Routledge Library Editions: Epistemology – serie

Originally published in 1969. This book examines the fundamental concepts of metaphysics and of theory of knowledge. Topics treated include the nature of substance and of causation; their relation to natural laws, dispositions, and attributes; the nature of consciousness and purposiveness; of symbols, signs, and signals, and their relation to interpretation and objective reference; and the nature and criteria of truth.The author holds that philosophy is by intent a science and that its becoming so requires precise and non-arbitrary semantical analysis of basic philosophical terms. He argues that philosophy then, like the other sciences, has practical importance: in its case this consists in its capacity to give to difficult practical decisions not only the efficacy insured by its application of the findings of the other sciences, but in addition some of the wisdom which is philosophy’s distinctive ultimate aim.

Originally published in 1969. Since the seventeenth century the kind of knowledge afforded by mathematical physics has come more and more to furnish mankind with an ideal for all knowledge. The ideal also carries with it a new conception of the nature of things: all things whatsoever are held to be intelligible ultimately in terms of the laws of inanimate nature. This reductionist formula can be overcome only by the fundamental rethinking of our philosophical premises. To contribute towards thsi rethinking was the aim of the Study Group at whose meetings this collection originated. The essayists come from a wide range of disciplines but all want to address the conflict in our culture. The first part consists of discussions of various fundamental problems in the sciences. There are essays on the inter-relation of physics and psychology, on the possible reduction of biology to physics and chemistry, on new approaches to experimental psychology, against the possibility of giving a purely ‘factual’ account of social and political life, and for a fundamental reform of our concept of responsibility. The second section of the book suggests lines of philosophical inquiry which might help to resolve the epistemological and ethical problems arising at the foundations of physics, biology, psychology and the social sciences.

Originally published in 1968. Scepticism is generally regarded as a position which, if correct, would be disastrous for our everyday and scientific beliefs. According to this view, a sceptical argument is one that leads to the intuitively false conclusion that we cannot know anything. But there is another, much neglected and more radical form of scepticism, Pyrrhonism, which neither denies nor accepts the possibility of knowledge and is to be regarded not as a philosophical position so much as the expression of a philosophical way of life. Professor Naess argues that, given a sympathetic interpretation, Sextus Empiricus’s outline of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides the essentials of a genuine and rational sceptical point of view. He begins with a brief account of Pyrrhonism, then goes on to argue for the psychological possibility of this kind of scepticism, defending it against common objections, and examining some of its implications. The last two chapters provide detailed support for the rationality of Pyrrhonism, drawing mainly on certain methodological distinctions in semantics which both justify the Pyrrhonist’s failure to make assertions and restrict the scope of recent epistemological arguments against scepticism in such a way as to modify severely the conclusions based on them.

Originally published in 1986. Wittgenstein, William James, Thomas Kuhn and John Wisdom share an attitude towards problems in the theory of knowledge which is fundamentally in conflict with the empiricist tradition. They encourage the idea that in understanding the central concepts of epistemology – objectivity, certainty and reasoning – people and their practices matter most. This clash between orthodox empiricism and a freshly inspired pragmatism forms the background to the strands of argument in this book. With these philosophers as a guide, it points to new directions by showing how the theory of knowledge can be shaped around our actions without sacrificing reason’s control over our beliefs.

Originally published in 1925. If we are to know what intelligence is, how the brain can think, and what place mind holds in the scheme of things, we must first have a science of the sensory basis and structure of knowledge. This book supplies that need; it also serves as a short introduction to the systematic psychology of cognition.

Originally published in 1961. Michael Polanyi was a polymath who influenced economics and the sciences as well as philosophy. His wide-ranging research in physical science is as well-known as his work on freedom and knowledge and his arguments against positivism and reductionism. This collection of essays written for him touches on all aspects of his influence but rotates around his published lectures Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. The contributors address four areas – The Scientist as Knower, Historical Perspectives, The Knowledge of Society and the Knowledge of Living Things.

