Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture - Böcker

"Time and Transcendence" provides a new theory of secularization in the Catholic context, a new interpretation of the origins of modern historical science, and a new reading of Heidegger's theories of time and history. The author shows how a secular sense of the past evolved in early modern French memoirs. Memoirs uncovered a level of personal experience that was then applied as an intuitive framework for the study of history. Modern history's scientific study of sources is embedded in the imaginative sense of a personal past. 19th-century French Traditionalists countered this threat of a secular past by expanding the concept of tradition to include all of history. Neoscholasticism then canonized philosophy as Catholic tradition, turning the history of philosophy against secular culture. Heidegger's thinking developed in the contexts of both this Catholic counterattack and the "fin-de-siecle" disillusion with secular history. Against "fin-de-siecle" notions of memory as a better way of penetrating the past, Heidegger recast history as future-oriented action.Rejecting both secular culture and religious tradition, he used history as a tool for secularizing religious experiences that secular culture had ignored, such as grace, mystical experience, and death. This book shows that while religion can turn a self-conscious secular culture against itself, ultimately the religious critique of secular culture can also be turned against religion.

Much of contemporary philosophy, political theory, and social thought has been shaped directly or indirectly by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, though there is considerable disagreement about how his work should be understood. He has been described both as a metaphysician and characterized as an ironic narrator who anticipated the character of philosophy after metaphysics. His position is equally ambiguous with regard to his political thought. He has been construed both as an enemy of the liberal state and as a friend of freedom. This volume's revisionist reassessment, building on the scholarship of Klaus Hartmann, explores these ambiguities in favour of a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel's arguments. It also shows how the foundations of his political thought support a liberal democractic state. This reappraisal of Hegel's arguments resituates him as a philosopher who anticipates the difficulties of post-modernity and offers a basis for reassessing ontology, aesthetics, and revolution. Philosophers and those doing work in political theory should find this volume of interest.

This work aims to cover a number of areas: giving an account of Leibniz's philosophy on individuals and the principle of individuation; providing an exploration of Leibniz's earliest philosophy, its sources in later scholastic philosophy, and the influence of those sources on his mature philosophy; and bringing together numerous Latin scholastic and Leibnizian texts, with many translated into English. On the basis of a study of Leibniz's earliest philosophy, an interpretation of central themes in Leibniz's philosophy is offered. This scholarly investigation demonstrates the persistence of premodern ideas in modern philosophy, calling into question in what sense Leibniz is a "modern" philosopher, and how the "modern" should be understood in modern philosophy and postmodernism. The intended audience includes historians of modern and later scholastic philosophy, Leibniz scholars, historians of ideas, philosophers with an interest in ontology and metaphysics, and graduate students in philosophy.

Analytic philosophy has been a dominant intellectual movement in the 20th century and a reflection of the cultural pre-eminence of scientism. In response to analytic philosophy's peculiar reticence (and inability) to discuss itself, this book provides a comprehensive history and critique. The central element in the analytic conversation has been the Enlightenment Project: the appeal to an autonomous human reason, freed of any higher authority and channeling itself through science as its privileged tool. This centrality is demonstrated by systematically examining its presence and development in the philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, language, psychology, social science, ethics, political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. This journey highlights the internal logical disintegration of that project. Post-modern relativism is its natural offspring and not a viable alternative.The Enlightenment Project's conception of physical science is defective; this defective conception of physical science renders the analytic conception of social science, philosophical psychology, and epistemology defective; and that defective conception of the human condition leads to defective conceptions of both moral and political philosophy, specifically the idea of social engineering or social technology. Throughout the book, an alternative conception of philosophy is presented as a way out of the abyss of analysis, an alternative that reconnects philosophy with the mainstream of Western civilization and initiates the process of providing a coherent cultural narrative. This book should be of particular interest to any reader concerned about the lack of a coherent cultural narrative.

Solidarity as a phenomenon lies like an erratic block in the midst of the moral landscape of our age. Until now, the geologists familiar with this landscape, such as ethicists and moral theorists, have taken it for granted and have circumnavigated it in any case. They have also, however, been incapable of moving it. In the present volume, scientists from diverse disciplines discuss and examine the concept of solidarity, its history, its scope and its limits.

