Routledge Library Editions: Historical Security - Böcker

This 12-volume set contains titles originally published between 1957 and 1992. International in scope, the set looks at security and military history covering several battles, particularly the first and second world wars. Highlighting the difference between theory and practice, it also explores the people involved in the policy making and strategy of war, and the leaders tasked with carrying those decisions out.

In forming the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918, Britain created the world’s first independent air service. Britain entered the First World War with less than 200 ill-assorted flying machines divided between the army and the navy, but by the end of the war the RAF mustered almost 300,000 personnel and 22, 000 aircraft. Originally published in 1986, more than 65 years after the event, the decision to form the RAF remained poorly understood and Malcolm Cooper presented the first detailed modern analysis of its creation, shedding new light on the process by which Britain entered the air age. Set against the background of the build-up of air power during the First World War, the book explains how deepening political concern at failures in home air defence, public demands for retaliatory air action against Germany, problems of mobilization and expansion in the aircraft industry, and disagreements between the existing army and navy air services combined to create the conditions for an independent air force. The author argues that the pressures of war were insufficient to give real substance to the RAF’s independence and that its failure to escape from its wartime role as an ancillary service was also of crucial significance in the evolution of British air strategy in later years. Based on an extensive study of official documents and private papers and amply illustrated with contemporary photographs, this title will prove invaluable in understanding both strategic thinking in the Great War and the early development of a form of warfare which dominated military and naval operations in the twentieth century.

In forming the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918, Britain created the world’s first independent air service. Britain entered the First World War with less than 200 ill-assorted flying machines divided between the army and the navy, but by the end of the war the RAF mustered almost 300,000 personnel and 22, 000 aircraft. Originally published in 1986, more than 65 years after the event, the decision to form the RAF remained poorly understood and Malcolm Cooper presented the first detailed modern analysis of its creation, shedding new light on the process by which Britain entered the air age. Set against the background of the build-up of air power during the First World War, the book explains how deepening political concern at failures in home air defence, public demands for retaliatory air action against Germany, problems of mobilization and expansion in the aircraft industry, and disagreements between the existing army and navy air services combined to create the conditions for an independent air force. The author argues that the pressures of war were insufficient to give real substance to the RAF’s independence and that its failure to escape from its wartime role as an ancillary service was also of crucial significance in the evolution of British air strategy in later years. Based on an extensive study of official documents and private papers and amply illustrated with contemporary photographs, this title will prove invaluable in understanding both strategic thinking in the Great War and the early development of a form of warfare which dominated military and naval operations in the twentieth century.

For seventy years Douglas Haig had been portrayed on the one hand as the ‘Butcher of the Somme’ – inept, insensitive and archaic; and on the other as the ‘Saviour of Britain’ – noble, unselfish and heroic. This polarised, strident and ultimately inconclusive argument had resulted in Haig becoming detached from his own persona; he had become a shallow symbol of a past age to be pilloried or praised. The middle ground in the Haig debate had been as barren as No Man’s Land.There should be no mystery about Haig. Certain from a very early age of his own greatness, he preserved every record of his achievements: diaries, letters, official reports etc. The opinions of his contemporaries are likewise readily available. But until this book the material had not been used to construct a complete and accurate picture. Critics and supporters have raided the historical records for evidence of the demi-god or demon and have ignored that which conflicts with their preconceptions. They have likewise raced through his early life in order to get to the war, in the process ignoring the complex process of his development as a soldier. Analyses of Haig’s command have consequently been as shallow as the prevailing images of the man.After eight years of painstaking and detailed research into previously neglected sources, Gerard De Groot gave us a more complete and balanced picture. This book, originally published in 1988, which will appeal both to the general and the specialised reader, is not simply a critique of Haig’s command in the war, but an exploration into his personality. Close attention to his early life and career reveals him as a creature of his society, a man who mirrored both the virtues and the faults of Edwardian Britain. What emerges is an intense, dedicated, but ultimately flawed servant of his country whose ironic fate it was to grow up in one age and to command in another.

