David S. Caudill - Böcker

Since 1993, Supreme Court precedent has asked judges to serve as gatekeepers to their expert witnesses, admitting only reliable scientific testimony. Lacking a strong background in science, however, some judges admit dubious scientific testimony packages by articulate practitioners, while others reject reliable evidence that is unreasonably portrayed as full of holes. Seeking a balance between undue deference and undeserved skepticism, Caudill and LaRue draw on the philosophy of science to help judges, juries, and advocates better understand its goals and limitations.

Since 1993, Supreme Court precedent has asked judges to serve as gatekeepers to their expert witnesses, admitting only reliable scientific testimony. Lacking a strong background in science, however, some judges admit dubious scientific testimony packages by articulate practitioners, while others reject reliable evidence that is unreasonably portrayed as full of holes. Seeking a balance between undue deference and undeserved skepticism, Caudill and LaRue draw on the philosophy of science to help judges, juries, and advocates better understand its goals and limitations.

Presenting examples of how literary accounts can provide a supplement to our understanding of science in law, this book challenges the view that law and science are completely different. It focuses on stories which explore the relationship between law and science, especially cultural images of science that prevail in legal contexts. Contrasting with other studies of the transfer and construction of expertise in legal settings, this book considers the intersection of three interdisciplinary projects: law and science, law and literature, and literature and science. Looking at the appropriation of scientific expertise into law from these perspectives, this book presents an original introduction into how we can gain insight into the use of science in the courtroom and in policy and regulatory settings through literary sources.

Presenting examples of how literary accounts can provide a supplement to our understanding of science in law, this book challenges the view that law and science are completely different. It focuses on stories which explore the relationship between law and science, especially cultural images of science that prevail in legal contexts. Contrasting with other studies of the transfer and construction of expertise in legal settings, this book considers the intersection of three interdisciplinary projects: law and science, law and literature, and literature and science. Looking at the appropriation of scientific expertise into law from these perspectives, this book presents an original introduction into how we can gain insight into the use of science in the courtroom and in policy and regulatory settings through literary sources.

When the utility of masks or vaccinations became politicized during the COVID-19 pandemic and lost its mooring in scientific evidence, an already-developing crisis of expertise was exacerbated. Those who believe in consensus science wondered: “How can ‘those people’ not see the truth?” With a foreword by Harry Collins, this book shows that the crisis is not a "scientific" controversy, but an ideological dispute with "believers" on both sides. If the advocates for consensus science acknowledge the uncertainties involved, rather than insisting on cold, hard facts, it is possible to open a pathway towards interaction and communication, even persuasion, between world views.As the crisis of expertise continues to be a global issue, this will be an invaluable resource for readers concerned about polarized societies and the distrust of consensus science.

This book analyzes future directions in the study of expertise and experience with the aim of engendering more critical discourse on the general discipline of science and technology studies. In 2002, Collins and Evans published an article entitled “The Third Wave of Science Studies,” suggesting that the future of science and technology studies would be to engage in “Studies in Expertise and Experience.”  In their view, scientific expertise in legal and policy settings should reflect a consensus of formally-trained scientists and citizens with experience in the relevant field (but not “ordinary” citizens). The Third Wave has garnered attention in journals and in international workshops, where scholars delivered papers explicating the theoretical foundations and practical applications of the Third Wave. This book arose out of those workshops, and is the next step in the popularization of the Third Wave. The chapters address the novel concept of interactional experts, the useof imitation games, appropriating scientific expertise in law and policy settings, and recent theoretical developments in the Third Wave.