Routledge INEM Advances in Economic Methodology – serie

Are human beings motivated exclusively by self-interest? The orthodox theory of rational choice in economics thinks that they are. Amartya Sen disagrees, and his concept commitment is central to his vision of an alternative to mainstream rational choice theory. This book examines commitment as it has evolved in Sen's critique of orthodox rational choice theory. The in-depth focus on commitment reveals subtleties in the concept itself as well as in its relationships with other concepts which Sen develops in his critique of rational choice theory, for example preference, sympathy, weakness of will, agency, personhood, social norms, rights, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. The book provides a comprehensive understanding of commitment and offers novel interpretations of the term as a way of strengthening its plausibility. Broadly in support of Sen’s conceptualization of rational choice, the book nevertheless reveals ambiguities and weaknesses in Sen’s conceptual framework, and it reformulates Sen’s concepts when doing so strengthens the claims he makes. The book also engages with critics of Sen and argues for the importance of commitment as a component in the theory of rational choice.

The goal of behavioural economics is to improve the explanatory and predictive power of economics. This can be achieved by using theoretical and methodological resources of psychology. Its fundamental idea is that the relationship between psychology and economics cannot be subsumed under standard philosophical accounts of intertheoretical relations. Philosophical Problems of Behavioural Economics argues that behavioural economics is best understood as an attempt to deidealize economic theory guided by psychological research. Behavioural economics deconstructs the model of decision-making by adding different elements. Based on this understanding behavioural economics has a number of tasks: first, it has to identify which economic theory needs to be challenged; second it aims to identify factors which need to be modelled within economic theories of choice and modify the theory accordingly; and finally, it has to create models that explain economic phenomena based on the new theory. This book analyses the different stages of this deconstruction process and shows how the scientific disciplines of economics and psychology are connected by it.This volume develops a new account of intertheoretical relations based on the idea of deidealization and thus contributes to debates within the philosophy of social science. It is suitable for those who are interested in or study economic theory and philosophy, economic psychology and philosophy of social science.

Approximately one in six top economic research papers draws an explicitly causal conclusion. But what do economists mean when they conclude that A ‘causes’ B? Does ‘cause’ say that we can influence B by intervening on A, or is it only a label for the correlation of variables? Do quantitative analyses of observational data followed by such causal inferences constitute sufficient grounds for guiding economic policymaking? The Philosophy of Causality in Economics addresses these questions by analyzing the meaning of causal claims made by economists and the philosophical presuppositions underlying the research methods used. The book considers five key causal approaches: the regularity approach, probabilistic theories, counterfactual theories, mechanisms, and interventions and manipulability. Each chapter opens with a summary of literature on the relevant approach and discusses its reception among economists. The text details case studies, and goes on to examine papers which have adopted the approach in order to highlight the methods of causal inference used in contemporary economics. It analyzes the meaning of the causal claim put forward, and finally reconstructs the philosophical presuppositions accepted implicitly by economists. The strengths and limitations of each method of causal inference are also considered in the context of using the results as evidence for policymaking.This book is essential reading to those interested in literature on the philosophy of economics, as well as the philosophy of causality and economic methodology in general.

Approximately one in six top economic research papers draws an explicitly causal conclusion. But what do economists mean when they conclude that A ‘causes’ B? Does ‘cause’ say that we can influence B by intervening on A, or is it only a label for the correlation of variables? Do quantitative analyses of observational data followed by such causal inferences constitute sufficient grounds for guiding economic policymaking? The Philosophy of Causality in Economics addresses these questions by analyzing the meaning of causal claims made by economists and the philosophical presuppositions underlying the research methods used. The book considers five key causal approaches: the regularity approach, probabilistic theories, counterfactual theories, mechanisms, and interventions and manipulability. Each chapter opens with a summary of literature on the relevant approach and discusses its reception among economists. The text details case studies, and goes on to examine papers which have adopted the approach in order to highlight the methods of causal inference used in contemporary economics. It analyzes the meaning of the causal claim put forward, and finally reconstructs the philosophical presuppositions accepted implicitly by economists. The strengths and limitations of each method of causal inference are also considered in the context of using the results as evidence for policymaking.This book is essential reading to those interested in literature on the philosophy of economics, as well as the philosophy of causality and economic methodology in general.