For seventy years Douglas Haig had been portrayed on the one hand as the ‘Butcher of the Somme’ – inept, insensitive and archaic; and on the other as the ‘Saviour of Britain’ – noble, unselfish and heroic. This polarised, strident and ultimately inconclusive argument had resulted in Haig becoming detached from his own persona; he had become a shallow symbol of a past age to be pilloried or praised. The middle ground in the Haig debate had been as barren as No Man’s Land.There should be no mystery about Haig. Certain from a very early age of his own greatness, he preserved every record of his achievements: diaries, letters, official reports etc. The opinions of his contemporaries are likewise readily available. But until this book the material had not been used to construct a complete and accurate picture. Critics and supporters have raided the historical records for evidence of the demi-god or demon and have ignored that which conflicts with their preconceptions. They have likewise raced through his early life in order to get to the war, in the process ignoring the complex process of his development as a soldier. Analyses of Haig’s command have consequently been as shallow as the prevailing images of the man.After eight years of painstaking and detailed research into previously neglected sources, Gerard De Groot gave us a more complete and balanced picture. This book, originally published in 1988, which will appeal both to the general and the specialised reader, is not simply a critique of Haig’s command in the war, but an exploration into his personality. Close attention to his early life and career reveals him as a creature of his society, a man who mirrored both the virtues and the faults of Edwardian Britain. What emerges is an intense, dedicated, but ultimately flawed servant of his country whose ironic fate it was to grow up in one age and to command in another.

Britain’s vast losses of men in the first world war produced a revulsion against conscription. Originally published in 1972, Peter Dennis here describes how conscription was introduced once more in 1939, when pressure from within Britain and from France forced the British Government to reverse its position.With the use of original sources, Peter Dennis explores the development of British military policy between the wars, from the period of readjustment and realignment immediately after the first world war, up to the breakdown of the Chamberlain government’s pledge not to introduce conscription in peacetime. He points out that the politicians and the public were not afraid of conscription itself, but of conscription in peacetime as the forerunner of continental military adventures in alliance with France. He shows how the battles over conscription had a marked effect on the indecision of military thinking, and how, in 1939, conscription finally became the crucial issue in Britain’s preparation for war.

Britain’s vast losses of men in the first world war produced a revulsion against conscription. Originally published in 1972, Peter Dennis here describes how conscription was introduced once more in 1939, when pressure from within Britain and from France forced the British Government to reverse its position.With the use of original sources, Peter Dennis explores the development of British military policy between the wars, from the period of readjustment and realignment immediately after the first world war, up to the breakdown of the Chamberlain government’s pledge not to introduce conscription in peacetime. He points out that the politicians and the public were not afraid of conscription itself, but of conscription in peacetime as the forerunner of continental military adventures in alliance with France. He shows how the battles over conscription had a marked effect on the indecision of military thinking, and how, in 1939, conscription finally became the crucial issue in Britain’s preparation for war.

Originally published in 1984, this book tells the story of sixteen of Australia’s most eminent military men, as they performed under the stress of strategy-making and in the heat of battle.In scrutinising critical periods in the careers of such men as Brudenell White, Chauvel, Monash, Gordon Bennett, Blamey and Scherger, it addresses a number of fascinating questions: Is there an Australian style of command? How well have Australian officers been prepared for high command? How have Australian commanders handled the problems of coalition way or co-operation with allies? How have political direction, organisational structures and entrenched defence policy affected the performance of commanders in the field?Each re-evaluation compares performance with reputation. Some of the figures examined are familiar (What was the real basis of Monash’s reputation as a commander? Was Blamey worthy of the field-marshal’s baton?); some are given an appraisal long denied them.This roll-call of some of Australia’s greatest warriors presents a fascinating picture of the realities of war at the top. Each of the sixteen lives examined presents a revealing account of the conditions under which crucial military decisions are made and carried out – on the battlefield, at headquarters, in victory and defeat. The Commanders will appeal not only to students of military affairs but to everyone interested in Australian history and biography.

Originally published in 1984, this book tells the story of sixteen of Australia’s most eminent military men, as they performed under the stress of strategy-making and in the heat of battle.In scrutinising critical periods in the careers of such men as Brudenell White, Chauvel, Monash, Gordon Bennett, Blamey and Scherger, it addresses a number of fascinating questions: Is there an Australian style of command? How well have Australian officers been prepared for high command? How have Australian commanders handled the problems of coalition way or co-operation with allies? How have political direction, organisational structures and entrenched defence policy affected the performance of commanders in the field?Each re-evaluation compares performance with reputation. Some of the figures examined are familiar (What was the real basis of Monash’s reputation as a commander? Was Blamey worthy of the field-marshal’s baton?); some are given an appraisal long denied them.This roll-call of some of Australia’s greatest warriors presents a fascinating picture of the realities of war at the top. Each of the sixteen lives examined presents a revealing account of the conditions under which crucial military decisions are made and carried out – on the battlefield, at headquarters, in victory and defeat. The Commanders will appeal not only to students of military affairs but to everyone interested in Australian history and biography.

