No Magic Wand

The Idealization of Science in Law

AvDavid S. Caudill,Lewis H. LaRue

Häftad, Engelska, 2006

461 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Inbunden

1 235 kr

Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar

Beskrivning

Since 1993, Supreme Court precedent has asked judges to serve as gatekeepers to their expert witnesses, admitting only reliable scientific testimony. Lacking a strong background in science, however, some judges admit dubious scientific testimony packages by articulate practitioners, while others reject reliable evidence that is unreasonably portrayed as full of holes. Seeking a balance between undue deference and undeserved skepticism, Caudill and LaRue draw on the philosophy of science to help judges, juries, and advocates better understand its goals and limitations.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2006-06-29
Mått:167 x 226 x 11 mm
Vikt:286 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:170
Förlag:Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
ISBN:9780742550230

Utforska kategorier

Rättsordning inom Juridik
Rättsvetenskap inom Juridik
Naturvetenskap:allmänt inom Naturvetenskap och teknik

Mer om författaren

David S. Caudill is a professor of law at Washington & Lee University School of Law. He is the author of Property: Cases, Documents, and Lawyering Strategies (2004).Lewis H. LaRue is also a professor of law at Washington & Lee University School of Law. He is the author of Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority (1995).

Recensioner i media

Legal actors' understanding of how scientific knowledge is produced is a matter of immense and increasing importance in contemporary society. Caudill and LaRue make a significant contribution to this debate by drawing on science studies research as a prophylactic against the temptation to adopt idealized or "romantic," as they call them, images of scientific activity. No Magic Wand demonstrates that bringing a science studies perspective to bear on legal problems leads, not to meaningless relativism, but to a profoundly pragmatic approach to assessing the value of knowledge claims that invoke the mantle of science.

Innehållsförteckning

Chapter 1 IntroductionChapter 2 1. What's the Problem?Chapter 3 2. On Judges Who Are Too StrictChapter 4 3. On Judges Who Are Too GullibleChapter 5 4. The Idealizations of Legal ScholarsChapter 6 5. Science is a Pragmatic ActivityChapter 7 6. Science Studies for Law