The links between self-interest and morality have been examined in moral philosophy since Plato. Economics is a mostly value-free discipline, having lost its original ethical dimension as described by Adam Smith. Examining moral philosophy through the framework provided by economics offers new insights into both disciplines and the discussion on the origins and nature of morality.The Morality of Economic Behaviour: Economics as Ethics argues that moral behaviour does not need to be exogenously encouraged or enforced because morality is a side effect of interactions between self-interested agents. The argument relies on two important parameters: behaviour in a social environment and the effects of intertemporal choice on rational behaviour. Considering social structures and repeated interactions on rational maximisation allows an argument for the morality of economic behaviour. Amoral agents interacting within society can reach moral outcomes. Thus, economics becomes a synthesis of moral and rational choice theory bypassing the problems of ethics in economic behaviour whilst promoting moral behaviour and ethical outcomes. This approach sheds new light on practical issues such as economic policy, business ethics and social responsibility.This book is of interest primarily to students of politics, economics and philosophy but will also appeal to anyone who is interested in morality and ethics, and their relationship with self-interest.

Central banks and other policymaking institutions use causal hypotheses to justify macroeconomic policy decisions to the public and public institutions. These hypotheses say that changes in one macroeconomic aggregate (e.g. aggregate demand) cause changes in other macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. in inflation). An important (perhaps the most important) goal of macroeconomists is to provide conclusive evidence in support of these hypotheses. If they cannot provide any conclusive evidence, then policymaking institutions will be unable to use causal hypotheses to justify policy decisions, and then the scientific objectivity of macroeconomic policy analysis will be questionable.The book analyzes the accounts of causality that have been or can be proposed to capture the type of causality that underlies macroeconomic policy analysis, the empirical methods of causal inference that contemporary macroeconomists have at their disposal, and the conceptions of scientific objectivity that traditionally play a role in economics. The book argues that contemporary macroeconomists cannot provide any conclusive evidence in support of causal hypotheses, and that macroeconomic policy analysis doesn’t qualify as scientifically objective in any of the traditional meanings. The book also considers a number of steps that might have to be taken in order for macroeconomic policy analysis to become more objective.The book addresses philosophers of science and economics as well as (macro-) economists, econometricians and statisticians who are interested in causality and macro-econometric methods of causal inference and their wider philosophical and social context.

Central banks and other policymaking institutions use causal hypotheses to justify macroeconomic policy decisions to the public and public institutions. These hypotheses say that changes in one macroeconomic aggregate (e.g. aggregate demand) cause changes in other macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. in inflation). An important (perhaps the most important) goal of macroeconomists is to provide conclusive evidence in support of these hypotheses. If they cannot provide any conclusive evidence, then policymaking institutions will be unable to use causal hypotheses to justify policy decisions, and then the scientific objectivity of macroeconomic policy analysis will be questionable.The book analyzes the accounts of causality that have been or can be proposed to capture the type of causality that underlies macroeconomic policy analysis, the empirical methods of causal inference that contemporary macroeconomists have at their disposal, and the conceptions of scientific objectivity that traditionally play a role in economics. The book argues that contemporary macroeconomists cannot provide any conclusive evidence in support of causal hypotheses, and that macroeconomic policy analysis doesn’t qualify as scientifically objective in any of the traditional meanings. The book also considers a number of steps that might have to be taken in order for macroeconomic policy analysis to become more objective.The book addresses philosophers of science and economics as well as (macro-) economists, econometricians and statisticians who are interested in causality and macro-econometric methods of causal inference and their wider philosophical and social context.

Economists do more than merely describe an external economic world. They shape it in the image of their theories and models. This idea, following the philosophy of language, puts forward that economic theories are performative, and not only descriptive. This idea has become a powerful critique of the scientificity of economics since it removes the idea of an external world against which our description could be evaluated as truth. If any theory can become true, there are no true theories per se because there is no such thing as a pre-existing economy to describe. Is such a relativist stance a fatality? This is the question at stake in this book. Furthermore, the author asks if any theory is able to ‘perform’ the social reality, or are there actually some limits to performativity? For philosophers, a performative statement is a statement that cannot fail to mean something, but can fail to do what it calls for. The state of the world may or may not be changed; the performative statement may be happy or unhappy. In economic terms, this can be interpreted as: some theories change the world while some do not. This book argues that this possibility of failure, a perspective previously missing from discussions on the subject, should be at the heart of any definition of failure.Taking on the question of why some theories change the world while others do not, this volume will be of interest to those studying advances courses on the philosophy of economics as well as those studying and researching in the areas of the philosophy of sciences and sociology of science and economics.

The Philosophy of Economics primarily considers the economic agent as a moral subject. Economics, however, has long overlooked the agent’s moral – that is to say, reasonable – dimension, to focus instead on the strictly rational. This volume seeks to address this neglected topic through exploring the Individual and the Other.The economic agent refers to "himself" (herself) in terms of his desire and passions, yet also refers to others besides himself. For the rational economic agent, what is the nature of this relationship with the Other? Should it not be understood as undergoing a transformation once we come to consider the economic agent as a reasonable being? Through what process does the Other pass from being an instrument at the disposal of a rational agent to being an end in itself for a moral subject? In other words, how does another become "an Other"? These questions are behind the re-examination of certain fundamental notions which takes place in this book, an examination which involves a re-reading of certain great authors. With contributions from authors around the world, this work is divided into three main parts. The first deals with individuals from the history of economic thought such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt; this is then followed by a thematic section in which the concepts of recognition and subjectivity are questioned in a market context. Finally, the third part offers an analysis of the issue of "the Individual and the Other" in different fields of the recent economic analysis including game theory, decision theory or social choice.The Individual and the Other in Economic Thought aims to help the reader better understand how the relationship between the Individual and the Other has been conceived, conceptualized and framed in economic analysis. It will be of great use to graduate students, scholars and any reader interested in this crucial issue.

With the failure of economics to predict the recent economic crisis, the image of economics as a rigorous mathematical science has been subjected to increasing interrogation. One explanation for this failure is that the subject took a wrong turn in its historical trajectory, becoming too mathematical. Using the philosophy of mathematics, this unique book re-examines this trajectory.Philosophy of Mathematics and Economics re-analyses the divergent rationales for mathematical economics by some of its principal architects. Yet, it is not limited to simply enhancing our understanding of how economics became an applied mathematical science. The authors also critically evaluate developments in the philosophy of mathematics to expose the inadequacy of aspects of mainstream mathematical economics, as well as exploiting the same philosophy to suggest alternative ways of rigorously formulating economic theory for our digital age. This book represents an innovative attempt to more fully understand the complexity of the interaction between developments in the philosophy of mathematics and the process of formalisation in economics.Assuming no expert knowledge in the philosophy of mathematics, this work is relevant to historians of economic thought and professional philosophers of economics. In addition, it will be of great interest to those who wish to deepen their appreciation of the economic contours of contemporary society. It is also hoped that mathematical economists will find this work informative and engaging.

Economists have long grappled with the problem of how economic theories relate to empirical evidence: how can abstract mathematized theories be used to produce empirical claims? How are such theories applied to economic phenomena? What does it mean to “test” economic theories? This book introduces, explains, and develops a structural philosophy of economics which addresses these questions and provides a unifying philosophical/logical basis for a general methodology of economics.The book begins by introducing a rigorous view of the logical foundations and structure of scientific theories based upon the work of Alfred Tarski, Patrick Suppes, Karl Marx, and others. Using and combining their methods, the book then goes on to reconstruct important economic theories – including utility theory, game theory, Marxian economics, Sraffian economic theory, and econometrics – proving all the main theorems and discussing the key claims and the empirical applicability of each theory. Through these discussions, this book presents, in a systematic fashion, a general philosophy of economics grounded in the structural view.Offering rigorous formulations of important economic theories, A Structuralist Theory of Economics will be invaluable to all readers interested in the logic, philosophy, and methodology of economics. It will also appeal particularly to those interested in economic theory.

‘Situational Analysis’ represents Karl Popper’s methodological proposal for the social sciences. Although it has been widely studied and interpreted, this book argues that Situational Analysis remains underestimated and undeveloped and, if properly reformulated, could yet become a broad methodological framework that encompasses both the ‘historical’ social sciences and a large section of the ‘theoretical’ social sciences.The first part of this book develops this idea by returning to Popper’s texts. This book calls for both a reformulation of Situational Analysis and a clarification of the status and role of Popper’s ‘Rationality Principle’. This book also develops Situational Analysis by addressing two aspects of the Problem-Situation facing individual actors that are only sketched out in Popper’s work: institutions and expectations. The second part of this book utilizes the reformulated version of Situational Analysis to shed light on the core methodological differences across some of the most widespread approaches in contemporary economics and sociology. In particular, by showing that many of these approaches are variants of the reformulated version of Situational Analysis presented in the first part of this book, this book argues that apparent methodological differences across these approaches may be reinterpreted as differences in the way social scientists reconstruct the Problem-Situation facing individual actors.This book will be vital reading for academic economists, sociologists, philosophers of science, and other social scientists interested in methodology.