The twentieth century was dominated by war and by preparations for war in a way that is unparalleled in history. Originally published in 1988, this textbook highlights key themes of warfare throughout the world and emphasizes the gulf between the theory of war and its practice.The contributors are professional historians and strategists who consider the impact of war upon society, theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency and nuclear strategy, as well as more ‘traditional topics’ such as tactics and strategy on land, the role of sea power, the evolution of strategic bombing, colonial and revolutionary warfare. Each chapter discusses recent research on the topic and provides guides to further reading. Together they give a clear up-to-date overview of the conflicts which dominated the twentieth century.This textbook is useful reading for all students and teachers of strategic and war studies, military history and international relations and for all those concerned with the study of major conflicts in the twentieth century.

The twentieth century was dominated by war and by preparations for war in a way that is unparalleled in history. Originally published in 1988, this textbook highlights key themes of warfare throughout the world and emphasizes the gulf between the theory of war and its practice.The contributors are professional historians and strategists who consider the impact of war upon society, theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency and nuclear strategy, as well as more ‘traditional topics’ such as tactics and strategy on land, the role of sea power, the evolution of strategic bombing, colonial and revolutionary warfare. Each chapter discusses recent research on the topic and provides guides to further reading. Together they give a clear up-to-date overview of the conflicts which dominated the twentieth century.This textbook is useful reading for all students and teachers of strategic and war studies, military history and international relations and for all those concerned with the study of major conflicts in the twentieth century.

Originally published in 1989, this is an empirical study of the impact of global war on the expansion and shaping of nation-states. Individual chapters examine the effects of such wars, and the preparation for them, on debt financing, expansion, military spending, welfare spending, GNP and domestic violence. The authors conclude that by virtue of the changes they spurn, global wars are inherently ‘accelerators of social change’.

Originally published in 1989, this is an empirical study of the impact of global war on the expansion and shaping of nation-states. Individual chapters examine the effects of such wars, and the preparation for them, on debt financing, expansion, military spending, welfare spending, GNP and domestic violence. The authors conclude that by virtue of the changes they spurn, global wars are inherently ‘accelerators of social change’.

Since it was first published in 1982, High Command had become the standard reference for anyone interested in Australia’s participation in the Second World War, this edition was originally published in 1992. The 50th anniversary of battles such as Singapore, Coral Sea and Kokoda in 1942 re-awakened interest in these milestones in Australia’s struggle for independence. Despite the well-known exploits of Australian servicemen in a score of famous battles, Australia’s contribution to the war was ultimately determined by the strategic policy-makers in Canberra, Washington and London.How competent were our politicians, military leaders and advisers in formulating our own war strategy? How much did the performance of Australian troops on the battlefield affect our ability to influence allied strategy?The author describes the clash between Generals Rowell and Blamey in Greece. He reveals the impact of the secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, on strategic policy-making. He analyses the role of intelligence, especially signals intelligence, in allied strategy. He shows how Blamey’s miscalculation in 1944 removed any chance of Australian troops joining the Americans in the Philippines. And he reveals how a British admiral challenged the authority of the Australian government.High Command presents the remarkable, full story of the political battles behind the military battles.

Since it was first published in 1982, High Command had become the standard reference for anyone interested in Australia’s participation in the Second World War, this edition was originally published in 1992. The 50th anniversary of battles such as Singapore, Coral Sea and Kokoda in 1942 re-awakened interest in these milestones in Australia’s struggle for independence. Despite the well-known exploits of Australian servicemen in a score of famous battles, Australia’s contribution to the war was ultimately determined by the strategic policy-makers in Canberra, Washington and London.How competent were our politicians, military leaders and advisers in formulating our own war strategy? How much did the performance of Australian troops on the battlefield affect our ability to influence allied strategy?The author describes the clash between Generals Rowell and Blamey in Greece. He reveals the impact of the secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, on strategic policy-making. He analyses the role of intelligence, especially signals intelligence, in allied strategy. He shows how Blamey’s miscalculation in 1944 removed any chance of Australian troops joining the Americans in the Philippines. And he reveals how a British admiral challenged the authority of the Australian government.High Command presents the remarkable, full story of the political battles behind the military battles.

