Verena Wagner – författare

This is the first edited collection dedicated to demonstrating Hume’s relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology. It features original essays by Hume scholars and epistemologists that address a wide range of important questions, including the following:What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like?How do Hume’s understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes?Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains?What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view?What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to understanding of current sceptical hypotheses?Is Hume a hinge epistemologist?Does naturalized epistemology trace back to Hume?Does Hume have an ethics of belief?What can Hume contribute to virtue and vice epistemology?Some chapters try to bring historically accurate interpretations of Hume’s ideas into contact with current issues, while others will take ideas merely suggested by Hume and demonstrate their philosophical usefulness. Together, they demonstrate Hume’s enduring relevance for debates about knowledge, belief, inquiry and suspension, reasons, modal knowledge, scepticism, hinge epistemology, naturalized epistemology, the ethics of belief and moral epistemology, virtue and vice epistemology, and the epistemology of testimony.Hume and Contemporary Epistemology will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hume, epistemology, and the history of philosophy.

This is the first edited collection dedicated to demonstrating Hume’s relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology. It features original essays by Hume scholars and epistemologists that address a wide range of important questions, including the following:What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like?How do Hume’s understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes?Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains?What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view?What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to understanding of current sceptical hypotheses?Is Hume a hinge epistemologist?Does naturalized epistemology trace back to Hume?Does Hume have an ethics of belief?What can Hume contribute to virtue and vice epistemology?Some chapters try to bring historically accurate interpretations of Hume’s ideas into contact with current issues, while others will take ideas merely suggested by Hume and demonstrate their philosophical usefulness. Together, they demonstrate Hume’s enduring relevance for debates about knowledge, belief, inquiry and suspension, reasons, modal knowledge, scepticism, hinge epistemology, naturalized epistemology, the ethics of belief and moral epistemology, virtue and vice epistemology, and the epistemology of testimony.Hume and Contemporary Epistemology will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hume, epistemology, and the history of philosophy.

This is the first volume dedicated to suspension of judgment. It features cutting-edge research from leading scholars on one of the main areas of contemporary epistemology and neighboring fields. The contributors examine the concept of suspension from various perspectives, encompassing historical and contemporary approaches, its nature and normativity, and its relationship to other philosophical concepts as well as interdisciplinary applications. They address a wide range of crucial issues, including but not limited to:What is the nature of suspension?Can we suspend judgment voluntarily?Is there more than one kind of suspension?What are the norms for suspension?What is the relation between epistemic and prudential norms for suspension?What is the logic of suspension and how can we formally represent different forms of suspension?What is the role of suspension for rational decision?What is the relation of suspension of judgment and abstention of action?What is the relation between suspension and inquiry?How does suspension relate to doubt, ignorance, and indecision?How does the Pyrrhonian notion of suspension of judgment relate to modern accounts?Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy.

This is the first volume dedicated to suspension of judgment. It features cutting-edge research from leading scholars on one of the main areas of contemporary epistemology and neighboring fields. The contributors examine the concept of suspension from various perspectives, encompassing historical and contemporary approaches, its nature and normativity, and its relationship to other philosophical concepts as well as interdisciplinary applications. They address a wide range of crucial issues, including but not limited to:What is the nature of suspension?Can we suspend judgment voluntarily?Is there more than one kind of suspension?What are the norms for suspension?What is the relation between epistemic and prudential norms for suspension?What is the logic of suspension and how can we formally represent different forms of suspension?What is the role of suspension for rational decision?What is the relation of suspension of judgment and abstention of action?What is the relation between suspension and inquiry?How does suspension relate to doubt, ignorance, and indecision?How does the Pyrrhonian notion of suspension of judgment relate to modern accounts?Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy.

This is the first edited collection dedicated to demonstrating Hume’s relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology. It features original essays by Hume scholars and epistemologists that address a wide range of important questions, including the following:

What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like? How do Hume’s understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes? Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains? What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view? What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to understanding of current sceptical hypotheses? Is Hume a hinge epistemologist? Does naturalized epistemology trace back to Hume? Does Hume have an ethics of belief? What can Hume contribute to virtue and vice epistemology?

Some chapters try to bring historically accurate interpretations of Hume’s ideas into contact with current issues, while others will take ideas merely suggested by Hume and demonstrate their philosophical usefulness. Together, they demonstrate Hume’s enduring relevance for debates about knowledge, belief, inquiry and suspension, reasons, modal knowledge, scepticism, hinge epistemology, naturalized epistemology, the ethics of belief and moral epistemology, virtue and vice epistemology, and the epistemology of testimony.

Hume and Contemporary Epistemology will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hume, epistemology, and the history of philosophy.

This is the first edited collection dedicated to demonstrating Hume’s relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology. It features original essays by Hume scholars and epistemologists that address a wide range of important questions, including the following:

What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like? How do Hume’s understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes? Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains? What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view? What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to understanding of current sceptical hypotheses? Is Hume a hinge epistemologist? Does naturalized epistemology trace back to Hume? Does Hume have an ethics of belief? What can Hume contribute to virtue and vice epistemology?

Some chapters try to bring historically accurate interpretations of Hume’s ideas into contact with current issues, while others will take ideas merely suggested by Hume and demonstrate their philosophical usefulness. Together, they demonstrate Hume’s enduring relevance for debates about knowledge, belief, inquiry and suspension, reasons, modal knowledge, scepticism, hinge epistemology, naturalized epistemology, the ethics of belief and moral epistemology, virtue and vice epistemology, and the epistemology of testimony.

Hume and Contemporary Epistemology will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hume, epistemology, and the history of philosophy.

This is the first volume dedicated to suspension of judgment. It features cutting-edge research from leading scholars on one of the main areas of contemporary epistemology and neighboring fields. The contributors examine the concept of suspension from various perspectives, encompassing historical and contemporary approaches, its nature and normativity, and its relationship to other philosophical concepts as well as interdisciplinary applications. They address a wide range of crucial issues, including but not limited to:

What is the nature of suspension? Can we suspend judgment voluntarily? Is there more than one kind of suspension? What are the norms for suspension? What is the relation between epistemic and prudential norms for suspension? What is the logic of suspension and how can we formally represent different forms of suspension? What is the role of suspension for rational decision? What is the relation of suspension of judgment and abstention of action? What is the relation between suspension and inquiry? How does suspension relate to doubt, ignorance, and indecision? How does the Pyrrhonian notion of suspension of judgment relate to modern accounts?

Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy.

This is the first volume dedicated to suspension of judgment. It features cutting-edge research from leading scholars on one of the main areas of contemporary epistemology and neighboring fields. The contributors examine the concept of suspension from various perspectives, encompassing historical and contemporary approaches, its nature and normativity, and its relationship to other philosophical concepts as well as interdisciplinary applications. They address a wide range of crucial issues, including but not limited to:

What is the nature of suspension? Can we suspend judgment voluntarily? Is there more than one kind of suspension? What are the norms for suspension? What is the relation between epistemic and prudential norms for suspension? What is the logic of suspension and how can we formally represent different forms of suspension? What is the role of suspension for rational decision? What is the relation of suspension of judgment and abstention of action? What is the relation between suspension and inquiry? How does suspension relate to doubt, ignorance, and indecision? How does the Pyrrhonian notion of suspension of judgment relate to modern accounts?

Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy.