Tim Henning – författare

This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are for. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a special emphasis on our practical lives. In essence, the essays here put epistemic virtues to work.

This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are for. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a special emphasis on our practical lives. In essence, the essays here put epistemic virtues to work.

Immanuel Kant and Henry Sidgwick are towering figures in the history of moral philosophy. Kant’s views on ethics continue to be discussed and studied in detail not only in philosophy, but also theology, political science, and legal theory. Meanwhile, Sidgwick is emerging as the philosopher within the utilitarian tradition who merits the same meticulous treatment that Kant receives. As champions of deontology and consequentialism respectively, Kant and Sidgwick disagree on many important issues. However, close examination reveals a surprising amount of consensus on various topics including moral psychology, moral epistemology, and moral theology.

This book presents points of agreement and disagreement in the writings of these two giants of philosophical ethics. The chapters will stimulate discussions among moral theorists and historians of philosophy by applying cutting-edge scholarship on each philosopher to shed light on some of the more perplexing arguments and views of the other, and by uncovering and examining points of agreement between Sidgwick and Kant as possible grounds for greater convergence in contemporary moral philosophy. This is the first full-length volume to investigate Sidgwick and Kant side by side. It will be of major interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy and its history.

Immanuel Kant and Henry Sidgwick are towering figures in the history of moral philosophy. Kant’s views on ethics continue to be discussed and studied in detail not only in philosophy, but also theology, political science, and legal theory. Meanwhile, Sidgwick is emerging as the philosopher within the utilitarian tradition who merits the same meticulous treatment that Kant receives. As champions of deontology and consequentialism respectively, Kant and Sidgwick disagree on many important issues. However, close examination reveals a surprising amount of consensus on various topics including moral psychology, moral epistemology, and moral theology.

This book presents points of agreement and disagreement in the writings of these two giants of philosophical ethics. The chapters will stimulate discussions among moral theorists and historians of philosophy by applying cutting-edge scholarship on each philosopher to shed light on some of the more perplexing arguments and views of the other, and by uncovering and examining points of agreement between Sidgwick and Kant as possible grounds for greater convergence in contemporary moral philosophy. This is the first full-length volume to investigate Sidgwick and Kant side by side. It will be of major interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy and its history.

Personen erzählen ihr Leben – eine These dieser Art ist vielerorts populär. Aber es fehlt bislang an ausgearbeiteten Argumenten für sie, ebenso wie an einer strengen Definition des Begriffs der Narrativität. Das vorliegende Buch bietet Abhilfe.

Zunächst stellt es einen Beitrag zur Theorie personaler Autonomie dar. Eine Analyse des zentralen Begriffs der Identifikation wird vorgeschlagen; ebenso wird eine anspruchsvolle biographische Bedingung der Autonomie formuliert und begründet. Ob wir das tun, was wir wirklich wollen, können wir nur vor dem Hintergrund unseres Wissens über bestimmte biographische Zusammenhänge entscheiden.

Weiter wird eine detaillierte Theorie der Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik narrativer Sprache entwickelt. Narrativität basiert nicht nur auf der Form und der Bedeutung von Sätzen, sondern hat eine essentielle pragmatische Dimension. Erst vor dem Hintergrund der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten und der empathischen Vermögen von Teilnehmern in Kontexten sind Äußerungen Geschichten.

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird gezeigt, dass die biographischen Zusammenhänge, die relevant für Autonomie sind, gerade solche sind, von denen wir erzählen können. Geschichten artikulieren praktische Gründe, und es zeichnet Personen als autonome Wesen aus, für diese narrativen Gründe empfänglich zu sein.

Das Buch wurde 2009 mit dem Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preis der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie ausgezeichnet.