Walter Sinnott-Armstrong – författare

ADVANGEBOOKS - UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL LOGIC, 9E shows readers how to construct arguments in everyday life, using everyday language. In addition, this easy-to-read textbook also devotes three chapters to the formal aspects of logic including forms of argument, as well as propositional, categorical, and quantificational logic. Plus, this edition helps readers apply informal logic to legal, moral, scientific, religious, and philosophical scenarios, too.

A masterclass in persuasion from the inspiring philosopher who has taught a million people to argue through his popular open online courseOur personal and political worlds are rife with arguments and disagreements, some of them petty and vitriolic. The inability to compromise and understand the other side is widespread today. What can we do to change this? In Think Again philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong draws on a long tradition of logic to show why we should stop focusing on winning arguments and instead argue in a more constructive way.Based on a hugely popular online course with more than a million followers around the world, Think Again explains how to analyse, evaluate and make better arguments while also spotting bad reasoning and avoiding certain fallacies. Through lively, practical examples from everyday life, politics and popular culture, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong offers brilliantly straightforward, wise advice that we can all use at work, at home and online.

People with scrupulosity have rigorous, obsessive moral beliefs that lead them to perform extreme, compulsive moral acts. A waitress with this condition checks and rechecks levels of cleaners and solvents to avoid any risk of poisoning her customers. Another individual asks repeatedly whether he fasted correctly, despite swallowing his own saliva. Those with scrupulosity stretch out their prayers for hours to be sure that they have said nothing incorrectly. They worry constantly about cleanliness, sinfulness, and all the ways they could be falling short of perfection. Using a range of fascinating case studies, Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argue that scrupulosity constitutes a mental illness and not moral sainthood. In doing so, they consider several important philosophical questions: Do the moral beliefs and judgments of those with scrupulosity differ from ours, or are these individuals just stricter in their moral observance? Are they morally responsible for their actions? Should they be pressured into psychiatric treatment, even when therapy leads them to act in ways they find immoral? Summers and Sinnott-Armstrong illustrate how psychiatric cases can inform the way we think about these and other philosophical issues, particularly those surrounding responsibility, rationality, and the nature of belief, morality, and mental illness. Clean Hands? will fascinate psychiatrists who treat patients with scrupulosity, philosophers who study morality, and anyone who has ever wondered about and struggled with the obligations and limits of morality.

Modern medicine enables us to keep many people alive after they have suffered severe brain damage and show no reliable outward signs of consciousness. Many such patients are misdiagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state when they are actually in a minimally conscious state. This mistake has far-reaching implications for treatment and prognosis. To alleviate this problem, neuroscientists have recently developed new brain-scanning methods for detecting consciousness in some of these patients and even for asking them questions, including "Do you want to stay alive?" These new technological abilities raise many questions about what exactly these methods reveal (Is it really consciousness?), how reliable they are (Do they fail to detect consciousness in some patients who are conscious?), what are these patients' lives like (Do they feel pain?), what we should do for and to these patients (Should we let them die?), who should decide (Are these patients competent to decide for themselves?), and which policies should governments and hospitals enact (Which kinds of treatment should be made available?). All of these questions and more are addressed in this collection of original papers. The prominent contributors provide background information, survey the issues and positions, and take controversial stands from a wide variety of perspectives, including neuroscience and neurology, law and policy, and philosophy and ethics. This collection should interest not only academics but anyone who might suffer brain damage, which includes us all.

This is a collection of essays on the topic of moral knowledge. Each paper represents a major position within the field of moral epistemology, and starts by introducing readers to the position the author defends, locating that position vis-a-vis competing views, and explaining technical vocabulary, before going on to argue that position. The papers cover the topics of moral skepticism, contractarianism, projectism, coherentism, feminist skepticism, and pragmatism.

Ideal for undergraduate courses in philosophy of law, this comprehensive anthology examines such topics as the concept of law, the dispute between natural law theorists and legal positivists, the relations between law and morality, criminal responsibility and legal punishment, the rights of the individual against the state, justice and equality, and legal evidence as compared with scientific evidence. The readings have been selected from both philosophy and law journals and include classic texts, contemporary theoretical developments, and well-known recent court cases. The text features extensive introductions that make even the most profound writings accessible to undergraduates.

Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Yet the only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way. This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen.

