The principal criticism of libertarianism is that it would damage human welfare. In response, this book considers an extreme libertarian thesis: there is no conceptual or practical clash among the most plausible accounts of economic rationality, interpersonal liberty, human welfare, and private-property anarchy. Eschewing moral advocacy as a distraction, it offers a critical-rationalist defence of this objective thesis from many criticisms in the literature.

The principal criticism of libertarianism is that it would damage human welfare. In response, this book considers an extreme libertarian thesis: there is no conceptual or practical clash among the most plausible accounts of economic rationality, interpersonal liberty, human welfare, and private-property anarchy. Eschewing moral advocacy as a distraction, it offers a critical-rationalist defence of this objective thesis from many criticisms in the literature.

The principal criticism of libertarianism is that it would damage human welfare. In response, this book considers an extreme libertarian thesis: there is no conceptual or practical clash among the most plausible accounts of economic rationality, interpersonal liberty, human welfare, and private-property anarchy. Eschewing moral advocacy as a distraction, it offers a critical-rationalist defence of this objective thesis from many criticisms in the literature.