Trends in Southeast Asia – serie

Malaysia pledged to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 in relation to its 2005 GDP figure. The sectors listed as the main focus of this effort included: energy, industrial processes, waste, agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Several initiatives under myriad governments have been launched to reduce Malaysia’s climate change impacts; among those has been the emphasis on renewable energy (RE). Malaysia’s current energy mix relies heavily on coal and natural gas. Long-entrenched subsidies on these energy sources, coupled with greatly depreciating prices make it difficult for new RE producers to enter the market and increase their market share. This is in spite of positive developments in RE infrastructure and reduced RE material costs. Solar, biogas, biomass and mini-hydro have been put forward as the RE sources with the most potential, but all have issues of consistency and reliability. Because small energy generators cannot guarantee infallible energy production, they may not be the most viable options for the long term. Their size also denies them the economies of scale that would reduce their costs. Instead, these higher costs may be transferred to the consumer. Other issues include the competition for land in the development of large-scale solar farms, including the possible loss of community farmlands and hence livelihoods, if not displacement. A push for biomass and biogas as a source of energy might also lead to increased oil palm production to meet the need for consistent supplies of oil palm waste. Biogas from municipal landfills is made even more challenging given that Malaysian municipal waste is not sorted at source. One possible solution is the use of hybrid RE in rural areas, comprising a mix of micro-hydro, solar and diesel-based energy generation as a back-up. However an immediate win is to ensure energy efficiency and public education to encourage emissions reduction and climate change impacts on the individual consumer.

Although Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s earlier government (1981–2003) limited the powers and privileges of Malaysia’s nine hereditary rulers, the political influence that they could exercise was still evident in the “Perak Crisis” of 2009, which also generated public debate about royal rights. In recent years, public wariness in Malaysia about politicians has helped the rulers present themselves as alternative sources of authority. “Monarchical activism” has been especially evident in the state of Perak, dating from 1984 when Sultan Azlan Muhibbuddin Shah, who was until then Malaysia’s Lord President, was installed as the thirty-fourth ruler. In 2014, he was succeeded by his eldest son, Sultan Nazrin Muizzuddin Shah. Sultan Nazrin Shah has presented himself as a modern, educated and approachable ruler who consistently endorses the rule of law and is aware that public support for the monarch is highly dependent on meeting expectations in regard to ethical conduct and good governance.This paper argues that although Sultan Azlan Shah and Sultan Nazrin Shah have embraced the idea of a “new” Malaysian monarchy that actively responds to changing political and social contexts, two issues with especial relevance to the situation today can be tracked through the history of Perak’s royal line since its inception in the sixteenth century. The first, arguably now of lesser importance, concerns royal succession. The second issue, still highly important, involves the ruler’s relationships with non-royal officials and with elected representatives and the public at large.

Muhammadiyah, together with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), are seen as the two pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah is currently often perceived to be the more conservative of the two and to have more affinity with Islamist groups. On political issues, for instance, it is steered by Islamist imagery. On cultural issues, Muhammadiyah is often guided by old enmity towards what is called the TBC (takhayul, bid’ah dan churafat; delusions, religious innovation without precedence in the Prophetic traditions and the Qur’an, and superstitions or irrational belief). This position has placed Muhammadiyah in an uneasy relationship with both local cultures and traditionalist Islam. Three issues that were raised in 2017—the banning of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the recurrent controversy on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the ruling of the Constitutional Court on Penghayat Kepercayaan—are issues where Muhammadiyah has been easily drawn towards Islamist and conservative tendencies. Be that as it may, Muhammadiyah remains a social movement guided by its long-held theology of al-M?`?n (kindness) and with a strong emphasis on social services. It is this doctrine that has prevented Muhammadiyah from dwelling on mythical or abstract issues and neutralized it against Islamism, making its members more realistic in viewing the world, more prone to distancing themselves from the utopian vision of a caliphate, from the dream of shariah as the Messiah that will solve every problem, and from the temptation to create an Islamic state. The “pragmatic Islamism” that Muhammadiyah has adopted allows it to handle social dynamics well.

The United States launched a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy in late 2017 after reluctantly concluding that its patient effort to engage and socialize China to the rules-based order since 1972 had failed.

China's policy towards its diaspora is primarily governed by its national interests and foreign policy imperatives. In general, since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government has treated the diaspora as an asset, rather than a liability.

American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration. This book reflects on this issue.

Party mergers are a new development in Myanmar politics. Given that such mergers often assist the consolidation of new democratic regimes, some broader system-wide effects may also occur. Myanmar’s ethnic parties consistently choose merger strategies over other forms of pre-electoral coalition. This highlights a transition from a focus on questions of authoritarianism and democracy to one on the creation of a federal system of government with a stronger cleavage between competing Bamar and ethnic nationalisms. Despite cooperation among political parties outside the electoral process, pre-electoral coalitions such as constituency-sharing or campaigning for allies have generally not been successful. Five of the six mergers among ethnic parties attempted prior to the 2015 general election failed. However, between 2017 and 2019, five mergers involving parties representing the Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin or Karen, and Mon ethnicities, achieved success. The successful mergers were motivated not only by desires for electoral success in 2020 but also by shared federal aims, which involve ethnic parties in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin or Karen, and Mon states forming a strong local party in their respective regions to strive for ethnic equality and self-determination. The mergers are between parties with markedly different platforms and their success is conditioned by their preferences for particular kinds of federalism. Mergers cannot guarantee electoral success. And other pre-electoral coalitions, such as avoiding competition for the same constituencies, also proved successful in the 2018 by-elections. But what mergers can uniquely do is respond to public demand for parties to unite and make the resulting party stronger in terms of resources and public support. In general, mergers can reduce system fragmentation, avoid vote wastage and lead to the formation of stable parties. Ethnic party mergers also simplify party labels for voters and make it easier for them to vote on the basis of ethnic preferences. In addition, mergers can increase public interest and political participation among members of ethnic communities. Three common factors behind the five successful mergers are previous electoral losses, public pressure and shared federal aims. The durability of these mergers depends on continuous party building, negotiations and equality among party members. Meanwhile, a greater number of new parties will form and continue to exist under the multi-party democracy principle granted in Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution. The upcoming 2020 general election will witness a combination of mergers and other pre-electoral coalition forms between ethnic parties as they compete with Bamar national parties. Election results will influence the durability of merged parties, their political allegiance and potential parliamentary coalitions.

This article traces China’s foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping’s doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines. From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China’s foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng’s Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping’s Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China’s foreign policy. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi’s “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form.This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China’s Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju). As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge. While China’s foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China’s foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.

There are at least 80–100 business associations in Malaysia today, representing over 600,000 firms. In February to April 2020, a range of chamber leaders and officers were interviewed to record their experiences of the recent Pakatan Harapan administration, and any future lessons for business associations in post GE-14 Malaysia.

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with 87.18 per cent of its 260 million population embracing the Islamic faith. However, Indonesia is neither an Islamic state nor a secular one. It adopts Pancasila as the state ideology but has a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) overseeing six official religions.MORA has its genesis in Dutch colonial rule (1602-1942). It was strengthened during the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and then sustained by the post-independence Indonesia government (after 1945). The decision to keep MORA was to compensate those who had aspired for the enactment of the Jakarta Charter in the era of Sukarno but failed.This article examines how MORA has been managed under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from 2014 till the present. It highlights similarities and differences in Jokowi's control of the influential ministry compared to his predecessors. In 2014, even though Jokowi was elected on a reform agenda, he left MORA untouched.After the 2019 election, Jokowi appointed Fachrul Razi, a retired general as Minister of Religious Affairs, departing from the past practices of naming a religious scholar (ulama) or a religiously trained person (santri) to that position. This demonstrates a wish on the part of the President to shake up the ministry and to exert control over the institution. This decision, however, has alienated core supporters in NU who helped him get re-elected in 2019.