As a philosopher, Stephen Erickson considers himself a messenger of sorts and the message he is delivering is a significant one. He argues that we are entering into a new historical moment, a period which will be properly defined by those who come after us, as were the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Erickson predicts a failure and eventual breakdown of traditional values and institutions resulting in a dramatic change in our understanding of human life. This he illustrates with examples from contemporary political, economic and religious circumstances. To lessen the impact of this changeover, which will be initially experienced as global anxiety, Erickson argues that we must do what we can to come into this new era, which he has called "The Age of Thresholding," with a better understanding of our past and present. Some questions should be directed toward our future - over what threshold might we be crossing and what will have been ventured? What will have been gained, and what will be left behind from "The (Coming) Age of Thresholding?"

This argument in favour of subsidizing the arts offers a distinctly political rationale for government support: engaging the arts helps develop the intellectual faculties of judgement. By appealing to art's instrumental ability to educate democratic citizens, the book avoids the most common criticisms of subsidy, namely that it is elitist and paternalistic. For those who oppose subsidy or are undecided, the book maps arts subsidy onto the larger landscape of political liberalism. Yet, while using political liberalism as its point of departure, the book's positive argument for subsidy draws on numerous philosophical traditions, including continental philosophy and the philosophy of art.

This volume is an extensive study of the virtue of temperance. It examines certain interpretive threads of temperance as a virtue beginning in classical philosophy and moving through early to medieval Christian conceptions. Rather than simply offering a normative view of temperance, this book seeks to understand how temperance works to engage and include the experience of emotion in morality. In present-day studies of the psychology of emotion, cognitive theories have reasserted the classical conception of emotion as consisting of both physiological and psychological elements of human personhood. Temperance is the primary virtue in the moral agent's cognitive response to the movements of emotion. Application of the possibilities for this renewal of temperance comes with an examination of how emotion will help moral deliberation in the clinical practice of medicine.

This is a work of historical critical exegesis. It aims to establish the influence of the "Science of Logic" (SL) of G.W.F. Hegel on the "Grundrisse" of Karl Marx. It demonstrates that the Hegelian logic guided Marx's doctrinal development, and that the ordering of the logical categories in the SL is reflected in the ordering of economic categories in the Grundrisse. The Grundrisse are both a critique of political economy, and a critical appropriation of Hegel's SL. Thus, the work establishes that Marx was cognizant of, and respected, the necessity of the development of Hegel's exposition of logical categories of scientific method. The "Grundrisse" can therefore be divided into three sections. Each is distinguished from the others based upon the peculiar logic that is used in the exposition of the particular subject matter that is treated in that section. This work uses a particular form of historical critical exegesis that relies on "concept exegesis" (Begriffsexegese). It attempts to establish that the ideas that are found in one text are related to ideas in another; and, to be more specific, that the logical form of one work is indebted to the logical form of another.The method that is used in concept exegesis is empirical. The text under scrutiny is first broken down into component parts, and further subdivided. The logical form of the argumentation in each part is isolated. It is then compared to the logical form of another text, for purposes of establishing an indebtedness.

Positive Rights in a Republic of Talk will appeal to philosophers and social scientists interested in issues of rights and social justice, and to graduate students and journalists seeking a critical survey of the field. Innumerable recent books have addressed the issues of rights and social justice, but none combines the comprehensiveness, disinterestedness, and brevity found in this work. Positive Rights in a Republic of Talk: -is unique in its critical, let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may approach; -is untainted with special pleading for specific philosophical schools or social policies; -is distinctive in its range, examining the views of classical as well as contemporary thinkers and trendy as well as more established approaches; -is relentless in its confrontation of the abstract with the concrete; -discusses positive rights in such contexts as health care, education, foreign aid, homelessness, welfare, and disaster relief policies; -is distinctive in its prose, which is vivid, engaging, clear, occasionally funny, and never pompous or engorged with jargon; -can be read and enjoyed by serious non-specialists as well as specialists.

Accounts of natural law moral philosophy and theology sought principles and precepts for morality, law, and other forms of social authority, whose prescriptive force was not dependent for validity on human decision, social influence, past tradition, or cultural convention, but through natural reason itself.This volume critically explores and assesses our contemporary culture wars in terms of: the possibility of natural law moral philosophy and theology to provide a unique, content-full, canonical morality; the character and nature of moral pluralism; the limits of justifiable national and international policy seeking to produce and preserve human happiness, social justice, and the common good; the ways in which morality, moral epistemology, and social political reform must be set within the broader context of an appropriately philosophically and theologically anchored anthropology. This work will be of interest to philosophers, theologians, bioethicists, ethicists and political scientists.