‘Situational Analysis’ represents Karl Popper’s methodological proposal for the social sciences. Although it has been widely studied and interpreted, this book argues that Situational Analysis remains underestimated and undeveloped and, if properly reformulated, could yet become a broad methodological framework that encompasses both the ‘historical’ social sciences and a large section of the ‘theoretical’ social sciences.The first part of this book develops this idea by returning to Popper’s texts. This book calls for both a reformulation of Situational Analysis and a clarification of the status and role of Popper’s ‘Rationality Principle’. This book also develops Situational Analysis by addressing two aspects of the Problem-Situation facing individual actors that are only sketched out in Popper’s work: institutions and expectations. The second part of this book utilizes the reformulated version of Situational Analysis to shed light on the core methodological differences across some of the most widespread approaches in contemporary economics and sociology. In particular, by showing that many of these approaches are variants of the reformulated version of Situational Analysis presented in the first part of this book, this book argues that apparent methodological differences across these approaches may be reinterpreted as differences in the way social scientists reconstruct the Problem-Situation facing individual actors.This book will be vital reading for academic economists, sociologists, philosophers of science, and other social scientists interested in methodology.

Are human beings motivated exclusively by self-interest? The orthodox theory of rational choice in economics thinks that they are. Amartya Sen disagrees, and his concept commitment is central to his vision of an alternative to mainstream rational choice theory. This book examines commitment as it has evolved in Sen's critique of orthodox rational choice theory. The in-depth focus on commitment reveals subtleties in the concept itself as well as in its relationships with other concepts which Sen develops in his critique of rational choice theory, for example preference, sympathy, weakness of will, agency, personhood, social norms, rights, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. The book provides a comprehensive understanding of commitment and offers novel interpretations of the term as a way of strengthening its plausibility. Broadly in support of Sen’s conceptualization of rational choice, the book nevertheless reveals ambiguities and weaknesses in Sen’s conceptual framework, and it reformulates Sen’s concepts when doing so strengthens the claims he makes. The book also engages with critics of Sen and argues for the importance of commitment as a component in the theory of rational choice.

With the failure of economics to predict the recent economic crisis, the image of economics as a rigorous mathematical science has been subjected to increasing interrogation. One explanation for this failure is that the subject took a wrong turn in its historical trajectory, becoming too mathematical. Using the philosophy of mathematics, this unique book re-examines this trajectory.Philosophy of Mathematics and Economics re-analyses the divergent rationales for mathematical economics by some of its principal architects. Yet, it is not limited to simply enhancing our understanding of how economics became an applied mathematical science. The authors also critically evaluate developments in the philosophy of mathematics to expose the inadequacy of aspects of mainstream mathematical economics, as well as exploiting the same philosophy to suggest alternative ways of rigorously formulating economic theory for our digital age. This book represents an innovative attempt to more fully understand the complexity of the interaction between developments in the philosophy of mathematics and the process of formalisation in economics.Assuming no expert knowledge in the philosophy of mathematics, this work is relevant to historians of economic thought and professional philosophers of economics. In addition, it will be of great interest to those who wish to deepen their appreciation of the economic contours of contemporary society. It is also hoped that mathematical economists will find this work informative and engaging.

This intriguing new book examines and analyses the role of critical realism in economics and specifically how this line of thought can be applied to the real world. With contributions from such varying commentators as Sheila Dow, Wendy Olsen and Fred Lee, this new book is unique in its approach and will be of great interest to both economic methodologists and those involved in applied economic studies.

Originally published over two decades ago, this classic text within the philosophy of economics is a tour de force against revealed preference. It critically examines the research programme carried out by the Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson on the revealed preference approach to the theory of consumer behaviour. It also challenges two essential premises:* that the programme has been completed * that the various contributions of Samuelson are mutually consistent.This text contains a new preface by Wong, in which he provides a detailed insight into the origins of his pioneering text, and a new introduction from Philip Mirowski, analyzing the impact The Foundation of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory has had on the discipline of economics as well as explaining why it remains core reading for economists today.The defining statement of economic method, this book will be of interest to economists everywhere.

