Susanna Siegel received her PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University in 2000. She was previously John L Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University, and is currently Professor of Philosophy and an affiliate of the Program in Mind, Brain and Behavior at Harvard University.

This is a clearly argued book that is well worth careful study.

• INTRODUCTION: SEEING JOHN MALKOVICH; THE CONTENT VIEW; WHY DOES IT MATTER WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; HOW CAN WE DECIDE WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; PART I: CONTENTS; 1.1 STATES OF SEEING AND PHENOMENAL STATES; 1.2 VISUAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES; 2.1 CONTENTS AS ACCURACY CONDITIONS; 2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.3 A FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING; 2.5 TWO OBJECTIONS FROM 'LOOKS', 'APPEARS' AND THEIR COGNATES; 2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTENT VIEW; 3.1 INTROSPECTION; 3.2 NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF CONTENT; 3.3 THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST; PART II: PROPERTIES; 4.1 THE EXAMPLES; 4.2 THE PREMISES; 4.3 CONTENT EXTERNALISM; 5.1 THE CAUSAL THESIS; 5.2 MICHOTTE'S RESULTS; 5.3 UNITY IN EXPERIENCE; 5.4 NON-CAUSAL CONTENTS; 5.5 RAW FEELS; 5.6 NON-SENSORY EXPERIENCES; PART III: OBJECTS; CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF OBJECTS IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 6.1 STRONG AND WEAK VERIDICALITY; 6.2 THE CONTENTS OF STATES OF SEEING; 6.3 THE CONTENTS OF PHENOMENAL STATES; 6.4 PHENOMENAL STATES: INTERNALISM VS. PURE DISJUNCTIVISM; 6.5 WHY INTERNALISM?; CHAPTER 7: SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 7.1 SUBJECT-INDEPENDENCE AND PERSPECTIVAL CONNECTEDNESS; 7.2 THE GOOD AND THE ODD; 7.3 COMPLEX CONTENTS; 7.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; CHAPTER 8: THE STRONG CONTENT VIEW REVISITED

Susanna Siegel received her PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University in 2000. She was previously John L Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University, and is currently Professor of Philosophy and an affiliate of the Program in Mind, Brain and Behavior at Harvard University.

This is a clearly argued book that is well worth careful study.

• INTRODUCTION: SEEING JOHN MALKOVICH; THE CONTENT VIEW; WHY DOES IT MATTER WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; HOW CAN WE DECIDE WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; PART I: CONTENTS; 1.1 STATES OF SEEING AND PHENOMENAL STATES; 1.2 VISUAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES; 2.1 CONTENTS AS ACCURACY CONDITIONS; 2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.3 A FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING; 2.5 TWO OBJECTIONS FROM 'LOOKS', 'APPEARS' AND THEIR COGNATES; 2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTENT VIEW; 3.1 INTROSPECTION; 3.2 NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF CONTENT; 3.3 THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST; PART II: PROPERTIES; 4.1 THE EXAMPLES; 4.2 THE PREMISES; 4.3 CONTENT EXTERNALISM; 5.1 THE CAUSAL THESIS; 5.2 MICHOTTE'S RESULTS; 5.3 UNITY IN EXPERIENCE; 5.4 NON-CAUSAL CONTENTS; 5.5 RAW FEELS; 5.6 NON-SENSORY EXPERIENCES; PART III: OBJECTS; CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF OBJECTS IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 6.1 STRONG AND WEAK VERIDICALITY; 6.2 THE CONTENTS OF STATES OF SEEING; 6.3 THE CONTENTS OF PHENOMENAL STATES; 6.4 PHENOMENAL STATES: INTERNALISM VS. PURE DISJUNCTIVISM; 6.5 WHY INTERNALISM?; CHAPTER 7: SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 7.1 SUBJECT-INDEPENDENCE AND PERSPECTIVAL CONNECTEDNESS; 7.2 THE GOOD AND THE ODD; 7.3 COMPLEX CONTENTS; 7.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; CHAPTER 8: THE STRONG CONTENT VIEW REVISITED

Susanna Siegel received her PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University in 2000. She was previously John L Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University, and is currently Professor of Philosophy and an affiliate of the Program in Mind, Brain and Behavior at Harvard University.

This is a clearly argued book that is well worth careful study.

• INTRODUCTION: SEEING JOHN MALKOVICH; THE CONTENT VIEW; WHY DOES IT MATTER WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; HOW CAN WE DECIDE WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?; PART I: CONTENTS; 1.1 STATES OF SEEING AND PHENOMENAL STATES; 1.2 VISUAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES; 2.1 CONTENTS AS ACCURACY CONDITIONS; 2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.3 A FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY; 2.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING; 2.5 TWO OBJECTIONS FROM 'LOOKS', 'APPEARS' AND THEIR COGNATES; 2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTENT VIEW; 3.1 INTROSPECTION; 3.2 NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF CONTENT; 3.3 THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST; PART II: PROPERTIES; 4.1 THE EXAMPLES; 4.2 THE PREMISES; 4.3 CONTENT EXTERNALISM; 5.1 THE CAUSAL THESIS; 5.2 MICHOTTE'S RESULTS; 5.3 UNITY IN EXPERIENCE; 5.4 NON-CAUSAL CONTENTS; 5.5 RAW FEELS; 5.6 NON-SENSORY EXPERIENCES; PART III: OBJECTS; CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF OBJECTS IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 6.1 STRONG AND WEAK VERIDICALITY; 6.2 THE CONTENTS OF STATES OF SEEING; 6.3 THE CONTENTS OF PHENOMENAL STATES; 6.4 PHENOMENAL STATES: INTERNALISM VS. PURE DISJUNCTIVISM; 6.5 WHY INTERNALISM?; CHAPTER 7: SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE; 7.1 SUBJECT-INDEPENDENCE AND PERSPECTIVAL CONNECTEDNESS; 7.2 THE GOOD AND THE ODD; 7.3 COMPLEX CONTENTS; 7.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; CHAPTER 8: THE STRONG CONTENT VIEW REVISITED