Stephen M. Bainbridge – författare

The first decade of the new millennium was bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining U.S. capital market competitiveness.

The years from 2000 to 2010 were bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

The first decade of the new millennium was bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

The first decade of the new millennium was bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

What responsibility, if any, does a corporation have to society? How should corporations balance environmental, social, and governance factors? The Profit Motive addresses these questions of corporate purpose using historical, legal, and economic perspectives. Stephen M. Bainbridge enters the debate around corporate social responsibility to mount an unabashed defense of shareholder capitalism and maximizing shareholder value. The book offers context for the current questions about corporate purpose, and provides a reference going forward. Direct and corrective, The Profit Motive argues that shareholder value maximization is not only required by law, but what the law ought to require.

What responsibility, if any, does a corporation have to society? How should corporations balance environmental, social, and governance factors? The Profit Motive addresses these questions of corporate purpose using historical, legal, and economic perspectives. Stephen M. Bainbridge enters the debate around corporate social responsibility to mount an unabashed defense of shareholder capitalism and maximizing shareholder value. The book offers context for the current questions about corporate purpose, and provides a reference going forward. Direct and corrective, The Profit Motive argues that shareholder value maximization is not only required by law, but what the law ought to require.

What responsibility, if any, does a corporation have to society? How should corporations balance environmental, social, and governance factors? The Profit Motive addresses these questions of corporate purpose using historical, legal, and economic perspectives. Stephen M. Bainbridge enters the debate around corporate social responsibility to mount an unabashed defense of shareholder capitalism and maximizing shareholder value. The book offers context for the current questions about corporate purpose, and provides a reference going forward. Direct and corrective, The Profit Motive argues that shareholder value maximization is not only required by law, but what the law ought to require.

This thoroughly revised second edition skilfully provides an updated and extensive overview of cutting-edge research on insider trading, the most common violation of securities law. It presents legal, economic, and empirical studies from Australasia, the Middle East, Europe and North America.Stephen M. Bainbridge brings together an array of expert contributors to provide global analysis on insider trading laws and economics. The book expands upon the previous edition with new and rigorously researched coverage exploring the USA’s comprehensive insider trading ban and the related legal proceedings, as well as empirical research advancements in the field. New chapters examine important developments in other major economies, including China, Japan, and the EU, and feature new insight into insider trading laws in Israel and Arab countries.This new edition of Research Handbook on Insider Trading is an essential resource for students, educators, and professionals in company and insolvency law, economics, and finance, interested in the intricacies of insider trading. Regulators and judges covering economic crime and corruption, and corporate law and governance will also find this book an invaluable reference.

This thoroughly revised second edition skilfully provides an updated and extensive overview of cutting-edge research on insider trading, the most common violation of securities law. It presents legal, economic, and empirical studies from Australasia, the Middle East, Europe and North America.

Stephen M. Bainbridge brings together an array of expert contributors to provide global analysis on insider trading laws and economics. The book expands upon the previous edition with new and rigorously researched coverage exploring the USA’s comprehensive insider trading ban and the related legal proceedings, as well as empirical research advancements in the field. New chapters examine important developments in other major economies, including China, Japan, and the EU, and feature new insight into insider trading laws in Israel and Arab countries.

This new edition of Research Handbook on Insider Trading is an essential resource for students, educators, and professionals in company and insolvency law, economics, and finance, interested in the intricacies of insider trading. Regulators and judges covering economic crime and corruption, and corporate law and governance will also find this book an invaluable reference.

Delaware is the state of incorporation for almost two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies, as well as more than half of all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and other major stock exchanges. This gives Delaware a seemingly unchallengeable position as the dominant producer of US corporate law. In recent years, however, some observers have suggested that Delaware's competitive position is eroding. Other states have long tried to chip away at Delaware's position, and recent Delaware legal developments may have strengthened the case for incorporating outside Delaware. More importantly, however, the federal government is increasingly preempting corporate governance law. The contributors to this volume are leading academics and practitioners with decades of experience in Delaware corporate law. They bring together a variety of perspectives that collectively provide the reader with a broad understanding of how Delaware achieved its dominant position and the threats it faces.

In this groundbreaking work, Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson change the conversation about corporate governance by examining the origins, roles, and performance of boards with a simple question in mind: why does the law require governance to be delivered through individual board members? While tracing the development of boards from quasi-political bodies through the current 'monitoring' role, the authors find the reasons for this requirement to be wanting. Instead, they propose that corporations be permitted to hire other business associations - known as 'Board Service Providers' or BSPs - to provide governance services. Just as corporations hire law firms, accounting firms, and consulting firms, so too should they be permitted to hire governance firms, a small change that will dramatically increase board accountability and enable governance to be delivered more efficiently. Outsourcing the Board should be read by academics, policymakers, and those within the corporations that will benefit from this change.

