War in Iraq

Thomas G. Mahnken currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. At the time this book was written, he was a Visit□ing Fellow at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, and a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He is author/editor of nine books, including the forthcoming Routledge Strategic Studies Reader (2007). Thomas A. Keaney is the Executive Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is author/editor of six books.

• Introduction Thomas A. Keaney and Thomas G. Mahnken Part 1: Defeating the Regime and Occupying Iraq 1. American Anabasis: The United States Army's Entry into War in Iraq Isaiah Wilson 2. Iraqi Military Effectiveness Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray and James G. Lacey 3. The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq Richard Andres 4. Deep Attack against Iraq: Precision Weapon, Cyber Attack and the Future of War Richard Andres 5. Doomed Execution: Iraq and its War Plan Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray and James G. Lacey 6. Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction Nora Bensahel Part 2: Reconstructing Iraq and Countering the Insurgency 7. Origins, Causes, and Evolution of the Iraqi Insurgency, 2003-06 Ahmed Hashim 8. Signaling Resolve and the First Battle of Fallujah Carter Malkasian 9. Counterinsurgency in Iraq - The Karbala Model Peter R. Mansoor 10. Extinguishing the Insurgency in Iraq: A Civil Affairs Perspective John Ballard 11. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in Iraq Kalev I. Sepp 12. Rediscovering the Way of Lawrence, Some Thoughts on Postmodern Planning Isaiah Wilson. Conclusion: The Iraq War in Context Eliot A. Cohen