Assistant Professor in Philosophy at University of British Columbia, Vancouver

One of the most elegant of the recent clutch of philosophical treatments of attention

• 1.1 THE PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF OUR TOPIC; 1.2 THREE APPROACHES; 1.3 BRADLEY'S PROTEST; 1.4 JAMES'S DISJUNCTIVE THEORY; 1.5 THE SOURCE OF BRADLEY'S DISSATISFACTION; 1.6 BEHAVIOURISM AND AFTER; 1.7 HEIRS OF BRADLEY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; 2.1 EXPLANATORY TACTICS; 2.2 THE BASIC DISTINCTION; 2.3 METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES AND TAXONOMIES; 2.4 ADVERBIALISM, MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY, AND NATURAL KINDS; 2.5 ADVERBIALISM AND LEVELS OF EXPLANATION; 2.6 TAXONOMIES AND SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS; 3.1 SUPERVENIENCE-FAILURE; 3.2 THE MODAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROCESS-FIRST VIEW; 3.3 THE INTERFERENCE ARGUMENT - A PUTATIVE PROBLEM FOR ADVERBIALIST ACCOUNTS; 3.4 CONCLUSION; 4.1 INTRODUCTION; 4.2 THE PROBLEM WITH ATTITUDE BASED ADVERBIALISM; 4.3 GILBERT RYLE AND ALAN WHITE; 4.4 WHITE'S ARGUMENT AGAINST DISPOSITION-BASED ADVERBIALISM; 4.5 THE COGNITIVE UNISON THEORY; 4.6 TASKS; 4.7 COGNITIVE PROCESSES; 4.8 POTENTIAL SERVICE OF A TASK; 4.9 SUPERORDINATE TASKS; 4.10 SOME FEATURES OF THE THEORY; 4.11 DIVIDED ATTENTION; 4.12 DEGREES OF ATTENTION AND MERELY PARTIAL ATTENTION; 4.13 SUMMARY; 5.1 MENTAL CAUSATION; 5.2 HOW TO RESPOND TO MENTAL CAUSATION OBJECTIONS; 5.3 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF ATTENTION; 5.4 ATTENTION AS AN ENABLING CONDITION; 5.5 COUNTERFACTUALS; 5.6 THE CAUSAL RELEVANCE OF ATTENTION PER SE; 5.7 COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSALLY RELEVANT PROPERTIES; 5.8 OBJECTIONS TO COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION AND OF CAUSAL RELEVANCE; 5.9 THE EXTRINSICNESS OF UNISON; 5.10 THE PRIVATIVE CHARACTER OF UNISON AND THE PROBLEM OF ABSENCE CAUSATION; 5.11 CAUSAL EXCLUSION; 5.12 SUMMARY; 6.1 PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS; 6.2 THE METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROCESS-IDENTIFYING PROJECT; 6.3 THE DIVERSE EXPLANATORY CONSTRUALS OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS; 6.4 REASONS FOR DEFLATION; 6.5 INDUCTIVELY UNRELIABLE PROPERTIES; 6.6 QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS; 6.7 THE POSITIVE PAYOFF; 7.1 PUTTING ATTENTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL WORK; 7.2 ATTENTION AND REFERENCE; 7.3 ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS; 7.4 PROSPECTS FOR OPTIMISM; NOTES; REFERENCES

Assistant Professor in Philosophy at University of British Columbia, Vancouver

One of the most elegant of the recent clutch of philosophical treatments of attention

