In Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity Robert J. Howell argues that the options in the debates about consciousness and the mind-body problem are more limited than many philosophers have appreciated. Unless one takes a hard-line stance, which either denies the data provided by consciousness or makes a leap of faith about future discoveries, one must admit that no objective picture of our world can be complete. Howell argues, however, that this isconsistent with physicalism, contrary to received wisdom. After developing a novel, neo-Cartesian notion of the physical, followed by a careful consideration of the three major anti-materialist arguments—Black''s ''Presentation Problem'', Jackson''s Knowledge Argument, and Chalmers'' Conceivability Argument—Howellproposes a ''subjective physicalism'' which gives the data of consciousness their due, while retaining the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.

In Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity Robert J. Howell argues that the options in the debates about consciousness and the mind-body problem are more limited than many philosophers have appreciated. Unless one takes a hard-line stance, which either denies the data provided by consciousness or makes a leap of faith about future discoveries, one must admit that no objective picture of our world can be complete. Howell argues, however, that this isconsistent with physicalism, contrary to received wisdom. After developing a novel, neo-Cartesian notion of the physical, followed by a careful consideration of the three major anti-materialist arguments—Black''s ''Presentation Problem'', Jackson''s Knowledge Argument, and Chalmers'' Conceivability Argument—Howellproposes a ''subjective physicalism'' which gives the data of consciousness their due, while retaining the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.

In Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity Robert J. Howell argues that the options in the debates about consciousness and the mind-body problem are more limited than many philosophers have appreciated. Unless one takes a hard-line stance, which either denies the data provided by consciousness or makes a leap of faith about future discoveries, one must admit that no objective picture of our world can be complete. Howell argues, however, that this isconsistent with physicalism, contrary to received wisdom. After developing a novel, neo-Cartesian notion of the physical, followed by a careful consideration of the three major anti-materialist arguments—Black''s ''Presentation Problem'', Jackson''s Knowledge Argument, and Chalmers'' Conceivability Argument—Howellproposes a ''subjective physicalism'' which gives the data of consciousness their due, while retaining the advantages of a monistic, physical ontology.