Suren Basov – författare

This book provides researchers and students with an understanding of the basic legal tenets of the Islamic finance industry, studying the real economic effects of those tenets using the tools of the modern economic theory. Split into four parts, the book begins with an introduction to the history and a legal framework for Islamic banking, covering typical Islamic financial products such as Sukuk and Takaful and examining the structure of Islamic financial institutions. It then analyzes and discusses the Miller-Modigliani Theorem, which is of direct relevance to Islamic banks which are prohibited to charge interest and often have to rely of profit-loss sharing agreements. Part III of the book introduces the reader to modern mechanism design theory, paying particular attention to optimal contracting under hidden action and hidden information, and final part  of the book applies the tools of economic theory to understand performance of Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic banks and Takaful operators.Islamic Finance in Light of Modern Economic Theory brings together all the necessary technical tools for analyzing the economic effects of Islamic frameworks and can be used as an advanced textbook for graduate students who wish to specialize in the area, as a reference for researchers and as a tool to help economists improve the design of Islamic financial institutions.

The book brings into a focus all necessary mathematical knowledge necessary to understand the economics of multidimensional results screening and applies them straightaway to economic models. The first part of this book contains a review of vector calculus, the theory of partial differential equations, and the theory of generalized convexity. These techniques are extensively used in multidimensional screening models. Part II is devoted to the economics of sceening models. It starts with a detailed discussion of economics and mathematics of unidimensional screening problems and three approaches to their solution: direct, dual, and Hamiltonian. It uses the Hamiltonian approach to unify all known results, which were previously obtained using different arguments. Then the major difficulties with direct and dual approach in the multidimensional context are discussed and the Hamiltonian approach is used to provide the most complete characterization of the solution known in the literature.

The book brings into a focus all necessary mathematical knowledge necessary to understand the economics of multidimensional results screening and applies them straightaway to economic models. The first part of this book contains a review of vector calculus, the theory of partial differential equations, and the theory of generalized convexity. These techniques are extensively used in multidimensional screening models. Part II is devoted to the economics of sceening models. It starts with a detailed discussion of economics and mathematics of unidimensional screening problems and three approaches to their solution: direct, dual, and Hamiltonian. It uses the Hamiltonian approach to unify all known results, which were previously obtained using different arguments. Then the major difficulties with direct and dual approach in the multidimensional context are discussed and the Hamiltonian approach is used to provide the most complete characterization of the solution known in the literature.

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.

This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.