Given their protracted economic difficulties, the nuclear and aerospace industries in Russia and Ukraine are tempted to export dual-use technologies that can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems. John C. Baker proposes using international incentives to discourage irresponsible export behaviour while seeking long-term changes in the non-proliferation attitudes of their managers and government leaders.

Argues that a carrot-and-stick policy is likely to be more effective than a stick-only approach in curbing India's nuclear ambitions. Increased strategic cooperation between India and the US is the ideal incentive, but the author argues that such cooperation is unlikely in the immediate future.

Since the mid-1970s, Islamist groups have been important opposition forces in the Arab world and have posed a considerable challenge to regimes. However, their increased influence has not led to political power. Ibrahim A. Karawan argues that Islamist movements have been unable to form an effective and united opposition, and have therefore reached an impasse. Although regimes cannot afford to ignore their Islamist challengers, the Arab world is unlikely to witness a wave of Islamist take-overs. More than 17 years after the fall of the Shah, the Iranian revolution remains an isolated case in the Middle East. The growth of Islamism is fuelled by social, economic and political discontent. Islamist movements are not passing phenomena, but the actual political threat they pose will depend mainly on their ability to form broad coalitions, and on the willingness of regimes to introduce badly needed reforms. However, Islamist movements are divided over key issues of strategy and tactics.

Regimes have exploited these divisions to contain their Islamist opponents, and have blended oppression and limited political accommodation to perpetuate their rule. Despite Islamist groups’ transnational language and ideology, national and sub-national issues drive their actions. Region-wide developments – notably the ‘oil revolution’ of the 1970s and Arab military defeats by Israel – are important in understanding the overall political climate, but they will not be crucial in deciding the outcome of the Islamist–regime confrontation.

The influence of the West on Arab Islamism is also unlikely to be decisive. Islamist activism is stronger in areas with greater exposure to Western influences. States are therefore keen not to be seen as being too close to Western powers. In addition, there is no one Western stance towards Islamist movements, nor is there a unified assessment of the causes and policy implications of their resurgence. Contentious political issues confront Western powers, such as linking economic aid to human rights.

Political and militant movements operating under the banner of Islamism are diverse. Their deep differences over the best means to achieve their objectives fragment their ranks and undermine their effectiveness. Although Arab regimes face many challenges, they have shown greater political resilience than analysts have expected.

Russia and China claim to have established a "strategic partnership". Jennifer Anderson argues that this relationship merely overlays a diplomatic agenda established in the late 1980s, and that China's pragmatic, limited approach (coupled with Russia's domestic economic and political difficulties) have meant that the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is unwieldy and imprecise.

Debates about military influence on civilian government tend to be partisan and rarely pay sufficient attention to specific contexts. This paper analyses, without condemnation or justification, why and how the military exercises such influence in Turkey and whether it is likely to continue to do so. It argues that the role of the military in Turkey grows out of a specific Turkish context and is more a symptom than a cause of the country's flawed democracy. It examines the Turkish officer ethos, particularly the role of the indigenous ideology of Kemalism, and the broad, though not universal, public mandate for an interventionist role in politics. It contends that the military's influence is neither uniform nor total and that it is more effective at blocking than initiating policy; thus creating a system in which civilian authority is primary rather than supreme. It analyses the mechanisms through which the military attempts to shape policy, and demonstrates how its influence depends more on its informal authority than legislated rights or responsibilities. The paper suggests that fears of threats to national security resulting from the reforms required for EU accession have made the military more, not less, reluctant to withdraw from the political arena. It concludes that, regardless of the future of Turkey's candidacy, such a withdrawal will be a slow and gradual process, dependent more on changes in Turkish social and political culture and the perceived security environment than in the military itself.

How can the core transatlantic Allies make coalitions more effective?  One year on from Kosovo, disparities in the capabilities of the coalition partners, as well as uneven levels of prior coordination, persist.  To address these problems will require much greater force planning in peacetime.

This stimulating and influential work offers one of the most comprehensive independent assessments to date of the Kosovo campaign, and of the performance of the NATO allies.  An important subject area in which there is a great deal of international interest.

