Nicholas Rescher is University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh and the author of many books, including Realistic Pragmatism: An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy; Predicting the Future: An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting; Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy; and Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge; all published by SUNY Press. Among his many achievements, he is former president of the American Philosophical Association and recipient of the Alexander von Humboldt Prize for Humanistic Scholarship.

• Preface Introduction KNOWLEDGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 1. Modes of Knowledge Is Knowledge True Justified Belief?Modes of (Propositional) KnowledgeOther Basic Principles 2. Fallibilism and Truth Estimation Problems of MetaknowledgeThe Preface ParadoxThe DiallelusAn Apory and Its Reconciliation: K-DestabilizationCosts and BenefitsMore on FallibilismThe Comparative Fragility of Science: Scientific Claims as Mere EstimatesFallibilism and the Distinction Between Our (Putative) Truth and the Real Truth 3. Skepticism and Its Deficits The Skeptic's "No Certainty" ArgumentThe Role of CertaintyThe Certainty of Logic Versus the Certainty of LifePragmatic InconsistencySkepticism and RiskRationality and Cognitive RiskThe Economic Dimension: Costs and BenefitsThe Deficiency of Skepticism 4. Epistemic Justification in a Functionalistic and Naturalistic Perspective Experience and FactProblems of Common-Cause EpistemologyModes of JustificationThe Evolutionary Aspect of Sensory EpistemologyRational versus Natural SelectionAgainst "Pure" IntellectualismThe Problem of ErrorConclusion 5. Plausibility and Presumption The Need for PresumptionsThe Role of PresumptionPlausibility and PresumptionPresumption and ProbabilityPresumption and SkepticismHow Presumption Works: What Justifies Presumptions 6. Trust and Cooperation in Pragmatic Perspective The Cost Effectiveness of Sharing and Cooperating in Information Acquisition and ManagementThe Advantages of CooperationBuilding Up Trust: An Economic ApproachTrust and PresumptionA Community of Inquirers RATIONAL INQUIRY AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 7. Foundationalism and Coherentism Hierarchical Systemization: The Euclidean Model of KnowledgeCyclic Systemization: The Network Model—An Alternative to the Euclidean ModelThe Contrast Between Foundationalism and CoherentismProblems of Foundationalism 8. The Pursuit of Truth: Coherentist Criteriology The Coherentist Approach to InquiryThe Central Role of Data for a Coherentist Truth-CriteriologyOn Validating the Coherence ApproachIdeal CoherenceTruth as an Idealization 9. Cognitive Relativism and Contextualism Cognitive RealismWhat's Wrong with RelativismThe Circumstantial Contextualism of ReasonA Foothold of One's Own: The Primacy of Our Own PositionThe Arbitrament of ExperienceAgainst RelativismContextualistic Pluralism is Compatible with Commitment on Pursuing "The Truth"The Achilles' Heel of Relativism 10. The Pragmatic Rationale of Cognitive Objectivity Objectivity and the Circumstantial University of ReasonThe Basis of ObjectivityThe Problem of Validating ObjectivityWhat is Right with ObjectivismAbandoning Objectivity is Pragmatically Self-Defeating 11. Rationality Stage-Setting for the ProblemOptimum-InstabilityIdeal versus Practical Rationality: The Predicament of ReasonThe Problem of Validating RationalityThe Pragmatic Turn: Even Cognitive Rationality has a Pragmatic RationaleAlternative Modes of Rationality?The Self-Reliance of Rationality is Not Viciously Circular COGNITIVE PROGRESS 12. Scientific Progress The Exploration Model of Scientific InquiryThe Demand for EnhancementTechnological Escalation: An Arms Race Against NatureTheorizing as Inductive ProjectionLater Need Not Be LesserCognitive CopernicanismThe Problem of Progress 13. The Law of Logarithmic Returns and the Complexification of Natural Science The Principle of Least Effort and the Methodological Status of Simplicity-Preference in ScienceComplexificationThe Expansion of ScienceThe Law of Logarithmic ReturnsThe Rationale and Implications of the Law of Logarithmic ReturnsThe Growth of KnowledgeThe Deceleration of Scientific ProgressPredictive Implications of the Information/Knowledge RelationshipThe Centrality of Quality and its Implications 14. The Imperfectability of Knowledge: Knowledge as Boundless Conditions of Perfected ScienceTheoretical Adequacy: Issues of Erotetic CompletenessPragmatic CompletenessPredictive CompletenessTemporal Finality"Perfected Science" As an Idealization that Affords a Useful Contrast ConceptionThe Dispensability of Perfection COGNITIVE LIMITS AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 15. The Rational Intelligibility of Nature Explaining the Possibility of Natural Science"Our" SideNature's SideSynthesisImplications 16. Human Science as Characteristically Human The Potential Diversity of "Science" The One World, One Science ArgumentA Quantitative PerspectiveComparability and Judgments of Relative Advancement or BackwardnessBasic Principles 17. On Ignorance, Insolubilia, and the Limits of Knowledge Concrete versus Generic Knowledge and IgnoranceErotetic IncapacityDivine versus Mundane KnowledgeIssues of Temporalized KnowledgeKant's Principle of Question ExfoliationCognitive IncapacityInsolubilia Then and NowCognitive IncapacityIdentifying InsolubiliaRelating Knowledge to IgnorancePostscript: A Cognitively Indeterminate Universe 18. Cognitive Realism ExistenceIs Man the Measure?Realism and IncapacityThe Cognitive Opacity of Real ThingsThe Cognitive Inexhaustibility of ThingsThe Corrigibility of ConceptionsThe Cognitive Inexhaustibility of ThingsCognitive DynamicsConceptual Basis of Realism as a PostulateHidden Depths: The Impetus to RealismThe Pragmatic Foundation of Realism as a Basis for Communication and DiscourseThe Idealistic Aspect of Metaphysical RealismScience and Reality Notes Index