Originally published in 1976, this book honours the centenary of The Royal Military College of Canada, 1876-1976. It comprises nine essays written by military historians who have been or still are in some way, as staff and students, connected with RMC since 1948. The essays range in time from the American invasion of Canada in 1775 to Hungary on the eve of the Second World War, and in place, from Upper Canada to the North West Frontier of India. The theme running through the book is the problem of civil-military relations and how this has been faced in Canada in the nineteenth century, in the defence of India in the nineteenth century and in the First World War and post-war period in Great Britain and Hungary.

Originally published in 1976, this book honours the centenary of The Royal Military College of Canada, 1876-1976. It comprises nine essays written by military historians who have been or still are in some way, as staff and students, connected with RMC since 1948. The essays range in time from the American invasion of Canada in 1775 to Hungary on the eve of the Second World War, and in place, from Upper Canada to the North West Frontier of India. The theme running through the book is the problem of civil-military relations and how this has been faced in Canada in the nineteenth century, in the defence of India in the nineteenth century and in the First World War and post-war period in Great Britain and Hungary.

Originally published in 1957, the original blurb reads: ‘From these studies of the secret diplomacy surrounding the entry of Turkey and Italy into the First World War, emerges a picture of the complex machinery behind the obvious wheels of international politics. The activities of statesmen and diplomats are related to the ramifications of big business, banks, oil and armament companies. The story of each move and counter-move, told mostly in the actors’ own words and with many quotations from actual memoranda and dispatches, is based on sources which are quite new. The Russian collections of confidential correspondence, which include foreign diplomatic dispatches intercepted and deciphered in Russia, and the latest Documenti Diplomatici Italiani are practically unknown to the British public. This material has been integrated with that taken from all the available collections of British, French, German, Austro-Hungarian and American diplomatic documents, official publications, contemporary periodicals and economic and financial data, and such mines of information as the diaries, recollections and private letters of those involved.This unusual combination of source material allows some general conclusions to be drawn as to the laws and logic of the diplomacy of power politics. The most striking fact, perhaps, is the diplomatic war among allies. The book brings out the deep-seated conflicts of interests in the German-Austro-Hungarian coalition, and those dividing Britain, France, Russia and Italy in the Near East, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Another point of special interest is the inter-group and party struggle inside the countries for or against war; and another is the genesis of some of the fateful Secret Treaties which bedevilled the peace settlements of 1919-20.’ Today it can be read and enjoyed in its historical context.

Originally published in 1957, the original blurb reads: ‘From these studies of the secret diplomacy surrounding the entry of Turkey and Italy into the First World War, emerges a picture of the complex machinery behind the obvious wheels of international politics. The activities of statesmen and diplomats are related to the ramifications of big business, banks, oil and armament companies. The story of each move and counter-move, told mostly in the actors’ own words and with many quotations from actual memoranda and dispatches, is based on sources which are quite new. The Russian collections of confidential correspondence, which include foreign diplomatic dispatches intercepted and deciphered in Russia, and the latest Documenti Diplomatici Italiani are practically unknown to the British public. This material has been integrated with that taken from all the available collections of British, French, German, Austro-Hungarian and American diplomatic documents, official publications, contemporary periodicals and economic and financial data, and such mines of information as the diaries, recollections and private letters of those involved.This unusual combination of source material allows some general conclusions to be drawn as to the laws and logic of the diplomacy of power politics. The most striking fact, perhaps, is the diplomatic war among allies. The book brings out the deep-seated conflicts of interests in the German-Austro-Hungarian coalition, and those dividing Britain, France, Russia and Italy in the Near East, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Another point of special interest is the inter-group and party struggle inside the countries for or against war; and another is the genesis of some of the fateful Secret Treaties which bedevilled the peace settlements of 1919-20.’ Today it can be read and enjoyed in its historical context.