Since the collapse of President Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 and the international intervention in East Timor in 1999, there has been much speculation in South-east Asia and the West over whether Indonesia - weakened by economic difficulties, social distresses and political instability - has a future as a coherent nation-state. This paper argues that although the separatist struggles in Aceh or Papua are unlikely to suceed in the foreseeable future, other problems threaten to undermine the central government's control.

Communal disputes have led to chronic violence in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. Simultaneously, tension between Islamic and secular political forces has grown. Indonesia's disarray has prompted international concern over an array of security threats, including contagious secessionism, Islamic terrorism, the movement through Indonesia of asylum-seekers, piracy and environmental dangers. In order to contain these security implications of Indonesia's protracted crisis, concerned governments should continue assisting its fragile reform process, particularly by helping Jakarta to manage the country's massive international debt. However, they should also coordinate their contingency planning for a further crumbling of Jakarta's authority.

This book analyzes the provision of aid to countries that have undergone negotiated settlements to civil wars, drawing on recent experiences in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. It focuses on the potential for peace conditionality, linking aid to steps to implement accords and consolidate the peace. The book explores how aid can encourage domestic investment in peace-related needs; the reconciliation of long-run peacebuilding objectives with short-run humanitarian imperatives; and the obstacles that donors' priorities and procedures pose to effective aid for peace. It concludes that investing in peace requires not only the reconstruction of war-torn societies but also the reconstruction of aid itself.

Over the last decade, the failure of countries to emerge from conflict and the rise of 'failed states' has focused attention on state security sectors. External actors involved in 'protectorates' such as Kosovo and East Timor and peace agreements such as Cambodia, El Salvador or Bosnia have come face to face with the problems exposed by factionalised, wrong-sized, dictatorial and non-professional security sectors. Consequently, international institutions, the UN or World Bank, for example, and individual government ministries in countries such as the UK, USA and Germany have been increasingly concerned with promoting security sector reform (SSR).

This paper argues, however, that while there is much discussion about capabilities for SSR and its technical requirements, there has been insufficient analysis of how to mobilise such resources. Three central questions, therefore, are examined: how have the external approaches to SSR evolved and what do they entail; what specific problems does the SSR agenda face operationally; and what concrete policy recommendations for engagment can be drawn from reform experiences to date.

Given their protracted economic difficulties, the nuclear and aerospace industries in Russia and Ukraine are tempted to export dual-use technologies that can contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems. John C. Baker proposes using international incentives to discourage irresponsible export behaviour while seeking long-term changes in the non-proliferation attitudes of their managers and government leaders.

Argues that a carrot-and-stick policy is likely to be more effective than a stick-only approach in curbing India's nuclear ambitions. Increased strategic cooperation between India and the US is the ideal incentive, but the author argues that such cooperation is unlikely in the immediate future.

Since the mid-1970s, Islamist groups have been important opposition forces in the Arab world and have posed a considerable challenge to regimes. However, their increased influence has not led to political power. Ibrahim A. Karawan argues that Islamist movements have been unable to form an effective and united opposition, and have therefore reached an impasse. Although regimes cannot afford to ignore their Islamist challengers, the Arab world is unlikely to witness a wave of Islamist take-overs. More than 17 years after the fall of the Shah, the Iranian revolution remains an isolated case in the Middle East. The growth of Islamism is fuelled by social, economic and political discontent. Islamist movements are not passing phenomena, but the actual political threat they pose will depend mainly on their ability to form broad coalitions, and on the willingness of regimes to introduce badly needed reforms. However, Islamist movements are divided over key issues of strategy and tactics.

Regimes have exploited these divisions to contain their Islamist opponents, and have blended oppression and limited political accommodation to perpetuate their rule. Despite Islamist groups’ transnational language and ideology, national and sub-national issues drive their actions. Region-wide developments – notably the ‘oil revolution’ of the 1970s and Arab military defeats by Israel – are important in understanding the overall political climate, but they will not be crucial in deciding the outcome of the Islamist–regime confrontation.

The influence of the West on Arab Islamism is also unlikely to be decisive. Islamist activism is stronger in areas with greater exposure to Western influences. States are therefore keen not to be seen as being too close to Western powers. In addition, there is no one Western stance towards Islamist movements, nor is there a unified assessment of the causes and policy implications of their resurgence. Contentious political issues confront Western powers, such as linking economic aid to human rights.