The Latin root of the English word culture ties together both worship and the tilling of the soil. In each case, the focus is the same: a rightly-directed culture produces either a bountiful harvest or falls short of the mark, materially or spiritually. This volume critically explores the nature and depth of our contemporary cultural crisis: its lack of traditional orientation and moral understanding. Prime among the issues at stake are the meaning and significance of birth, copulation, suffering, and death, expressed in debates regarding human embryo-experimentation and stem cell research, the character of moral and scientific norms, as well as more fundamentally, the character of an adequate epistemology for coming to appreciate the deep nature of reality and its normative implications. Given varying background ontological, epistemological, and axiological presuppositions, different moral positions and political objections will appear as not merely morally permissible but as socially and politically obligatory.

The present work has emerged as the result of several years' involvementin various multidisciplinary research projects which have been carried out within the - search Programme in Biomedical Ethics at Uppsala University, now the Centre for Bioethics at Karolinska Institutet and Uppsala University. I am grateful to various colleagues who have taken part, whether brie?y or at length, in discussions of the concepts of privacy and integrity. Hearty thanks must go to Gert Helgesson, Ulrik von Essen, Par Segerdahland Richard Wessman who have read the initial version of the book and provideduseful comments. I am particularlyindebted to Par for taking the trouble to read the whole manuscript a second time. Arne Ohman and his - searchgroupatthe PsychologySectionin theDepartmentofClinical Neurosciences at Karolinska Institutet read an earlier version of Chapters 3 and 4. This provided a constructive and rewarding discussion which was of particular value to me since psychologydid not form part of my own professionaltraining. Sven Danielsson and the members of his research seminar in practical philosophy at Uppsala University read Chapters 5 and 6 and offered constructivecriticism.Their critical views helped me to try to express more clearly the aim of these chapters within the framework of the book as a whole. All the readers of the book or parts of it can certainly have reason to wish for further revisions or indeed for a different presentation of the problem of understanding the role of the agent in the private sphere.

This book examines the views of Hermann Helmholtz, Hermann Cohen and Gottlob Frege in reaction to the epistemic crises induced by rapid changes in 19th century scientific practice.

This book examines the views of Hermann Helmholtz, Hermann Cohen and Gottlob Frege in reaction to the epistemic crises induced by rapid changes in 19th century scientific practice.

Critics argue that sex robots present a clear risk to real persons and a social degradation that will increase sexual violence, objectify women, encourage pedophilia, reinforce negative body images, increase forms of sexual dysfunction, and pass on sexually transmitted disease.

Critics argue that sex robots present a clear risk to real persons and a social degradation that will increase sexual violence, objectify women, encourage pedophilia, reinforce negative body images, increase forms of sexual dysfunction, and pass on sexually transmitted disease.

This book explores an undeveloped area in postmodern thought: organizational ethics. Health Care organizations make policy decisions that affect every aspect of a patient’s care from admission to treatment and the types of care that are or are not offered.

This book explores an undeveloped area in postmodern thought: organizational ethics. Health Care organizations make policy decisions that affect every aspect of a patient’s care from admission to treatment and the types of care that are or are not offered.

This book offers a timely intervention in the discourses around transhumanism, posthumanism, and phenomenology, aspiring to inaugurate a turning in Western thought in the direction of a more phenomenologically oriented consideration of what it means to be human and of what it might mean to be “posthuman.” It gathers important contributions from both established and new scholarly voices to each of the literatures on phenomenology, humanism, and posthumanism, as well as to the much scantier literature on phenomenology and posthumanism.The book treats “posthumanism(s)” primarily in terms of transhumanism and critical posthumanism but also includes consideration of alternative posthumanisms either extant or conceivable, including forms of “phenomenological posthumanism.” By “phenomenology” is primarily meant the tradition of transcendental methodology forged by Edmund Husserl and further developed by such figures as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas, among others. In relation to each of the movements of phenomenology, humanism(s), and posthumanism(s), the chapters in this volume propose new understandings of long-discussed topics, offer alternatives to standard accounts, introduce and explicate neglected figures and movements, provide case studies of exemplary issues, and more.  The book is divided into four main parts: “Part I: Humanism(s),” “Part II: Posthumanism(s),” “Part III: Transhumanism,” and “Part IV: Humans, Nonhumans, and Posthumans.”