International relations scholarship and the popular media tend to portray China as a great power with hegemonic designs for Southeast Asia. Moreover, studies on Chinese influence in Southeast Asia predominantly focus on the Chinese state. This paper argues that Chinese non-state actors and their daily encounters with local communities in Southeast Asia deserve equal attention as these interactions evidently produce friction at both the society-to-state and state-to-state levels. The influence of Chinese non-state actors in Southeast Asia can be illustrated with three examples, namely, Chinese tourism operations in Thailand, Chinese market demand and agricultural transformations in Myanmar, and Chinese gangs within the casino economy in Cambodia. Thailand has recently become a top tourist destination for Chinese nationals. This has cultural implications as those involved in the tourism industry need to have Chinese language skills. The economic implications include increased competition and decreased accountability as Chinese tour companies have set up in Thailand using Thai locals as nominees. Bilateral relations also soured after a boat carrying Chinese tourists capsized in Thailand. As global prices of corn rose in 2011 and 2012, areas in Myanmar close to the Chinese border have increased corn cultivation to meet Chinese demands for that crop. This has led to deforestation in these areas. Chinese gangsters fleeing their government’s crackdown in China have settled down to operate in the casino economy in Cambodia. Consequentially, there has been a rise in crime rate involving online scams and deteriorating public security. Despite the Chinese government encouraging the Cambodian government to enforce a ban on online gambling, the actions of non-state actors from China continue to be associated with the Chinese state as a whole and there is rising resentment towards the Chinese in Cambodia. The COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily halted cross-border trade between China and mainland Southeast Asia. This has negatively affected local farmers who are dependent on the Chinese market.

Vietnam is in the midst of one of the world’s most rapid and intensive rural-to-urban transitions.In Hanoi, heritage preservation has gained significant policy attention over the last decades, but efforts continue to focus on the Old Quarter and Colonial City to the exclusion of collective socialist housing complexes and former village areas, and natural features such as canals and urban lakes.Parks and public spaces are urgently needed to offset the high residential densities and to improve the quality of life of residents.Motor vehicles continue to fuel the growth in transportation. Significant efforts were recently made to establish a mass transit system, but progress there is slow. More attention should be paid to improving the existing transportation system and to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Investments in new housing estates have fuelled a speculative real estate market but failed to address adequately the needs of the vulnerable segments of the population.Regional integration is a challenge as the city expands and swallows the peri-urban areas around the city.

Challenges facing Vietnam's export of fruits and vegetables to the Chinese market include technical barriers, long risk assessment periods, restrictions on products exported through official quotas to the Chinese market, and frequent changes in China's policy on border crossings.

The rise of religious extremism in public discourses is a cause for concern for government officials and moderate Muslims.While a substantial body of research on violent extremism is available, the issue of non-violent extremism remains neglected by scholars.Although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violence, it still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred that in turn can lead to physical violence and repression of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the community.Given this potential impact, the government needs to pay more attention to the dissemination of non-violent extremist public discourses,especially on social media. It could work together with influential religious organizations which possess immense religious authority and legitimacy.

In the context of Myanmar's ethnic diversity, ethnic armed organizations may play a key role in harmonizing responses to the coup. Redressing the grievances of non-Bamar groups is crucial to ensuring national and regional stability. Conversely, strategies that mistakenly assume national unity will lead to short-term solutions may cycle back into violence and conflict.There is little evidence that the Tatmadaw is willing to negotiate with ethnic armed organizations or the National Unity Government. These organizations require support in coordinating anti-coup efforts and material resources to enhance their leverage against the postcoup regime.The anti-coup movement's relationship with Myanmar's ethnic groups has moved through three broad phases: (1) diversity without coordinated demands; (2) visions of a federal future; and (3) agitating for change. The movement is at a critical juncture. Its success depends on its ability to transform existing centre-periphery relations. The role of ethnic armed organizations and civil society organizations needs to be recognized rather than sidelined in favour of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw or the National Unity Government.Previous missed opportunities for transforming centre-periphery relations are instructive for actors seeking to support the anti-coup movement. Three aspects of the anti-coup movement have historical precedents in Karen State: (1) refuge; (2) non-state social services; and (3) shared experiences of violence. In previous iterations of each, a failure in relational thinking has entrenched the centralization of power in Myanmar.

Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism.Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to the political system—regime change not excluded—to deal with Chinese threats.An examination of prominent cases of online Vietnamese nationalism shows that anti-China sentiments have been a recurrent theme and a consistent trigger. The online nationalistic movements have been mostly instigated by popular figures, with state actors playing a facilitating role in stoking and harnessing them for their own ends.Manifestations of online nationalism, especially those centred on anti-China and sovereignty issues, may hold serious consequences, including violence and deadly riots. In some instances, online nationalistic campaigns both galvanize and dissipate relatively quickly once state and popular actors have somehow managed to achieve their aims.The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.