The rhetoric of economics has long claimed scientific objectivity, however the late, great economist Joan Robinson argued that ‘the purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists.’ This unique book examines the use of rhetoric in economics, focusing on the work of Deirdre McCloskey and other major economic philosophers. McCloskey is one of the most recognizable names in economics, yet this is the first real attempt to analyze her work in book form. She views economics as a language that uses all the rhetorical devices of everyday conversation, and her controversial standpoint on judging economics by aesthetic and literary standards has been hugely influential. Utilizing the views of Derrida and Foucualt amongst others, Benjamin Balak analyzes McCloskey’s major texts and critically evaluates the linguistic, literary and philosophical approaches they introduce. This long overdue examination of the methodological and philosophical consequences of McCloskey’s work will be of interest to philosophers and economists alike.

This new book, under the impressive editorship of Thomas Boylan and Paschal O'Gorman, explores a number of major themes central to the work of Karl Popper.The tensions that have resulted from Popperian thought are well documented. How can mainstream orthodox economics be falsifiable while privileging its core of rationality as unquestionable? This book includes expert contributions from thinkers such as Tony Lawson, K. Vela Velupillai and John McCall, who discuss this issue with renewed academic rigour.

Economics is dominated by model building, therefore a comprehension of how such models work is vital to understanding the discipline. This book provides a critical analysis of the economist's favourite tool, and as such will be an enlightening read for some, and an intriguing one for others.

What is the correct concept behind measures of inflation? Does money cause business activity or is it the other way around? Shall we stimulate growth by raising aggregate demand or rather by lowering taxes and thereby providing incentives to produce? Policy-relevant questions such as these are of immediate and obvious importance to the welfare of societies. The standard approach in dealing with them is to build a model, based on economic theory, answer the question for the model world and then apply the results to economic phenomena outside. Data come in, if at all, only in testing a limited number of the model's consequences. Despite some critical voices, economic methodology too has by and large subscribed to a "theory first" approach to applied economics.Error in Economics systematically develops an alternative to the theory-based orthodoxy. It places the methodical study of evidence at the centre of the scientific enterprise and thus provides a foundation for a methodology of evidence-based economics. But the book does not stop at the truism that claims should be based on the best available evidence. Rather, detailed studies in the areas of measurement, causal inference and policy analysis show what it means for a claim to be evidence-based in the context of a concrete case. The examples discussed concern topics as diverse as consumer price indices, radio spectrum auctions, the transmission mechanism, natural experiments on minimum wages and the evaluation of counterfactuals for policy.Error in Economics is essential reading for economic methodologists, philosophers of science and anyone interested in how claims about socio-economic matters are validated.

This is a book about one of the most controversial concepts in economics: the invisible hand. The author explores the unintended social consequences implied by the invisible hand and discusses the mechanisms that bring about these consequences.The book questions, examines and explicates the strengths and weaknesses of invisible-hand explanations concerning the emergence of institutions and macro-social structures, from a methodological and philosophical perspective. Aydinonat analyses paradigmatic examples of invisible-hand explanations such as Carl Menger’s ‘Origin of Money’ and Thomas Schelling’s famous checkerboard model of residential segregation in relation to contemporary models of emergence of money and segregation. Based on this analysis, he provides a fresh look at the philosophical literature on models and explanation and develops a philosophical framework for interpreting invisible-hand type of explanations in economics and elsewhere. Finally, the author applies this framework to recent game theoretic models of institutions and outlines the way in which they should be evaluated.

Economics is dominated by model building, therefore a comprehension of how such models work is vital to understanding the discipline. This book provides a critical analysis of the economist's favourite tool, and as such will be an enlightening read for some, and an intriguing one for others.

Originally published over two decades ago, this classic text within the philosophy of economics is a tour de force against revealed preference. It critically examines the research programme carried out by the Nobel Prize winner Paul Samuelson on the revealed preference approach to the theory of consumer behaviour. It also challenges two essential premises:* that the programme has been completed * that the various contributions of Samuelson are mutually consistent.This text contains a new preface by Wong, in which he provides a detailed insight into the origins of his pioneering text, and a new introduction from Philip Mirowski, analyzing the impact The Foundation of Paul Samuelson’s Revealed Preference Theory has had on the discipline of economics as well as explaining why it remains core reading for economists today.The defining statement of economic method, this book will be of interest to economists everywhere.