• 1.1 THE PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF OUR TOPIC; 1.2 THREE APPROACHES; 1.3 BRADLEY'S PROTEST; 1.4 JAMES'S DISJUNCTIVE THEORY; 1.5 THE SOURCE OF BRADLEY'S DISSATISFACTION; 1.6 BEHAVIOURISM AND AFTER; 1.7 HEIRS OF BRADLEY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; 2.1 EXPLANATORY TACTICS; 2.2 THE BASIC DISTINCTION; 2.3 METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES AND TAXONOMIES; 2.4 ADVERBIALISM, MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY, AND NATURAL KINDS; 2.5 ADVERBIALISM AND LEVELS OF EXPLANATION; 2.6 TAXONOMIES AND SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS; 3.1 SUPERVENIENCE-FAILURE; 3.2 THE MODAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROCESS-FIRST VIEW; 3.3 THE INTERFERENCE ARGUMENT - A PUTATIVE PROBLEM FOR ADVERBIALIST ACCOUNTS; 3.4 CONCLUSION; 4.1 INTRODUCTION; 4.2 THE PROBLEM WITH ATTITUDE BASED ADVERBIALISM; 4.3 GILBERT RYLE AND ALAN WHITE; 4.4 WHITE'S ARGUMENT AGAINST DISPOSITION-BASED ADVERBIALISM; 4.5 THE COGNITIVE UNISON THEORY; 4.6 TASKS; 4.7 COGNITIVE PROCESSES; 4.8 POTENTIAL SERVICE OF A TASK; 4.9 SUPERORDINATE TASKS; 4.10 SOME FEATURES OF THE THEORY; 4.11 DIVIDED ATTENTION; 4.12 DEGREES OF ATTENTION AND MERELY PARTIAL ATTENTION; 4.13 SUMMARY; 5.1 MENTAL CAUSATION; 5.2 HOW TO RESPOND TO MENTAL CAUSATION OBJECTIONS; 5.3 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF ATTENTION; 5.4 ATTENTION AS AN ENABLING CONDITION; 5.5 COUNTERFACTUALS; 5.6 THE CAUSAL RELEVANCE OF ATTENTION PER SE; 5.7 COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSALLY RELEVANT PROPERTIES; 5.8 OBJECTIONS TO COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION AND OF CAUSAL RELEVANCE; 5.9 THE EXTRINSICNESS OF UNISON; 5.10 THE PRIVATIVE CHARACTER OF UNISON AND THE PROBLEM OF ABSENCE CAUSATION; 5.11 CAUSAL EXCLUSION; 5.12 SUMMARY; 6.1 PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS; 6.2 THE METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROCESS-IDENTIFYING PROJECT; 6.3 THE DIVERSE EXPLANATORY CONSTRUALS OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS; 6.4 REASONS FOR DEFLATION; 6.5 INDUCTIVELY UNRELIABLE PROPERTIES; 6.6 QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS; 6.7 THE POSITIVE PAYOFF; 7.1 PUTTING ATTENTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL WORK; 7.2 ATTENTION AND REFERENCE; 7.3 ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS; 7.4 PROSPECTS FOR OPTIMISM; NOTES; REFERENCES

Assistant Professor in Philosophy at University of British Columbia, Vancouver

One of the most elegant of the recent clutch of philosophical treatments of attention

• 1.1 THE PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF OUR TOPIC; 1.2 THREE APPROACHES; 1.3 BRADLEY'S PROTEST; 1.4 JAMES'S DISJUNCTIVE THEORY; 1.5 THE SOURCE OF BRADLEY'S DISSATISFACTION; 1.6 BEHAVIOURISM AND AFTER; 1.7 HEIRS OF BRADLEY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY; 2.1 EXPLANATORY TACTICS; 2.2 THE BASIC DISTINCTION; 2.3 METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES AND TAXONOMIES; 2.4 ADVERBIALISM, MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY, AND NATURAL KINDS; 2.5 ADVERBIALISM AND LEVELS OF EXPLANATION; 2.6 TAXONOMIES AND SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS; 3.1 SUPERVENIENCE-FAILURE; 3.2 THE MODAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROCESS-FIRST VIEW; 3.3 THE INTERFERENCE ARGUMENT - A PUTATIVE PROBLEM FOR ADVERBIALIST ACCOUNTS; 3.4 CONCLUSION; 4.1 INTRODUCTION; 4.2 THE PROBLEM WITH ATTITUDE BASED ADVERBIALISM; 4.3 GILBERT RYLE AND ALAN WHITE; 4.4 WHITE'S ARGUMENT AGAINST DISPOSITION-BASED ADVERBIALISM; 4.5 THE COGNITIVE UNISON THEORY; 4.6 TASKS; 4.7 COGNITIVE PROCESSES; 4.8 POTENTIAL SERVICE OF A TASK; 4.9 SUPERORDINATE TASKS; 4.10 SOME FEATURES OF THE THEORY; 4.11 DIVIDED ATTENTION; 4.12 DEGREES OF ATTENTION AND MERELY PARTIAL ATTENTION; 4.13 SUMMARY; 5.1 MENTAL CAUSATION; 5.2 HOW TO RESPOND TO MENTAL CAUSATION OBJECTIONS; 5.3 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF ATTENTION; 5.4 ATTENTION AS AN ENABLING CONDITION; 5.5 COUNTERFACTUALS; 5.6 THE CAUSAL RELEVANCE OF ATTENTION PER SE; 5.7 COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSALLY RELEVANT PROPERTIES; 5.8 OBJECTIONS TO COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION AND OF CAUSAL RELEVANCE; 5.9 THE EXTRINSICNESS OF UNISON; 5.10 THE PRIVATIVE CHARACTER OF UNISON AND THE PROBLEM OF ABSENCE CAUSATION; 5.11 CAUSAL EXCLUSION; 5.12 SUMMARY; 6.1 PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS; 6.2 THE METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS OF THE PROCESS-IDENTIFYING PROJECT; 6.3 THE DIVERSE EXPLANATORY CONSTRUALS OF CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS; 6.4 REASONS FOR DEFLATION; 6.5 INDUCTIVELY UNRELIABLE PROPERTIES; 6.6 QUESTIONS WITHOUT ANSWERS; 6.7 THE POSITIVE PAYOFF; 7.1 PUTTING ATTENTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL WORK; 7.2 ATTENTION AND REFERENCE; 7.3 ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS; 7.4 PROSPECTS FOR OPTIMISM; NOTES; REFERENCES