The unrealized transitions were a setback for a "reform agenda", which Anwar Ibrahim articulated, but which emerged from dissident movements for diverse reforms. These movements helped the multiethnic, socially inclusive, opposition to win the 14th General Election. They are only seemingly dormant because of the pandemic.The Pakatan Harapan regime had the best chance to supply a fresh vision, deeper social understanding, and commitment to reform. The present Perikatan Nasional regime's fixation on"Malayness" overlooks twenty years of intense intra-Malay conflicts that began with the failure of the first transition.As the "7th Prime Minister", Mahathir had a rare chance to redeem himself from major errors of his first twenty-two-year tenure. He squandered his chance by not honouring the Pakatan Harapan transition plan.Anwar Ibrahim's opponents mock him for being obsessed with wanting to be prime minister. Yet they obsessively fear his becoming prime minister. Anwar may be twice loser in political succession but "the spectre of Anwar" still haunts Malaysian political consciousness.

Until approximately two decades ago, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) struggled to make inroads in Johor due to: (1) the unique historical developments in the state, which benefited its primary opponent Barisan Nasional (BN), and (2) the decentralized party structure in Johor with party branches serving as the main player responsible for grassroots mobilization and campaigning, which resulted in an underdeveloped and less cohesive state party structure. Despite Lee Kaw playing a crucial leadership role for the nascent party to take root in the state, Johor remained in the periphery during the initial decades of the party's establishment. The party managed to achieve some electoral success only in central Johor around the Kluang. The party achieved a rare breakthrough in Johor during the 1990 General Election when numerous Chinese educationalists allied with the DAP under the call of then Dong Zong chairman Lim Fong Seng. However, the national alliance frayed soon after, with the DAP losing its momentum in Johor by the next general election. Dr Boo Cheng Hau inherited the decentralized state leadership structure when he became the DAP Johor chairman in 2005. Under Dr Boo's leadership the party prioritized welfare provision and constituency services in several state constituencies, particularly Skudai (in Gelang Patah) and Bentayan (in Bakri).

On 28 April 2021, the Indonesian government, under President Joko Widodo, dissolved the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (Kemenristek-Dikti). Since then, the management of higher education has been taken over by the Ministry of Education and Culture, while research and innovation are now the responsibility of the National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, or BRIN). Based on Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Nos. 33 and 78 of 2021, various research institutes, such as LIPI, BATAN, LAPAN and BPPT, and research agencies in some ministries have been or will be merged into BRIN, making it a "super-government agency" with an "overarching" role. With a Rp26 trillion budget allocated by the government for research per year and with a large number of researchers, BRIN is expected to boost national research and innovation, and help the country catch up with countries such as Singapore and South Korea.

The ASEAN+6 Single Window (ASW+6) in this study refers to the geographic expansion of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) to enable cross-border electronic exchange of trade-related data and documents among ASEAN member states and six FTA partners, namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The ASW is part of ASEAN's trade facilitation reform to reduce intraregional trade costs and time.This study considers cross-border paperless trade measures to represent the implementation of ASW+6, using data from the UN Global Survey on Digital and Sustainable Trade Facilitation in 2019. The simulation analyses reveal that the ASW+6 has significant potential to reduce times required to export and import, and to boost trade in ASEAN and its FTA partners.

Micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account for approximately 97 per cent of all active business entities within the ASEAN region. They are an important contributor to both emissions generation and future reduction.A recent large-scale, multi-country quantitative assessment was undertaken into how SMEs are dealing with climate change in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. Most respondents reported a high level of concern about climate change.Over 90 per cent of firms are currently undertaking measures to reduce emissions, albeit that they are typically simple steps such as reducing air conditioning and electricity, recycling or installing low-energy lighting.Common intentions to deal with future extreme weather events include reducing emissions, developing a disaster plan, or reviewing business insurance policies.

Malaysia was initially lauded for its ability to combat the first few waves of COVID-19 but infection spikes since the Sabah state elections in September 2020 and subsequent exponential increases in both infections and deaths in 2021 left the nation reeling. Nationwide vaccination is seen as the only way out of the pandemic.Malaysia's COVID-19 communication strategy was hampered by political machinations and myriad changes in government. The need to shore up favour among the electorate resulted in inconsistent messaging and regular U-turns whenever there was public outrage at arbitrary restrictions. This resulted in confusion on the ground, preventing successful COVID-19 management and containment.Under the current regime, claims to more accessible data have been disputed and doubts have surfaced over data transparency and accuracy. There is an urgent need to ensure convincingly reliable information, as well as to use more engaging messaging on more suitable media.