Economics is often defined as the science of choice or human action. But choice and action are essentially mental phenomena, an aspect rarely mentioned in the economics discourse. Choice, while not always a conscious or rational process, is held to involve beliefs, desires, intentions and arguably even free will. Actions are often opposed to mere bodily movements, with the former being in some sense only understandable in reference to mental processes while the latter are understandable in entirely non-mental, physical terms. While philosophers have long concerned themselves with the connections between these concepts, economists have tended to steer clear of what might appear to be an a priori debate. At the same time, philosophers working on these important notions have tended to not dirty their hands with the empirical, real-world applications in which economists are specialized. This volume fills these gaps by bringing economists and philosophers of mind together to explore the intersection of their disciplines.

This is a book about one of the most controversial concepts in economics: the invisible hand. The author explores the unintended social consequences implied by the invisible hand and discusses the mechanisms that bring about these consequences.The book questions, examines and explicates the strengths and weaknesses of invisible-hand explanations concerning the emergence of institutions and macro-social structures, from a methodological and philosophical perspective. Aydinonat analyses paradigmatic examples of invisible-hand explanations such as Carl Menger’s ‘Origin of Money’ and Thomas Schelling’s famous checkerboard model of residential segregation in relation to contemporary models of emergence of money and segregation. Based on this analysis, he provides a fresh look at the philosophical literature on models and explanation and develops a philosophical framework for interpreting invisible-hand type of explanations in economics and elsewhere. Finally, the author applies this framework to recent game theoretic models of institutions and outlines the way in which they should be evaluated.

When President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher adopted the neoliberal doctrine as the paradigm of economics, there was no evidence that the move would have been successful, but thirty years on, the recurrent crises that culminated in 2008 suggest a serious mis-match between expectations and outcomes: a re-examination of the paradigm is in order. This book focuses on Milton Friedman’s formulation of the neoliberal doctrine, and analyses two aspects that were essential to turning it into a fully-fledged paradigm: the attribution of scientific status to positive economics, which led to informing public policies on the requirements of the market; and the characterisation of economic freedom as capable of promoting political freedom, which led to identifying free market with democracy. The book exposes Friedman’s methodological argument for attributing positive economics scientific status as a failure, and his characterisation of economic freedom as a delusion; it identifies in the emergence as the mainstream in economics of the neoclassical synthesis, which borrowed from Walras’ the mathematical treatment of equilibrium but not the ethical and social framework in which it was inscribed, a development that facilitated the transition from the Keynesian to the neoliberal paradigm. Dr. Mosini shows that the gigantic bail-outs carried out courtesy of the public purse, which institutionalised the practice of collectivising losses while keeping profits private, were no accident, but the consequence of the rethinking of the function of lender of last resort according to Friedman’s conception of rationality in relation to risk, combined with his interpretation of the 1930s recession. The book concludes that the neoliberal paradigm has served the interests of the economically powerful social strata it was designed to benefit extremely well, but that the deep, and deepening, injustice it has brought about calls for a complete rethinking of the paradigm of economics according to ethical principles respectful of human values. This book should be of interest to students and researchers of Political Economy, Economic Methodology, History of Economic Thought and Philosophy.

What is the correct concept behind measures of inflation? Does money cause business activity or is it the other way around? Shall we stimulate growth by raising aggregate demand or rather by lowering taxes and thereby providing incentives to produce? Policy-relevant questions such as these are of immediate and obvious importance to the welfare of societies. The standard approach in dealing with them is to build a model, based on economic theory, answer the question for the model world and then apply the results to economic phenomena outside. Data come in, if at all, only in testing a limited number of the model's consequences. Despite some critical voices, economic methodology too has by and large subscribed to a "theory first" approach to applied economics.Error in Economics systematically develops an alternative to the theory-based orthodoxy. It places the methodical study of evidence at the centre of the scientific enterprise and thus provides a foundation for a methodology of evidence-based economics. But the book does not stop at the truism that claims should be based on the best available evidence. Rather, detailed studies in the areas of measurement, causal inference and policy analysis show what it means for a claim to be evidence-based in the context of a concrete case. The examples discussed concern topics as diverse as consumer price indices, radio spectrum auctions, the transmission mechanism, natural experiments on minimum wages and the evaluation of counterfactuals for policy.Error in Economics is essential reading for economic methodologists, philosophers of science and anyone interested in how claims about socio-economic matters are validated.

This book brings together, for the first time, philosophers of pragmatism and economists interested in methodological questions. The main theoretical thrust of Dewey is to unite inquiry with behavior and this book's contributions assess this insight in the light of developments in modern American philosophy, social and legal theories, and the theoretical orientation of economics.This unique book contains impressive contributions from a range of different perspectives and its unique nature will make it required reading for academics involved with philosophy and economics.