In this groundbreaking work, Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson change the conversation about corporate governance by examining the origins, roles, and performance of boards with a simple question in mind: why does the law require governance to be delivered through individual board members? While tracing the development of boards from quasi-political bodies through the current ''monitoring'' role, the authors find the reasons for this requirement to be wanting. Instead, they propose that corporations be permitted to hire other business associations - known as ''Board Service Providers'' or BSPs - to provide governance services. Just as corporations hire law firms, accounting firms, and consulting firms, so too should they be permitted to hire governance firms, a small change that will dramatically increase board accountability and enable governance to be delivered more efficiently. Outsourcing the Board should be read by academics, policymakers, and those within the corporations that will benefit from this change.

In this groundbreaking work, Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson change the conversation about corporate governance by examining the origins, roles, and performance of boards with a simple question in mind: why does the law require governance to be delivered through individual board members? While tracing the development of boards from quasi-political bodies through the current ''monitoring'' role, the authors find the reasons for this requirement to be wanting. Instead, they propose that corporations be permitted to hire other business associations - known as ''Board Service Providers'' or BSPs - to provide governance services. Just as corporations hire law firms, accounting firms, and consulting firms, so too should they be permitted to hire governance firms, a small change that will dramatically increase board accountability and enable governance to be delivered more efficiently. Outsourcing the Board should be read by academics, policymakers, and those within the corporations that will benefit from this change.

Delaware is the state of incorporation for almost two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies, as well as more than half of all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and other major stock exchanges. This gives Delaware a seemingly unchallengeable position as the dominant producer of US corporate law. In recent years, however, some observers have suggested that Delaware's competitive position is eroding. Other states have long tried to chip away at Delaware's position, and recent Delaware legal developments may have strengthened the case for incorporating outside Delaware. More importantly, however, the federal government is increasingly preempting corporate governance law. The contributors to this volume are leading academics and practitioners with decades of experience in Delaware corporate law. They bring together a variety of perspectives that collectively provide the reader with a broad understanding of how Delaware achieved its dominant position and the threats it faces.

What responsibility, if any, does a corporation have to society? How should corporations balance environmental, social, and governance factors? The Profit Motive addresses these questions of corporate purpose using historical, legal, and economic perspectives. Stephen M. Bainbridge enters the debate around corporate social responsibility to mount an unabashed defense of shareholder capitalism and maximizing shareholder value. The book offers context for the current questions about corporate purpose, and provides a reference going forward. Direct and corrective, The Profit Motive argues that shareholder value maximization is not only required by law, but what the law ought to require.

In this groundbreaking work, Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson change the conversation about corporate governance by examining the origins, roles, and performance of boards with a simple question in mind: why does the law require governance to be delivered through individual board members? While tracing the development of boards from quasi-political bodies through the current 'monitoring' role, the authors find the reasons for this requirement to be wanting. Instead, they propose that corporations be permitted to hire other business associations - known as 'Board Service Providers' or BSPs - to provide governance services. Just as corporations hire law firms, accounting firms, and consulting firms, so too should they be permitted to hire governance firms, a small change that will dramatically increase board accountability and enable governance to be delivered more efficiently. Outsourcing the Board should be read by academics, policymakers, and those within the corporations that will benefit from this change.

In most capital markets, insider trading is the most common violation of securities law. It is also the most well known, inspiring countless movie plots and attracting scholars with a broad range of backgrounds and interests, from pure legal doctrine to empirical analysis to complex economic theory. This volume brings together original cutting-edge research in these and other areas written by leading experts in insider trading law and economics.The Handbook begins with a section devoted to legal issues surrounding the US's ban on insider trading, which is one of the oldest and most energetically enforced in the world. Using this section as a foundation, contributors go on to discuss several specific court cases as well as important developments in empirical research on the subject. The Handbook concludes with a section devoted to international perspectives, providing insight into insider trading laws in China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the European Union.This timely and comprehensive volume will appeal to students and professors of law and economics, as well as scholars, researchers and practitioners with an interest in insider trading.Contributors: K. Alexander, S.M. Bainbridge, L.N. Beny, S.F. Diamond, J. Fisch, J.M. Heminway, M.T. Henderson, N.C. Howson, H. Huang, K. Kendall, S.H. Kim, T.A. Lambert, K. Langenbucher, D.C. Langevoort, H.G. Manne, M. Nelemans, A. Padilla, A.C. Pritchard, J.M. Ramseyer, M.C. Schouten, H.N. Seyhun, A.F. Simpson, J.W. Verret, G. Walker

