Andrew Reynolds has succeeded in doing what too many editors of post-convention edited volumes fail to do: composing an impressive book that is smart in structure and contains a series of very strong chapters.

• PART I: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: AN OVERVIEW ; Introduction Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in Divided Societies ; 1. 1. Constitutional Design and the Problem of adoption: Proposals versus Processes ; 2. The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy ; 3. Institutions and Coalition-Building in Post-Communist Transitions ; PART II: PRESIDENTIALISM, FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION, AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS. ; 4. Presidents, Parliaments and Democracy: Insights from the Post-Communist World ; 5. Presidentialism and Democratic Performance ; 6. Constitutional asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy ; 7. Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives ; 8. Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems and Democratization ; 9. Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve ; PART III: COUNTRY STUDIES ; 10. 10. Constitutional Engineering in Fiji ; 11. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998: Results and Prospects ; 12. The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and Substance ; 13. Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing By the Rules ; 14. Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria ; 15. India