Yann P. Kerevel – författare

Latin American legislators, like legislators worldwide, are drawn from a narrow set of elites who are largely out of touch with average citizens. Despite comprising the vast majority of the labor force, working-class people represent a small slice of the legislature. Working Class Inclusion examines how the near exclusion of working-class citizens from legislatures affects citizens' evaluations of government. Combining surveys from across Latin America with novel data on legislators' class backgrounds and experiments from Argentina and Mexico, the book demonstrates voters want more workers in office, and when combined with policy representation, the presence of working-class legislators improves citizens' evaluations of government. Absent policy representation, however, workers are met with distrust and backlash. Chapters show citizens have many opportunities to learn about the presence, or absence, of workers; and the relationship between working-class representation and evaluations of government is strongest among citizens who are aware of legislators' class status.

Latin American legislators, like legislators worldwide, are drawn from a narrow set of elites who are largely out of touch with average citizens. Despite comprising the vast majority of the labor force, working-class people represent a small slice of the legislature. Working Class Inclusion examines how the near exclusion of working-class citizens from legislatures affects citizens' evaluations of government. Combining surveys from across Latin America with novel data on legislators' class backgrounds and experiments from Argentina and Mexico, the book demonstrates voters want more workers in office, and when combined with policy representation, the presence of working-class legislators improves citizens' evaluations of government. Absent policy representation, however, workers are met with distrust and backlash. Chapters show citizens have many opportunities to learn about the presence, or absence, of workers; and the relationship between working-class representation and evaluations of government is strongest among citizens who are aware of legislators' class status.

The Power of Opposition: Legislative Effectiveness in Mexico's Multiparty Democracy develops a theory of legislative effectiveness in presidential systems where it is rare for presidents to control a majority of seats in the legislature. Legislators belonging to the president’s party are often constrained in their behavior as the executive branch has an overarching interest in ensuring copartisan legislative proposals fit within the president’s agenda. Executive bills often require bargains with the opposition to secure votes, and legislators from the president’s party may find their bills coopted by the president, or blocked if they conflict with presidential priorities. As a result, legislators from governing parties are generally less effective when it comes to their own initiatives. Presidents allow the opposition to push their own priorities through the legislative process, or provide credit-claiming opportunities on major presidential initiatives. Since opposition legislators can exchange votes on executive bills for presidential support on opposition-led initiatives, they are generally more effective at navigating their own proposals through the legislative process. Yann P. Kerevel and Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez demonstrate support for this argument drawing on extensive quantitative data from Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies from 1997-2024, and interviews with numerous lawmakers and staffers.