Political and militant movements operating under the banner of Islamism are diverse. Their deep differences over the best means to achieve their objectives fragment their ranks and undermine their effectiveness. Although Arab regimes face many challenges, they have shown greater political resilience than analysts have expected.

Russia and China claim to have established a "strategic partnership". Jennifer Anderson argues that this relationship merely overlays a diplomatic agenda established in the late 1980s, and that China's pragmatic, limited approach (coupled with Russia's domestic economic and political difficulties) have meant that the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is unwieldy and imprecise.

Debates about military influence on civilian government tend to be partisan and rarely pay sufficient attention to specific contexts. This paper analyses, without condemnation or justification, why and how the military exercises such influence in Turkey and whether it is likely to continue to do so. It argues that the role of the military in Turkey grows out of a specific Turkish context and is more a symptom than a cause of the country's flawed democracy. It examines the Turkish officer ethos, particularly the role of the indigenous ideology of Kemalism, and the broad, though not universal, public mandate for an interventionist role in politics. It contends that the military's influence is neither uniform nor total and that it is more effective at blocking than initiating policy; thus creating a system in which civilian authority is primary rather than supreme. It analyses the mechanisms through which the military attempts to shape policy, and demonstrates how its influence depends more on its informal authority than legislated rights or responsibilities. The paper suggests that fears of threats to national security resulting from the reforms required for EU accession have made the military more, not less, reluctant to withdraw from the political arena. It concludes that, regardless of the future of Turkey's candidacy, such a withdrawal will be a slow and gradual process, dependent more on changes in Turkish social and political culture and the perceived security environment than in the military itself.

How can the core transatlantic Allies make coalitions more effective?  One year on from Kosovo, disparities in the capabilities of the coalition partners, as well as uneven levels of prior coordination, persist.  To address these problems will require much greater force planning in peacetime.

This stimulating and influential work offers one of the most comprehensive independent assessments to date of the Kosovo campaign, and of the performance of the NATO allies.  An important subject area in which there is a great deal of international interest.

Since the collapse of President Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 and the international intervention in East Timor in 1999, there has been much speculation in South-east Asia and the West over whether Indonesia - weakened by economic difficulties, social distresses and political instability - has a future as a coherent nation-state. This paper argues that although the separatist struggles in Aceh or Papua are unlikely to suceed in the foreseeable future, other problems threaten to undermine the central government's control.

Communal disputes have led to chronic violence in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. Simultaneously, tension between Islamic and secular political forces has grown. Indonesia's disarray has prompted international concern over an array of security threats, including contagious secessionism, Islamic terrorism, the movement through Indonesia of asylum-seekers, piracy and environmental dangers. In order to contain these security implications of Indonesia's protracted crisis, concerned governments should continue assisting its fragile reform process, particularly by helping Jakarta to manage the country's massive international debt. However, they should also coordinate their contingency planning for a further crumbling of Jakarta's authority.

This book analyzes the provision of aid to countries that have undergone negotiated settlements to civil wars, drawing on recent experiences in Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. It focuses on the potential for peace conditionality, linking aid to steps to implement accords and consolidate the peace. The book explores how aid can encourage domestic investment in peace-related needs; the reconciliation of long-run peacebuilding objectives with short-run humanitarian imperatives; and the obstacles that donors' priorities and procedures pose to effective aid for peace. It concludes that investing in peace requires not only the reconstruction of war-torn societies but also the reconstruction of aid itself.

Over the last decade, the failure of countries to emerge from conflict and the rise of 'failed states' has focused attention on state security sectors. External actors involved in 'protectorates' such as Kosovo and East Timor and peace agreements such as Cambodia, El Salvador or Bosnia have come face to face with the problems exposed by factionalised, wrong-sized, dictatorial and non-professional security sectors. Consequently, international institutions, the UN or World Bank, for example, and individual government ministries in countries such as the UK, USA and Germany have been increasingly concerned with promoting security sector reform (SSR).

This paper argues, however, that while there is much discussion about capabilities for SSR and its technical requirements, there has been insufficient analysis of how to mobilise such resources. Three central questions, therefore, are examined: how have the external approaches to SSR evolved and what do they entail; what specific problems does the SSR agenda face operationally; and what concrete policy recommendations for engagment can be drawn from reform experiences to date.