Does Perception Have Content?

Berit Brogaard is Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, St. Louis. She is the author of Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions and numerous articles in the philosophy of perception and philosophy of language.

What is particularly valuable here is the thorough introduction provided by its editor. Brogaard discusses the central arguments of each contribution, usefully highlighting not only points of connection between papers but also potential challenges to their central arguments.

• 1. Introduction: Does Perception Have Content? ; Berit Brogaard ; Part I: Content Views ; 2. Bence Nanay: Empirical Problems with Anti-Representationalism ; 3. Susanna Siegel: Affordances and the Contents of Perception ; 4. Kathrin Gluer: Looks, Reasons and Experiences ; Part II: Against Strong Content ; 5. Charles Travis: The Preserve of Thinkers ; 6. Diana Raffman: Disjunctivism and the Alleged Nontransitivity of Indiscriminability ; Part III: Reconciliatory Views ; 7. Susanna Schellenberg: The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience ; 8. Heather Logue: Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation ; 9. Benj Hellie: On which perceptual phenomena have content and why they have it ; Part IV: Imagistic and Possible-Word Content ; 10. Mohan Matthen: Image Content ; 11. Michael Tye: What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? ; Part V: The Constituents of Perceptual Content and the Role of Perception ; 12. Bill Lycan: What Does Vision Represent? ; 13. Terry Horgan: Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color ; 14. Tomasz Budek and Katalin Farkas: Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience.