Stig S. Gezelius – författare

This is a book about fishermen's reasons for obeying fisheries law. The fish harvesting industry has become subject to state interference to an increasing extent over the past twenty years. As natural resources become scarce and subsequent fisheries regulations abound, the question of law-abidingness is brought to the public agenda. However, there is still little empirical data as regards the dynamics of compliance in this field, and this book aims to meet a demand for in-depth knowledge. The cases studied can be regarded as instances of economies dependent on the harvesting of natural resources for both household and the market, and the study aims to contribute to the building of more adequate theory on the dynamics of compliance in such economies. However, focusing on a specific type of setting seldom constitutes a safe escape route for getting away from more pervasive sociological questions, and it certainly does not in this case. As any attempt to explain social phenomena, this study is faced with the fundamental sociological question of how the acts of individuals can best be understood. The question concerns the interface between the individual and the collectivity – between collective morality and self-interest. It thus deals with classical sociological issues such as the nature and regulatory capacity of group norms and sanctions, and the forms and roles of rationality and strategic action.

The state of the Northeast Atlantic fisheries in recent years has highlighted - plementation as the Achilles heel of modern fisheries management: discards and unreported or misreported landings are in many cases recognised to effectively subvert sound conservation goals. Social science literature on fisheries mana- ment has tended to regard the implementation of resource conservation policies mainly as a question of effective enforcement. This literature regards surveillance and penalty as the key mechanism through which fishermen keep to catch restr- tions and loyally report their catches. This book emerged because several years of research on fishermen’s compliance had made us uneasy about this rather narrow approach to the problem of implementation. This uneasiness motivated us to widen the approach to the question of implementing conservation policies in the fisheries. Taking Norway as an example, its fishing fleet consists of some 7,000 vessels spread along a coastline of more than 20,000 km, populated by less than 5 million people. The idea of ensuring desirable behaviour through surveillance and - forcement alone is almost absurd in such a context, as the task is impossible by any reasonable means. The Norwegian implementation system has thus had to rely heavily on the incentives provided by the rules and legitimacy created through a century of state/industry collaboration. Different coastal states face very different conditions in terms of solving typical implementation problems such as discards and misreporting.

The state of the Northeast Atlantic fisheries in recent years has highlighted - plementation as the Achilles heel of modern fisheries management: discards and unreported or misreported landings are in many cases recognised to effectively subvert sound conservation goals. Social science literature on fisheries mana- ment has tended to regard the implementation of resource conservation policies mainly as a question of effective enforcement. This literature regards surveillance and penalty as the key mechanism through which fishermen keep to catch restr- tions and loyally report their catches. This book emerged because several years of research on fishermen’s compliance had made us uneasy about this rather narrow approach to the problem of implementation. This uneasiness motivated us to widen the approach to the question of implementing conservation policies in the fisheries. Taking Norway as an example, its fishing fleet consists of some 7,000 vessels spread along a coastline of more than 20,000 km, populated by less than 5 million people. The idea of ensuring desirable behaviour through surveillance and - forcement alone is almost absurd in such a context, as the task is impossible by any reasonable means. The Norwegian implementation system has thus had to rely heavily on the incentives provided by the rules and legitimacy created through a century of state/industry collaboration. Different coastal states face very different conditions in terms of solving typical implementation problems such as discards and misreporting.

The state of the Northeast Atlantic fisheries in recent years has highlighted - plementation as the Achilles heel of modern fisheries management: discards and unreported or misreported landings are in many cases recognised to effectively subvert sound conservation goals. Social science literature on fisheries mana- ment has tended to regard the implementation of resource conservation policies mainly as a question of effective enforcement. This literature regards surveillance and penalty as the key mechanism through which fishermen keep to catch restr- tions and loyally report their catches. This book emerged because several years of research on fishermen’s compliance had made us uneasy about this rather narrow approach to the problem of implementation. This uneasiness motivated us to widen the approach to the question of implementing conservation policies in the fisheries. Taking Norway as an example, its fishing fleet consists of some 7,000 vessels spread along a coastline of more than 20,000 km, populated by less than 5 million people. The idea of ensuring desirable behaviour through surveillance and - forcement alone is almost absurd in such a context, as the task is impossible by any reasonable means. The Norwegian implementation system has thus had to rely heavily on the incentives provided by the rules and legitimacy created through a century of state/industry collaboration. Different coastal states face very different conditions in terms of solving typical implementation problems such as discards and misreporting.

This is a book about fishermen''s reasons for obeying fisheries law. The fish harvesting industry has become subject to state interference to an increasing extent over the past twenty years. As natural resources become scarce and subsequent fisheries regulations abound, the question of law-abidingness is brought to the public agenda. However, there is still little empirical data as regards the dynamics of compliance in this field, and this book aims to meet a demand for in-depth knowledge. The cases studied can be regarded as instances of economies dependent on the harvesting of natural resources for both household and the market, and the study aims to contribute to the building of more adequate theory on the dynamics of compliance in such economies. However, focusing on a specific type of setting seldom constitutes a safe escape route for getting away from more pervasive sociological questions, and it certainly does not in this case. As any attempt to explain social phenomena, this study is faced with the fundamental sociological question of how the acts of individuals can best be understood. The question concerns the interface between the individual and the collectivity – between collective morality and self-interest. It thus deals with classical sociological issues such as the nature and regulatory capacity of group norms and sanctions, and the forms and roles of rationality and strategic action.