In the first half of 2021, COVID-19 vaccine doses from the COVAX Facility were in short supply, and the plan to mass produce COVAX vaccines through the Serum Institute of India (SII) faltered as the pandemic surged in India in March 2021.Due to COVAX's shift in approach towards convincing richer nations to redistribute their excess doses, the second half of 2021 saw increases in the frequency and volume of its shipments. Donors were however able to "earmark" their dose donations and identify their intended recipients.The six Southeast Asian countries which qualified for free COVAX shots—Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Vietnam (the AMC6)—received 16 million doses in the first half of 2021. In the second half, they received 128 million doses from COVAX, 80.9 per cent of which were earmarked donations.

Over the past two decades, the fixation on anti-state content has shaped the way Vietnamese authorities deployed various censorship strategies to achieve the dual goals of creating a superficial openness while maintaining a tight grip on online discourses. These considerations dictated how several regulations on Internet controls were formulated and enforced.Vietnamese censors also selectively borrowed from China's online censorship playbook, a key tenet of which is the fear-based approach. The modus operandi for the authorities is to first harp on what they perceive as online foreign and domestic threats to Vietnam's social stability. Then those threats are exhaustively used to enforce tougher measures that are akin to those implemented in China.But unlike China, Vietnam has not afforded to ban Western social media platforms altogether. Realizing that they would be better off exploiting social media for their own gains, Vietnamese authorities have sought to co-opt and utilize it to curb anti-state content on the Internet. The lure of the Vietnamese market has also emboldened Facebook and Google's YouTube to consider it fit to acquiesce to state censorship demands.

Religious extremism among students in major campuses in Indonesia remains a problem for the Indonesian government, campus authorities and moderate Muslims.A substantial number of studies on Islam and religious extremism in Indonesia have focused on security and cultural paradigms. In contrast, this article discusses the factors that cause the rise of religious extremism among university students through an organizational and institutional lens.The dissemination and internalization of religious extremist narratives contribute to the rise of religious extremism among university students in Indonesia.Counter-extremism policies by the government and campus authorities have not been effective due to the absence of an integrative approach. All stakeholders—the government, campus authorities, parents of university students, communities and student organizations—need to establish a concerted and integrative effort to uproot religious extremism from among university students.

Organized propaganda and public opinion manipulation are increasing in Indonesia's cybersphere. Specifically, since 2019, there has been a marked rise of cyber troop campaigns that serve to mobilize public consensus for controversial government policies.Cyber troop operations played a crucial role in three controversial events in which public opinion had been initially critical of the government policy at issue. These were, first, the revision of the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission in September 2019; second, the launch of the New Normal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic in May 2020; and third, the passing of the Omnibus Law for Job Creation in October 2020.In all three cases, there is clear evidence of cyber troops manipulating public opinion in support of government policy. In all three cases, the cyber troops manufactured consent by flooding social media with narratives that promoted the governing elite's agenda, often using deceptive messages and disinformation that were amplified by numerous "buzzer" and "bot" accounts. Thereby they effectively drowned out oppositional discourses on social media and neutralized dissent, especially as mainstream media simultaneously echoed the cyber troops' narratives.The ever more systematic use of cyber troops—and the considerable resources spent on such operations—indicates increasing co-optation of Indonesia's cybersphere for elite interests. This threatens to undermine the quality of public debate and democracy in Indonesia because cyber troop operations not only feed public opinion with disinformation but also prevent citizens from scrutinizing and evaluating the governing elite's behaviour and policy-making processes, which further exacerbates Indonesia's ongoing democratic regression.

A few ASEAN countries have signed the Global Methane Pledge, but methane should receive a broader and higher priority from the entire region, given its significant contribution to climate change, and the availability of solutions.The agriculture sector contributes the most amount of methane emissions with a steadily rising share over the past decade.Several Southeast Asian countries face similar methane abatement challenges (i.e., agricultural productivity in Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines; gas leakage in Malaysia and Brunei; and waste management in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), warranting closer collaboration at the subregional level.While it is true that countries have been participating in international initiatives and implementing national policies related to rice cultivation and oil and gas processing, their impacts have not been thoroughly evaluated.Rather than creating new institutional structures, ASEAN could for example ensure that its existing working groups and networks prioritize methane abatement.Missing data on the relative contribution to methane emissions from livestock, rice paddies and informal economies should be collected to help refine problem definition and formulate effective solutions.