Yaniv Roznai – författare

Can constitutional amendments be unconstitutional? The problem of 'unconstitutional constitutional amendments' has become one of the most widely debated issues in comparative constitutional theory, constitutional design, and constitutional adjudication. This book describes and analyses the increasing tendency in global constitutionalism to substantively limit formal changes to constitutions. The challenges of constitutional unamendability to constitutional theory become even more complex when constitutional courts enforce such limitations through substantive judicial review of amendments, often resulting in the declaration that these constitutional amendments are 'unconstitutional'.Combining historical comparisons, constitutional theory, and a wide comparative study, Yaniv Roznai sets out to explain what the nature of amendment power is, what its limitations are, and what the role of constitutional courts is and should be when enforcing limitations on constitutional amendments.

Can constitutional amendments be unconstitutional? The problem of 'unconstitutional constitutional amendments' has become one of the most widely debated issues in comparative constitutional theory, constitutional design, and constitutional adjudication. This book describes and analyses the increasing tendency in global constitutionalism to substantively limit formal changes to constitutions. The challenges of constitutional unamendability to constitutional theory become even more complex when constitutional courts enforce such limitations through substantive judicial review of amendments, often resulting in the declaration that these constitutional amendments are 'unconstitutional'.Combining historical comparisons, constitutional theory, and a wide comparative study, Yaniv Roznai sets out to explain what the nature of amendment power is, what its limitations are, and what the role of constitutional courts is and should be when enforcing limitations on constitutional amendments.

Few terms in political theory are as overused, and yet as under-theorized, as constitutional revolution. In this book, Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai argue that the most widely accepted accounts of constitutional transformation, such as those found in the work of Hans Kelsen, Hannah Arendt, and Bruce Ackerman, fail adequately to explain radical change. For example, a “constitutional moment” may or may not accompany the onset of a constitutional revolution. The consolidation of revolutionary aspirations may take place over an extended period. The “moment” may have been under way for decades—or there may be no such moment at all. On the other hand, seemingly radical breaks in a constitutional regime actually may bring very little change in constitutional practice and identity. Constructing a clarifying lens for comprehending the many ways in which constitutional revolutions occur, the authors seek to capture the essence of what happens when constitutional paradigms change.

It is well known that the US Constitution has been amended twenty-seven times since its creation in 1787, but that number does not reflect the true extent of constitutional change in America. Although the Constitution is globally recognized as a written text, it consists also of unwritten rules and principles that are just as important, such as precedents, customs, traditions, norms, presuppositions, and more. These, too, have been amended, but how does that process work? In this book, leading scholars of law, history, philosophy, and political science consider the many theoretical, conceptual, and practical dimensions of what it means to amend America's 'unwritten Constitution': how to change the rules, who may legitimately do it, why leaders may find it politically expedient to enact written instead of unwritten amendments, and whether anything is lost by changing the constitution without a codified constitutional amendment.

Constitutional identity has become one of the most important and hotly contested concepts in contemporary constitutional theory and practice. It has been repeatedly invoked in debates concerning EU integration, constitutional reform and revolution, and the spread of ethno-nationalist populism, democratic backsliding, and constitutional retrogression. Yet, the concept's precise foundations, meaning, scope, and dynamics of continuity and change remain somewhat unclear and under-explored. This contemporary and definitive volume aims to address this stark gap. Featuring some of the world's leading scholars of comparative constitutionalism, constitutional theory, and constitutional politics, this book provides a comprehensive, first-of-its-kind theoretical, comparative, normative, and empirical account of the concept of constitutional identity. It will be of great interest to scholars, students, jurists, and constitutional drafters alike.

Offering a unique perspective on an overlooked subject – the relationship between time, change, and lawmaking – this edited collection brings together world-leading experts to consider how time considerations and social, political and technological change affect the legislative process, the interpretation of laws, the definition of the powers of the government and the ability of legal orders to promote innovation.Divided into four parts, each part considers a different form of interaction between time and law, and change. The first part offers legal, theoretical and historical perspectives on the relationship between time and law, and how time shaped law and influences legal interpretation and constitutional change.The second part offers the reader an analysis of the different ways in which courts approach the impact of time on law, as well as theoretical and empirical reflections upon the meaning of the principle of legal certainty, legitimate expectations and the influence of law over time.The third part of the book analyses how legislation and the legislative process addresses time and change, and the various challenges they create to the legal order.The fourth and final part addresses the complex relationship between fast-paced technological change and the regulation of innovations.

Part III, “Public Health, Financial and Economic Crises,” considers how constitutions change in response to crises that are neither political in the conventional sense nor violent, which also complicates how we evaluate constitutional resilience in times of stress.