This book offers a new discourse-theoretical framework for understanding the aesthetic and ethical dimensions of our relationship to nature by drawing on the tradition of Critical Theory. It traces an overlooked thread in the works of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Adorno—one that shows how nonhuman beings can make normative claims on us not through language, but through visible, audible, and tactile forms of expression. By recovering this thread, this text proposes an alternative approach to recognition and agency that does not exclusively rely on linguistic mediation. In doing so, it links aesthetics and ethics in an original way, offering an important contribution to environmental political theory. The book also offers a critical response to the limitations of current communicative models—particularly those shaped by the legacy of Habermas and argues for a broader conception of communication that includes nonhuman forms of expression. Rather than treating nature as a system to be described or a resource to be managed, it explores how natural beings appear to us as expressive presences—capable of evoking care, respect, and responsibility. It is intended for scholars and graduate students in political theory, philosophy, Critical Theory, and environmental humanities. Individual chapters are suitable for advanced seminars on the philosophical foundations of ecological thought and discourse ethics.

Descartes’s concern with the proper method of belief formation is evident in the titles of his works—e.g., The Search after Truth, The Rules for the Direction of the Mind and The Discourse on Method of rightly conducting one’s reason and seeking the truth in the sciences. It is most apparent, however, in his famous discussions, both in the Meditations and in the Principles, of one particularly noteworthy source of our doxastic errors—namely, the misuse of one’s will. What is not widely recognized, let alone appreciated and understood, is the relationship between his concern with belief formation and his concern with virtue. In fact, few seem to realize that Descartes regards doxastic errors as moral errors and as sins both because such errors are intrinsically vicious and because they entail notably deleterious social consequences.Reforming the Art of Living seeks to rectify this rather common oversight in two ways. First, it aims to elucidate the nature of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation. Second, it aims both (i) to illuminate the social significance of Descartes’s philosophical program as it relates to the understanding and practice not of science, but of religion and (ii) to develop a kind of Leibnizian critique of this aspect of his program. More specifically, it aims to show that Descartes’s project is “dangerous,” insofar as it is subversive not only of traditional Christianity but also of other traditional forms of religion, both in theory and in practice.

Descartes’s concern with the proper method of belief formation is evident in the titles of his works—e.g., The Search after Truth, The Rules for the Direction of the Mind and The Discourse on Method of rightly conducting one’s reason and seeking the truth in the sciences. It is most apparent, however, in his famous discussions, both in the Meditations and in the Principles, of one particularly noteworthy source of our doxastic errors—namely, the misuse of one’s will. What is not widely recognized, let alone appreciated and understood, is the relationship between his concern with belief formation and his concern with virtue. In fact, few seem to realize that Descartes regards doxastic errors as moral errors and as sins both because such errors are intrinsically vicious and because they entail notably deleterious social consequences.Reforming the Art of Living seeks to rectify this rather common oversight in two ways. First, it aims to elucidate the nature of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation. Second, it aims both (i) to illuminate the social significance of Descartes’s philosophical program as it relates to the understanding and practice not of science, but of religion and (ii) to develop a kind of Leibnizian critique of this aspect of his program. More specifically, it aims to show that Descartes’s project is “dangerous,” insofar as it is subversive not only of traditional Christianity but also of other traditional forms of religion, both in theory and in practice.

The outbreak of World War I in August 1914,set in chain a series of crises and re-configurations, which have continued to shape the world for a century: industrialized slaughter, the end of colonialism and European empires, the rise of the USA, economic crises, fascism, Soviet Marxism, the gulags and the Shoah.

This book represents a series of incursions or philosophical forays between realms of Byzantine and Russian thought and territory long claimed by Western philosophy and theology.

Western philosophy has long nurtured the hope to resolve moral controversies through reason; thereby to secure moral direction and human meaning without the need for a defining encounter with God or the transcendent. The expectation is for a moral rationality that is universal and able adequately to frame and guide the moral life. Moral and cultural unity was sought though philosophical reflection on human nature and the basic goods of a properly nurtured and virtuous life—that is, through appeal to what has come to be called the natural law.The natural law addresses permissible moral choice through objective understandings of human nature and human goods. Persons are obligated to act in ways that are compatible with creating and integrating the basic human goods into their lives and the lives of others. Such goods provide the basis for practical reasoning about virtuous choices and immediate reasons for action. The goal is the making of rational choices in the pursuit of a virtuous, flourishing, human life. Natural law theorists have argued extensively against human cloning, abortion, and same-gender marriage.Yet, whose assumptions regarding human nature should guide our understanding of the basic goods that mark the full flourishing human life? Moreover, why should nature, even human nature, be thought of as a moral boundary beyond which one must not trespass? Persons may wish actively to direct human evolution, utilizing the tools of both imagination and biotechnology. Perhaps nature is simply a challenge to be addressed, overcome, and set aside.This volume is a critical exploration of natural law theory.

