Management, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse – serie

Die elektronische Mundpropaganda beeinflusst maßgeblich die Erwartungsbildung der Konsumenten, sodass Firmen starke Anreize haben, die Informationskanäle strategisch zu manipulieren.

Sebastian Burchhardt develops a game theory model that analyzes the possible behavioral patterns of employees during M&A processes and the impact of such patterns on the success of the transaction itself. The result is the development of a principal-multi-agent model that allows for endogenous contest entry driven by identity. In addition, the model proposes guidance for practical M&A management.

Da bei Vertrauensgütermärkten, wiesie auch im Gesundheitswesen und der Finanzbranche vorkommen, eben dieseInformationsasymmetrie ursächlich für Marktineffizienzen ist und dasbetrügerische Verhalten der Verkäufer erst ermöglicht, wirken die Ergebnissedieser Arbeit intuitiven Vorstellungen entgegen.

Index based insurance schemes can play a vital role in insuring poor people in developing countries against a multitude of risk. Matthias Rödl provides a theoretical framework of index based insurance schemes and further highlights where the latter distinguishes from a classic indemnity insurance.

Stefan T. Webers zeigt, dass durch die Dezentralisierung und Delegation von Entscheidungen fur die Mitarbeiter starkere Anreize entstehen, sich entscheidungsrelevantes Wissen anzueignen, und leitet Implikationen fur die praktische Gestaltung organisatorischer Strukturen und das Management der Wissenspotenziale der Mitarbeiter ab.

The industrial structures in Europe and the United States have changed decisively since the end of the last millennium. The increasing globalization and liberalization of markets have led firms to expand or at least to consolidate their positions in the market by the acquisition of other firms. This mainly concerns horizontal mergers among competitors in the same industry such as the " mega-mergers" between Daimler and Chrysler or between Hochst and Rh6ne-Poulenc. In the theoretical literature this issue has been risen and analyzed quite early, with the result that an important research stream within industrial economics deals with the impact of horizontal mergers on the industrial structure, the competition between firms and consumer welfare. Given that many mergers hold synergies in the field of R&D, this research is especially focused on the analysis of the effects of mergers on innovation efforts of firms and the whole industry. This is where this book starts: While most analyses focus on the cooperation of firms in the frame of process innovation, Claus van der Velden concentrates in his work on product innovation. In a micro economic model of a patent contest he examines the effects of mergers on the innovation process and the profits of the merging firm and its competitors.

Over the last years stock options have become an integral part of the compensation of senior managers in Germany: Originating in the USA in the 1950s, this form of compensation gained increasing popularity among German corporations during the 1990s, so that by today far over 100 German listed companies grant stock option plans to their employees. Based on recent research the average German CEO ("Vor­ standsvorsitzender") receives approximately 10% of his salary in form of stock op­ tions. The ongoing globalisations of business practises as well as the boom of the Neuer Markt have been key drivers of this development. Initially, from an economic perspective the increasing importance of stock option plans in the compensation of senior managers has to be welcomed: Assuming that senior managers through their actions have the ability to influence the stock price of their companies, stock options represent a performance based type of pay that im­ proves the incentives to senior managers to create additional shareholder value. However, this perspective often neglects the potential costs created by such an in­ centive instrument. Several research studies suggest that companies in some cases generate additional costs through the granting of stock options that can exceed the benefits created by their incentive effect.

The constantly growing number of arising referee corruption cases as well as their damage to the integrity of the sports society raises the question of why sports associations started availing themselves of referees as an instrument of contest design in the first place? Cedric Duvinage shows that economic theory allows to develop a deeper understanding of the role of a referee in a contest as well as of the danger of sports corruption by considering a referee’s influence on the competitors’ strategies in a contest. These insights provide the basis for efficient anti-corruption policies as well as their urgent implementation resulting from the current legal ambiguity regarding the prosecution of sports corruption in Germany.

Gerd Schwarz analyzes the pros and cons of shared service centers for the implementation of IT, finance, personnel and purchasing processes and make design suggestions on the empirical study of American public companies are based at 72. It describes how through the development of shared service centers achieved cost and quality improvements and shows based on the transaction cost approach to outsourcing to the differences in detail.

Andreas Hack untersucht, mit welchem Risikokapitalgeber ein junges Unternehmen eine langfristige Beteiligungsbeziehung eingehen sollte und welcher Mehrwert und welche Risiken damit verbunden sind. Er vergleicht die drei wichtigsten Risikokapitalgebergruppen - Venture Capitalists, Corporate Venture Capitalists und Business Angel - und zeigt ihren Einfluss auf den Erfolg von Startups auf.

Dass unsere an natürlichen Ressourcen arme Volkswirtschaft ihr hohes Wohlstandsni­ veau im verschärften globalen Wettbewerb nur in dem Maße aufrecht erhalten kann, als es ihren Arbeitskräften gelingt, überlegene Qualifikationen zu entwickeln, ist eine allge­ mein geteilte, dennoch aber höchst beunruhigende Einsicht. Christian Lukas untersucht in seinem Buch Anreizwirkungen erfolgsabhängiger Vergütungsregelungen auf die Qua­ lifizierungsbemühungen von Arbeitnehmern. Er nimmt dabei strikt den Standpunkt des methodologischen Individualismus ein, legt also die Annahme zu Grunde, dass sich Ar­ beitnehmer individuell rational verhalten und rationale Erwartungen über das Verhalten des Arbeitgebers bilden, der seinerseits ein rationaler Spieler ist. Qualifizierungsanstrengungen von Arbeitskräften sind nicht direkt kontrollierbar, sie spie­ len sich letzten Endes im Kopf des Individuums ab. Beobachtbar sind allenfalls Erfolge und Misserfolge bei der Anwendung der Qualifikation, nicht die Qualifikation selbst und erst recht nicht die wirkliche Qualifizierungsanstrengung. Erfolge und Misserfolge hängen außerdem nicht nur von stochastischen Umwelteinflüssen ab, sondern auch von der An­ strengung beim Einsatz vorhandener Qualifikation. Qualifizierungsanstrengungen können daher nicht im Arbeitsvertrag vereinbart werden, Kontrakte bewirken allenfalls Anreize dazu.