Epistemic autonomy worth valuing requires epistemic dependence on others, as well as on tools and technology.

In How We Govern Our Minds Through Others, J. Adam Carter and Neil Levy argue that epistemic autonomy worth valuing requires various kinds of epistemic dependence on others, as well as on tools and technology. Challenging the Cartesian ideal of self-sufficient knowledge acquisition, they show that epistemic dependence is both inevitable and beneficial. Self‑governance is mediated by social relationships and institutions; we manage our beliefs and attention through collaborations, trust, and the influence of others. What emerges is a reconceptualization of epistemic autonomy as deeply social and deeply scaffolded.

Integrating insights from philosophy, cognitive science, AI ethics, and media studies, the authors offer a positive, socially scaffolded conception of epistemic self‑governance. The topics they explore include epistemic autonomy in connection with hijacked attention, intellectual collaboration with others in group settings, artificial intelligence, first-hand insight, nudging and questioning, epistemic feedback loops, and adaptive control. Their arguments have ramifications for educators and designers of digital platforms, as well as those working in the emerging landscape of AI law, digital rights, and mental privacy.

Epistemic autonomy worth valuing requires epistemic dependence on others, as well as on tools and technology.

In How We Govern Our Minds Through Others, J. Adam Carter and Neil Levy argue that epistemic autonomy worth valuing requires various kinds of epistemic dependence on others, as well as on tools and technology. Challenging the Cartesian ideal of self-sufficient knowledge acquisition, they show that epistemic dependence is both inevitable and beneficial. Self‑governance is mediated by social relationships and institutions; we manage our beliefs and attention through collaborations, trust, and the influence of others. What emerges is a reconceptualization of epistemic autonomy as deeply social and deeply scaffolded.

Integrating insights from philosophy, cognitive science, AI ethics, and media studies, the authors offer a positive, socially scaffolded conception of epistemic self‑governance. The topics they explore include epistemic autonomy in connection with hijacked attention, intellectual collaboration with others in group settings, artificial intelligence, first-hand insight, nudging and questioning, epistemic feedback loops, and adaptive control. Their arguments have ramifications for educators and designers of digital platforms, as well as those working in the emerging landscape of AI law, digital rights, and mental privacy.

Epistemic autonomy worth valuing requires epistemic dependence on others, as well as on tools and technology.

In How We Govern Our Minds Through Others, J. Adam Carter and Neil Levy argue that epistemic autonomy worth valuing requires various kinds of epistemic dependence on others, as well as on tools and technology. Challenging the Cartesian ideal of self-sufficient knowledge acquisition, they show that epistemic dependence is both inevitable and beneficial. Self‑governance is mediated by social relationships and institutions; we manage our beliefs and attention through collaborations, trust, and the influence of others. What emerges is a reconceptualization of epistemic autonomy as deeply social and deeply scaffolded.

Integrating insights from philosophy, cognitive science, AI ethics, and media studies, the authors offer a positive, socially scaffolded conception of epistemic self‑governance. The topics they explore include epistemic autonomy in connection with hijacked attention, intellectual collaboration with others in group settings, artificial intelligence, first-hand insight, nudging and questioning, epistemic feedback loops, and adaptive control. Their arguments have ramifications for educators and designers of digital platforms, as well as those working in the emerging landscape of AI law, digital rights, and mental privacy.