to describe how the authority acted, why it did so, and the consequences of its actions.