Contrasting with conventional Neo-Confucian attempts to recast the Confucian heritage in light of modern Western values, this book offers a Reconstructionist Confucian project to reclaim Confucian resources to meet contemporary moral and public policy challenges. Ruiping Fan argues that popular accounts of human goods and social justice within the dominant individualist culture of the West are too insubstantial to direct a life of virtue and a proper structure of society. Instead, he demonstrates that the moral insights of Confucian thought are precisely those needed to fill the moral vacuum developing in post-communist China and to address similar problems in the West. The book has a depth of reflection on the Confucian tradition through a comparative philosophical strategy and a breadth of contemporary issues addressed unrivaled by any other work on these topics. It is the first in English to explore not only the endeavor to revive Confucianism in contemporary China, but also brings such an endeavor to bear upon the important ethical, social, and political difficulties being faced in 21st century China. The book should be of interest to any philosopher working in application of traditional Chinese philosophy to contemporary issues as well as any reader interested in comparative cultural and ethical studies.

In this study of Hegel's philosophy, Brinkmann undertakes to defend Hegel's claim to objective knowledge by bringing out the transcendental strategy underlying Hegel's argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic. Hegel's metaphysical commitments are shown to become moot through this transcendental reading. Starting with a survey of current debates about the possibility of objective knowledge, the book next turns to the original formulation of the transcendental argument in favor of a priori knowledge in Kant's First Critique. Through a close reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Hegel's critique of it, Brinkmann tries to show that Hegel develops an immanent critique of Kant's position that informs his reformulation of the transcendental project in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the formulation of the position of 'objective thought' in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Brinkmann takes the reader through the strategic junctures of the argument of the Phenomenology that establishes the position of objective thinking with which the Logic begins. A critical examination of the Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy shows that Hegel's metaphysical doctrine of the self-externalization of spirit need not compromise the ontological project of the Logic and thus does not burden the position of objective thought with pre-critical metaphysical claims.Brinkmann's book is a remarkable achievement. He has given us what may be the definitive version of the transcendental, categorial interpretation of Hegel. He does this in a clear approachable style punctuated with a dry wit, and he fearlessly takes on the arguments and texts that are the most problematic for this interpretation. Throughout the book, he situates Hegel firmly in his own context and that of contemporary discussion." -Terry P. Pinkard, University Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, USA"Klaus Brinkmann’s important Hegel study reads the Phenomenology and the Logic as aspects of a single sustained effort, in turning from categories to concepts, to carry Kant’s Copernican turn beyond the critical philosophy in what constitutes a major challenge to contemporary Cartesianism."- Tom Rockmore, McAnulty College Distinguished Professor, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA"In this compelling reconstruction of the theme of objective thought, Klaus Brinkmann takes the reader through Hegel’s dialectic with exceptional philosophical acumen.... Many aspects of this book are striking: the complete mastery of the central tenets of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy, the admirable clarity in treating obscure texts and very difficult problems, and how Brinkmann uses his expertise for a discussion of the problems of truth, objectivity and normativity relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate. This will prove to be a very important book, one that every serious student of Kant and Hegel will have to read."- Alfredo Ferrarin, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

This book is most easily described as philosophy of history; however, this descr- tion may be a little misleading. Truly, this is a work of applied philosophy that was originally conceived not in a philosophy seminar but in a school of public policy. As a philosopher learning about the study of public policy formation, I was f- quently struck by what I perceived to be two very different sets of assumptions and methods at work. I found these assumptions and methods to be mutually exclusive conceptually, but they were often employed simultaneously. On the one hand, it was often accepted as given when studying past policy changes and political events that history is shaped by impersonal forces, that p- ple’s actions can, and ought only to be understood as manifestations of their own material interests, and that individuals are to be identi?ed as representatives of their respective demographic categories. Thus, for example, the events in question were explained in terms of the race or class of the various parties. When such an approach was challenged with an appeal to the actual arguments and stated rationales of the participants of the historical moment in question, this was taken to be an option that might be employed either in conjunction with the former method or as an alter- tive. Which method one chose to emphasize or employ exclusively seemed more a function of inclination or intuition than rational adjudication.