'Bainbridge and Henderson have given us one of the most important books on one of the most important contemporary legal issues, the liability of individual and corporate shareholders for corporate debts. There is no issue in corporate law more subject to uncertainty and no issue more likely to be litigated. No single book has ever attempted, much less carried off, the complete historical, international, economic and legal theoretical exegesis of limited liability, which these two authors do with range, depth, confidence and even a bit of panache. This monograph, of crucial interest both to scholars and practitioners, will become an instant classic and an immediate authority.'Stephen B. Presser, Northwestern University and the author of Piercing the Corporate VeilThe modern corporation has become central to our society. The key feature of the corporation that makes it such an attractive form of human collaboration is its limited liability. This book explores how allowing those who form the corporation to limit their downside risk and personal liability to only the amount they invest allows for more risks to be taken at a lower cost.This comprehensive economic analysis of the policy debate surrounding the laws governing limited liability examines limited it not only in an American context, but internationally, as the authors consider issues of limited liability in Britain, Europe and Asia. Stephen Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson begin with an exploration of the history and theory of limited liability, delve into an extended analysis of corporate veil piercing and related doctrines, and conclude with thoughts on possible future reforms. Limited liability in unincorporated entities, reverse veil piercing and enterprise liability are also addressed. This comprehensive book will be of great interest to students and scholars of corporate law. The book will also be an invaluable resource for judges and practitioners.

''Bainbridge and Henderson have given us one of the most important books on one of the most important contemporary legal issues, the liability of individual and corporate shareholders for corporate debts. There is no issue in corporate law more subject to uncertainty and no issue more likely to be litigated. No single book has ever attempted, much less carried off, the complete historical, international, economic and legal theoretical exegesis of limited liability, which these two authors do with range, depth, confidence and even a bit of panache. This monograph, of crucial interest both to scholars and practitioners, will become an instant classic and an immediate authority.''Stephen B. Presser, Northwestern University and the author of Piercing the Corporate Veil

The modern corporation has become central to our society. The key feature of the corporation that makes it such an attractive form of human collaboration is its limited liability. This book explores how allowing those who form the corporation to limit their downside risk and personal liability to only the amount they invest allows for more risks to be taken at a lower cost.

This comprehensive economic analysis of the policy debate surrounding the laws governing limited liability examines limited it not only in an American context, but internationally, as the authors consider issues of limited liability in Britain, Europe and Asia. Stephen Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson begin with an exploration of the history and theory of limited liability, delve into an extended analysis of corporate veil piercing and related doctrines, and conclude with thoughts on possible future reforms. Limited liability in unincorporated entities, reverse veil piercing and enterprise liability are also addressed.

This comprehensive book will be of great interest to students and scholars of corporate law. The book will also be an invaluable resource for judges and practitioners.

'Bainbridge and Henderson have given us one of the most important books on one of the most important contemporary legal issues, the liability of individual and corporate shareholders for corporate debts. There is no issue in corporate law more subject to uncertainty and no issue more likely to be litigated. No single book has ever attempted, much less carried off, the complete historical, international, economic and legal theoretical exegesis of limited liability, which these two authors do with range, depth, confidence and even a bit of panache. This monograph, of crucial interest both to scholars and practitioners, will become an instant classic and an immediate authority.'Stephen B. Presser, Northwestern University and the author of Piercing the Corporate VeilThe modern corporation has become central to our society. The key feature of the corporation that makes it such an attractive form of human collaboration is its limited liability. This book explores how allowing those who form the corporation to limit their downside risk and personal liability to only the amount they invest allows for more risks to be taken at a lower cost.This comprehensive economic analysis of the policy debate surrounding the laws governing limited liability examines limited it not only in an American context, but internationally, as the authors consider issues of limited liability in Britain, Europe and Asia. Stephen Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson begin with an exploration of the history and theory of limited liability, delve into an extended analysis of corporate veil piercing and related doctrines, and conclude with thoughts on possible future reforms. Limited liability in unincorporated entities, reverse veil piercing and enterprise liability are also addressed. This comprehensive book will be of great interest to students and scholars of corporate law. The book will also be an invaluable resource for judges and practitioners.