Moral epistemology is the term for thinking about how a moral belief can be justified. All contentious moral issues --from gay marriage to terrorism--raise difficult questions about the formation and status of moral beliefs. If we do form an opinion, how is that belief justified, particularly when others may feel quite differently? And even if we reach a consensus, how is that unanimous belief justified? These questions raise fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, and justification and knowledge; but they also have tremendous practical importance regarding how to (if indeed we can) resolve controversial moral issues in health care ethics, politics, the law, and education. Most agree that moral nihilism--the idea that moral beliefs simply cannot be justified--is undesirable. Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of this difficult subject, tackling such questions as: Does knowledge require true belief? Are any moral beliefs true, and are any justified? The second half of the book brings into dialogue various moral theories that have grappled with these questions, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong finds all of these theories lacking in their ability to fight off moral nihilism. He defends his own theory, which he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which argues that some moral beliefs can be modestly justified, but not extremely justified.

Some argue that atheism must be false, since without God, no values are possible, and thus "everything is permitted." Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that God is not only not essential to morality, but that our moral behavior should be utterly independent of religion. He attacks several core ideas: that atheists are inherently immoral people; that any society will sink into chaos if it is becomes too secular; that without morality, we have no reason to be moral; that absolute moral standards require the existence of God; and that without religion, we simply couldn't know what is wrong and what is right. Sinnott-Armstrong brings to bear convincing examples and data, as well as a lucid, elegant, and easy to understand writing style. This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a pithy, tightly-constructed argument on an issue of great social importance.

Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls "moderate moral skepticism," which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action. Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research--including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John-Dylan Haynes--that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel have brought together prominent experts in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and law to discuss whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other.

What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have debated the extent of human free will for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be freeThis book contains thirty bidirectional exchanges between neuroscientists and philosophers that focus on the most critical questions in the neurophilosophy of free will. It mimics a lively, interdisciplinary conference, where experts answer questions and follow-up questions from the other field, helping each discipline to understand how the other thinks and works. Each chapter is concise and accessible to non-experts-free from disciplinary jargon and highly technical details-but also employs thorough and up-to-date research from experts in the field. The resulting collection should be useful to anyone who wants to get up to speed on the most fundamental issues in the rising field of the neurophilosophy of free will. It will interest experts from philosophy or neuroscience who want to learn about the other discipline, students in courses on a host of related topics, and lay readers who are fascinated by these profound issues.

What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have debated the extent of human free will for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be freeThis book contains thirty bidirectional exchanges between neuroscientists and philosophers that focus on the most critical questions in the neurophilosophy of free will. It mimics a lively, interdisciplinary conference, where experts answer questions and follow-up questions from the other field, helping each discipline to understand how the other thinks and works. Each chapter is concise and accessible to non-experts-free from disciplinary jargon and highly technical details-but also employs thorough and up-to-date research from experts in the field. The resulting collection should be useful to anyone who wants to get up to speed on the most fundamental issues in the rising field of the neurophilosophy of free will. It will interest experts from philosophy or neuroscience who want to learn about the other discipline, students in courses on a host of related topics, and lay readers who are fascinated by these profound issues.

Some argue that atheism must be false, since without God, no values are possible, and thus "everything is permitted." Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that God is not only not essential to morality, but that our moral behaviour should be utterly independent of religion. He attacks several core ideas: that atheists are inherently immoral people; that any society will sink into chaos if it is becomes too secular; that without morality, we have no reason to be moral; that absolute moral standards require the existence of God; and that without religion, we simply couldn't know what is wrong and what is right.Sinnott-Armstrong brings to bear convincing examples and data, as well as a lucid, elegant, and easy to understand writing style. This book should fit well with the debates raging over issues like evolution and intelligent design, atheism, and religion and public life as an example of a pithy, tightly-constructed argument on an issue of great social importance."In his call for sincere dialogue with theists, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a welcome relief from the apoplectic excesses of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens, while also addressing objections to homosexuality and evolution frequently raised by evangelical Christians." --Publishers Weekly "[I]t is accessible and lively, my hope is that it will be widely read, especially by theists."--Peter Lamal, The Humanist "... the clarity of this text successfully defuses many erroneous claims about religion and morality, both popular and academic; this volume certainly deserves a wide audience in this increasingly secular and skeptical world." -Choice"Morality Without God? is an engaging, pithy book arguing against the necessity of God and religion for a robust morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has distinguished himself as a leading philosopher in his work on metaethics and moral psychology, as well as books on moral and epistemological skepticism, and in Morality Without God? he commendably succeeds in writing a philosophically respectable introduction to the problems facing religious morality suitable for virtually any audience." --Philosophia Christi

