Henderson examines the sophisticated motivation and control systems utilized by the North Vietnamese command. The book is based on communist documents and recorded interviews with captured Viet Cong.

A blockbuster. . . sure to be controversial. A major work, not just in military sociology but among concerned citizens generally. The Hollow Army is one of a kind in that it completely runs against the conventional wisdom that today's American Army is an effective fighting force. Henderson's argument is brilliantly conceived, backed with data and penetrating insight. . . . The scholarship is extremely sound. . . and the use of data is peerless. Charles C. Moskos Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and SocietyWilliam Darryl Henderson maintains that despite highly successful marketing efforts to sell the image of a new quality army to the American public, the Congress, and to the U.S. Army itself, the Army has, in fact, not risen above mediocre performance levels. Henderson dispels the myth of today's quality army, and explores the long buried and avoided MPT (manpower, personnel, and training) issues that are expanded on in succeeding chapters.The 24 charts, 13 tables, and 9 chapters of this compelling and timely investigation factually demonstrate the real army story. Henderson insists, in an introductory chapter, that everything, even the bad news must be told. Chapter 2 suggests that the nature and significance of the army's mission are changing and gaining in importance and the exploration of the actual number of combat troops in Chapter 3 concludes that the most important principle of war can no longer be effectively employed by the U.S. Army. The vital areas of training, personnel, and the small combat unit are addressed in the next four chapters. Chapter 8 details the unfocused character of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps. The final chapter suggests that if the army is to perform its stated function and achieve maximum value for the manpower and funds allocated, a rigorous structural-functional systems analysis and a searching review of underlying assumptions must be undertaken. This ambitious and eye-opening examination should be required reading not only for students and scholars of defense and military studies but for Congressional members, government officials, army personnel, and U.S. taxpayers as well.

Henderson examines the sophisticated motivation and control systems utilized by the North Vietnamese command. The book is based on communist documents and recorded interviews with captured Viet Cong.

A blockbuster. . . sure to be controversial. A major work, not just in military sociology but among concerned citizens generally. The Hollow Army is one of a kind in that it completely runs against the conventional wisdom that today's American Army is an effective fighting force. Henderson's argument is brilliantly conceived, backed with data and penetrating insight. . . . The scholarship is extremely sound. . . and the use of data is peerless. Charles C. Moskos Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and SocietyWilliam Darryl Henderson maintains that despite highly successful marketing efforts to sell the image of a new quality army to the American public, the Congress, and to the U.S. Army itself, the Army has, in fact, not risen above mediocre performance levels. Henderson dispels the myth of today's quality army, and explores the long buried and avoided MPT (manpower, personnel, and training) issues that are expanded on in succeeding chapters.The 24 charts, 13 tables, and 9 chapters of this compelling and timely investigation factually demonstrate the real army story. Henderson insists, in an introductory chapter, that everything, even the bad news must be told. Chapter 2 suggests that the nature and significance of the army's mission are changing and gaining in importance and the exploration of the actual number of combat troops in Chapter 3 concludes that the most important principle of war can no longer be effectively employed by the U.S. Army. The vital areas of training, personnel, and the small combat unit are addressed in the next four chapters. Chapter 8 details the unfocused character of the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps. The final chapter suggests that if the army is to perform its stated function and achieve maximum value for the manpower and funds allocated, a rigorous structural-functional systems analysis and a searching review of underlying assumptions must be undertaken. This ambitious and eye-opening examination should be required reading not only for students and scholars of defense and military studies but for Congressional members, government officials, army personnel, and U.S. taxpayers as well.