The early history of British aerial defence development is one of misdirection and delusion. The misdirection, judging by the criteria of successful aerial defence in World War II, was primarily in the downgrading of home defence measures including the fighter plane. The delusion, again judging by Britain’s efforts in that second world war, was primarily in the assumption of the effects to be obtained by strategic bombing.In both cases, the First World War was a major catalyst. Although events and writings before that war indicate the coming patterns, it was during that war that a great amount of the patterns are well established. Originally published in 1976, this work explores these origins and stresses the interaction between various diverse segments of English society in the formation of the major patterns. The working out of these patterns in the first half of the interwar years is also analysed, again with respect to diverse groupings in Britain.

The early history of British aerial defence development is one of misdirection and delusion. The misdirection, judging by the criteria of successful aerial defence in World War II, was primarily in the downgrading of home defence measures including the fighter plane. The delusion, again judging by Britain’s efforts in that second world war, was primarily in the assumption of the effects to be obtained by strategic bombing.In both cases, the First World War was a major catalyst. Although events and writings before that war indicate the coming patterns, it was during that war that a great amount of the patterns are well established. Originally published in 1976, this work explores these origins and stresses the interaction between various diverse segments of English society in the formation of the major patterns. The working out of these patterns in the first half of the interwar years is also analysed, again with respect to diverse groupings in Britain.

Originally published in 1985, this book is the result of an exploration of the state papers of the United Kingdom undertaken with the aim of discovering information about the past use of chemical warfare. This information may serve as a point of historical reference in speculation upon the possible nature and consequences of large-scale chemical warfare recurring in Europe. Part I of the monograph concentrates primarily on material documenting the use of chemical weapons in the First and Second World Wars, the impact of this use on the civilian populations of France and Belgium, casualties incurred in the production, research, development, training and deployment of chemical warfare agents, and the attempts made to incorporate chemical weapons into military doctrine and war-preparedness. Part II supplements the citation of documents in Part I. It comprises an ordered bibliography listing not only the location of the records found to be of primary concern to this study, but also the location of other records not cited in Part I which appear to form much of the remainder of the official record of the British CW effort. A list of some of the papers which have not been released comprises the concluding section.

Originally published in 1985, this book is the result of an exploration of the state papers of the United Kingdom undertaken with the aim of discovering information about the past use of chemical warfare. This information may serve as a point of historical reference in speculation upon the possible nature and consequences of large-scale chemical warfare recurring in Europe. Part I of the monograph concentrates primarily on material documenting the use of chemical weapons in the First and Second World Wars, the impact of this use on the civilian populations of France and Belgium, casualties incurred in the production, research, development, training and deployment of chemical warfare agents, and the attempts made to incorporate chemical weapons into military doctrine and war-preparedness. Part II supplements the citation of documents in Part I. It comprises an ordered bibliography listing not only the location of the records found to be of primary concern to this study, but also the location of other records not cited in Part I which appear to form much of the remainder of the official record of the British CW effort. A list of some of the papers which have not been released comprises the concluding section.

The Grand Strategy, the imaginative plan to divide the rebellious American colonies, ended in disaster. On October 17, 1777, General Sir John Burgoyne, alone, unaided and stranded in the American wilderness, capitulated with his army at Saratoga in upper New York State. It was the ‘turning point’ of the Revolution, which culminated four years later in the British surrender at Yorktown. Creasy wrote of Saratoga: ‘Nor can any military event be said to have exercised more important influence upon the future fortunes of mankind…’Who blundered? For nearly two centuries, Lord George Germain, the ‘maladroit’ minister, has been blamed, together with the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Howe; but Burgoyne, ‘Gentleman Johnny’ as his affectionate troops called him, has largely escaped criticism.Only in the late 1960s had a full assessment become possible, by the publication of all the correspondence that passed between these men. Originally published in 1971, from his study of these letters, and by his visit to the campaign area, author Rupert Furneaux questions this long accepted view.The British disaster resulted, he says, not because anyone particularly blundered, or from any ‘pigeon-holed’ despatch, but rather because no one bargained that thousands of ordinary American citizens would rally to bar Burgoyne’s path. Experienced frontier-fighters and skilled marksmen, they mowed down the closely-ranked Redcoats and the German mercenaries, who had all been trained for European battles. Saratoga heralded a new age of warfare, which Europeans took another hundred years to learn. It was also far more than a British defeat; it was an American victory, the decisive battle whereby they won the right to run their own lives without interference from Europe – and with incalculable consequences.