A balanced and thought-provoking guide to all the big questions about AI and ethics Can computers understand morality? Can they respect privacy? And what can we do to make AI safe and fair?The artificial intelligence revolution has begun. Today, there are self-driving cars on our streets, autonomous weapons in our armies, robot surgeons in our hospitals – and AI's presence in our lives will only increase. Some see this as the dawn of a new era in innovation and ease; others are alarmed by its destructive potential. But one thing is clear: this is a technology like no other, one that raises profound questions about the very definitions of human intelligence and morality.In Moral AI, world-renowned researchers in moral psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence – Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Vincent Conitzer – tackle these thorny issues head-on. Writing lucidly and calmly, they lay out the recent advances in this still nascent field, peeling away the exaggeration and misleading arguments. Instead, they offer clear examinations of the moral concerns at the heart of AI programs, from racial equity to personal privacy, fake news to autonomous weaponry. Ultimately, they argue that artificial intelligence can be built and used safely and ethically, but that its potential cannot be achieved without careful reflection on the values we wish to imbue it with. This is an essential primer for any thinking person.

A balanced and thought-provoking guide to all the big questions about AI and ethics Can computers understand morality? Can they respect privacy? And what can we do to make AI safe and fair?The artificial intelligence revolution has begun. Today, there are self-driving cars on our streets, autonomous weapons in our armies, robot surgeons in our hospitals – and AI's presence in our lives will only increase. Some see this as the dawn of a new era in innovation and ease; others are alarmed by its destructive potential. But one thing is clear: this is a technology like no other, one that raises profound questions about the very definitions of human intelligence and morality.In Moral AI, world-renowned researchers in moral psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence – Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Vincent Conitzer – tackle these thorny issues head-on. Writing lucidly and calmly, they lay out the recent advances in this still nascent field, peeling away the exaggeration and misleading arguments. Instead, they offer clear examinations of the moral concerns at the heart of AI programs, from racial equity to personal privacy, fake news to autonomous weaponry. Ultimately, they argue that artificial intelligence can be built and used safely and ethically, but that its potential cannot be achieved without careful reflection on the values we wish to imbue it with. This is an essential primer for any thinking person.

Current controversies over abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, hate speech, and other issues have sparked considerable public debate about how the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted. Such controversies, along with the changing composition of an often deeply divided Supreme Court, have led to a resurgence of interest in theories of con

Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop fresh positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This collection honours one of the most rigourous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.

Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop fresh positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This collection honours one of the most rigourous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.

Bernard Gert's moral theory is among the clearest and most comprehensive on the contemporary scene. It touches on elements of the dominant ethical orientations—-utilitarianism, Kantianism, contractionism, and virtue ethics—without fitting neatly into any of those categories. For that reason, Gert's moral theory appeals to many ethicists dissatisfied with each of the dominant formulations.Rationality, Rules, and Ideals presents Gert's Morality, the reactions by a number of prominent scholars, and Gert's response. All told, it is a remarkably wide-ranging study of ethical theory. The work is broken down into six parts, making Rationality, Rules, and Ideals perfect for a broad-ranging course on ethical theory, following Gert's critiques of utilitariansim, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. Both students and professionals will find much material to work with in this volume. The papers contribute not only to the understanding of Gert's wide-ranging theory but to a number of important topics in ethic theory, the theory of rationality, and applied ethics.

This book explores the interplay between science, economics, politics, and ethics in understanding the challenge that climate change poses to the international community. A central theme is that climate change involves core issues of scientific uncertainty and intergenerational fairness that must be accounted for in the design and implementation of policy responses. Drawing together contributions from leading scholars in a variety of relevant disciplines, this volume provides a synthetic approach to this important topic that should prove valuable to a variety of readers. This series focuses on the interface between geosystems, biosystems, and the political economy. The volumes integrate physical, natural, and social sciences with economics. It encompasses the atomistic and mechanistic epistemology of modern economic analysis.