Originally published in 1990. This book discusses in a philosophically responsible and illuminating way the progress of the dialogue and its separate sections to improve our understanding of Plato’s work on Theaetetus. An early coverage of this dialogue, this investigation predated a surge in study of Plato’s piece which examined Socratic and pre-Socratic thought. The author’s argument is that the Theaetetus engages in re-evaluation of earlier doctrines of middle-period Platonism as well as reaffirming theories about knowledge. An important work in Platonic studies and epistemology.

Originally published in 1961. This book is a study of some important ways of knowledge and experience and of the symbols through which they become articulate. Both ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are interpreted in wide senses which are sanctioned by common use – though not always by the usage of philosophers and scientists. The four main fields considered are: the arts, religion, moral knowledge, and our knowledge of one another. These fields, though distinguishable, are nevertheless found to be interrelated in subtle and interesting ways, and it is contended that increase of ‘wisdom’, or ‘educated understanding’, can be achieved only through acceptance and assimilation of all their many-sided disciplines into personal insight. The book deals in a new way with questions of perennial interest which, because they are fundamental, are difficult. Nevertheless, the writing is lucid and untechnical and addressed to a wide range of readers.

Originally published in 1970. This work evaluates the appeal to the sensually given which played an important role in epistemological discussions during the early 20th Century. While many contemporary philosophers regarded this appeal as a mistake, there were still some who defended the notion of the given and even made it the foundation of their views regarding perception. The author here points to several different views concerning the nature of the sensually given and argues that the issue between them is not empirical, as is naturally suggested by what he calls ‘the Naïve View’ of the dispute, but rather metaphysical, involving different theories regarding the relationship between Thought and Reality. This leads on to a discussion of the different views presently held regarding the task of the epistemologist, and to a new suggestion with regard to the relationship between common sense and the rival ontologies suggested by scientists and philosophers.In the course of the argument a variety of different topics are discussed such as the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, the differences between scientific and philosophical theories, and the relevance of scientific treatments of the subject of perception to the treatment of this topic by philosophers.

Originally published in 1990. Examining epistemic justification, truth and logic, this book works towards a holistic theory of knowledge. It discusses evidence, belief, reliability and many philosophical theories surrounding the nature of true knowledge. A thorough Preface updates the main work from when it was written in 1976 to include theories ascendant in the ‘80s.

Originally published in 1916. This book reviews the common problems of philosophy and then critiques the varied epistemological theories of the time. A theory of knowledge may be either dualistic or monistic and realistic or idealistic. Examining the resulting doctrines at the beginning, this book then goes on to consider mysticism, psychology, logic, consciousness, intellectualism and then scientific method. A fascinating insight into early Twentieth century philosophy.

Originally published in 1940. Firstly, this book seeks to combine epistemology and the new developments of the time in psychology. It holds that no epistemology can be sound if it is psychologically defective, nor can a psychological analysis of knowledge be philosophically naïve. Secondly, it attempts to suggest a single structural pattern underlying every type of cognitive situation. Offering a significant reorientation to epistemological thought of its time, this work considers perception, sense and memory and examines the referential theory of knowledge. It is a lucid and precisely organised reading and analysis of knowledge.

Originally published in 1949. Understanding the questions is the major problem when beginning philosophy. This book does not attempt to provide the answers, but defines the questions and shows by example how they should be tackled. Subjects treated include the nature of the objects of thought and judgment; truth and error in belief; perception and knowledge of the material world; the status and function of memory.

Originally published in 1966. This book considers the perceived asymmetries between the self and others, or between self and things. An in-depth analysis of scepticism, dualism, belief, knowledge and semantics. A topic which is central to both epistemology but also the whole of contemporary philosophy.

Originally published in 1986. Wittgenstein, William James, Thomas Kuhn and John Wisdom share an attitude towards problems in the theory of knowledge which is fundamentally in conflict with the empiricist tradition. They encourage the idea that in understanding the central concepts of epistemology – objectivity, certainty and reasoning – people and their practices matter most. This clash between orthodox empiricism and a freshly inspired pragmatism forms the background to the strands of argument in this book. With these philosophers as a guide, it points to new directions by showing how the theory of knowledge can be shaped around our actions without sacrificing reason’s control over our beliefs.

Originally published in 1990. This book discusses in a philosophically responsible and illuminating way the progress of the dialogue and its separate sections to improve our understanding of Plato’s work on Theaetetus. An early coverage of this dialogue, this investigation predated a surge in study of Plato’s piece which examined Socratic and pre-Socratic thought. The author’s argument is that the Theaetetus engages in re-evaluation of earlier doctrines of middle-period Platonism as well as reaffirming theories about knowledge. An important work in Platonic studies and epistemology.

Originally published in 1966. This book considers the asymmetries between the self and others, or between self and things. An indepth analysis of scepticism, dualism, belief and knowledge.

Originally published in 1968. Scepticism is generally regarded as a position which, if correct, would be disastrous for our everyday and scientific beliefs. According to this view, a sceptical argument is one that leads to the intuitively false conclusion that we cannot know anything. But there is another, much neglected and more radical form of scepticism, Pyrrhonism, which neither denies nor accepts the possibility of knowledge and is to be regarded not as a philosophical position so much as the expression of a philosophical way of life. Professor Naess argues that, given a sympathetic interpretation, Sextus Empiricus’s outline of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides the essentials of a genuine and rational sceptical point of view. He begins with a brief account of Pyrrhonism, then goes on to argue for the psychological possibility of this kind of scepticism, defending it against common objections, and examining some of its implications. The last two chapters provide detailed support for the rationality of Pyrrhonism, drawing mainly on certain methodological distinctions in semantics which both justify the Pyrrhonist’s failure to make assertions and restrict the scope of recent epistemological arguments against scepticism in such a way as to modify severely the conclusions based on them.

Originally published in 1940. Firstly, this book seeks to combine epistemology and the new developments of the time in psychology. It holds that no epistemology can be sound if it is psychologically defective, nor can a psychological analysis of knowledge be philosophically naïve. Secondly, it attempts to suggest a single structural pattern underlying every type of cognitive situation. Offering a significant reorientation to epistemological thought of its time, this work considers perception, sense and memory and examines the referential theory of knowledge. It is a lucid and precisely organised reading and analysis of knowledge.

Originally published in 1969. Since the seventeenth century the kind of knowledge afforded by mathematical physics has come more and more to furnish mankind with an ideal for all knowledge. The ideal also carries with it a new conception of the nature of things: all things whatsoever are held to be intelligible ultimately in terms of the laws of inanimate nature. This reductionist formula can be overcome only by the fundamental rethinking of our philosophical premises. To contribute towards thsi rethinking was the aim of the Study Group at whose meetings this collection originated. The essayists come from a wide range of disciplines but all want to address the conflict in our culture. The first part consists of discussions of various fundamental problems in the sciences. There are essays on the inter-relation of physics and psychology, on the possible reduction of biology to physics and chemistry, on new approaches to experimental psychology, against the possibility of giving a purely ‘factual’ account of social and political life, and for a fundamental reform of our concept of responsibility. The second section of the book suggests lines of philosophical inquiry which might help to resolve the epistemological and ethical problems arising at the foundations of physics, biology, psychology and the social sciences.

Originally published in 1970. This work evaluates the appeal to the sensually given which played an important role in epistemological discussions during the early 20th Century. While many contemporary philosophers regarded this appeal as a mistake, there were still some who defended the notion of the given and even made it the foundation of their views regarding perception. The author here points to several different views concerning the nature of the sensually given and argues that the issue between them is not empirical, as is naturally suggested by what he calls ‘the Naïve View’ of the dispute, but rather metaphysical, involving different theories regarding the relationship between Thought and Reality. This leads on to a discussion of the different views presently held regarding the task of the epistemologist, and to a new suggestion with regard to the relationship between common sense and the rival ontologies suggested by scientists and philosophers.In the course of the argument a variety of different topics are discussed such as the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, the differences between scientific and philosophical theories, and the relevance of scientific treatments of the subject of perception to the treatment of this topic by philosophers.

Originally published in 1961. Michael Polanyi was a polymath who influenced economics and the sciences as well as philosophy. His wide-ranging research in physical science is as well-known as his work on freedom and knowledge and his arguments against positivism and reductionism. This collection of essays written for him touches on all aspects of his influence but rotates around his published lectures Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. The contributors address four areas – The Scientist as Knower, Historical Perspectives, The Knowledge of Society and the Knowledge of Living Things.

Originally published in 1916. This book reviews the common problems of philosophy and then critiques the varied epistemological theories of the time. A theory of knowledge may be either dualistic or monistic and realistic or idealistic. Examining the resulting doctrines at the beginning, this book then goes on to consider mysticism, psychology, logic, consciousness, intellectualism and then scientific method. A fascinating insight into early Twentieth century philosophy.

Originally published in 1990. Examining epistemic justification, truth and logic, this book works towards a holistic theory of knowledge. It discusses evidence, belief, reliability and many philosophical theories surrounding the nature of true knowledge. A thorough Preface updates the main work from when it was written in 1976 to include theories ascendant in the ‘80s.

Originally published in 1925. If we are to know what intelligence is, how the brain can think, and what place mind holds in the scheme of things, we must first have a science of the sensory basis and structure of knowledge. This book supplies that need; it also serves as a short introduction to the systematic psychology of cognition.

Originally published in 1949. Understanding the questions is the major problem when beginning philosophy. This book does not attempt to provide the answers, but defines the questions and shows by example how they should be tackled. Subjects treated include the nature of the objects of thought and judgment; truth and error in belief; perception and knowledge of the material world; the status and function of memory.

Originally published in 1969. This book examines the fundamental concepts of metaphysics and of theory of knowledge. Topics treated include the nature of substance and of causation; their relation to natural laws, dispositions, and attributes; the nature of consciousness and purposiveness; of symbols, signs, and signals, and their relation to interpretation and objective reference; and the nature and criteria of truth.The author holds that philosophy is by intent a science and that its becoming so requires precise and non-arbitrary semantical analysis of basic philosophical terms. He argues that philosophy then, like the other sciences, has practical importance: in its case this consists in its capacity to give to difficult practical decisions not only the efficacy insured by its application of the findings of the other sciences, but in addition some of the wisdom which is philosophy’s distinctive ultimate aim.

Originally published in 1961. This book is a study of some important ways of knowledge and experience and of the symbols through which they become articulate. Both ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are interpreted in wide senses which are sanctioned by common use – though not always by the usage of philosophers and scientists. The four main fields considered are: the arts, religion, moral knowledge, and our knowledge of one another. These fields, though distinguishable, are nevertheless found to be interrelated in subtle and interesting ways, and it is contended that increase of ‘wisdom’, or ‘educated understanding’, can be achieved only through acceptance and assimilation of all their many-sided disciplines into personal insight. The book deals in a new way with questions of perennial interest which, because they are fundamental, are difficult. Nevertheless, the writing is lucid and untechnical and addressed to a wide range of readers.

Originally published in 1990. This study argues that scepticism is an intelligible view and that the issue scepticism raises is whether or not certain sceptical hypotheses are as plausible as the ordinary views we accept. It discusses psychological concepts, definitions of knowledge, belief and hypothetic inference (inference to the best explanation). Starting from ‘Is skepticism a problem for epistemology’, the book takes us through the argument for the possibility of scepticism, including looking at sense data and considering memory and perception.