Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he also serves as Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies.

"Fixing the Facts is an insightful exploration of how relations between intelligence officers and policymakers too often go sour. Joshua Rovner convincingly shows that politicization has been a persistent phenomenon and that many of the best-known errors and controversies involving intelligence are rooted in politics and in efforts by leaders to sell their policies to the public."

• Preface1. A Basic Problem: The Uncertain Role of Intelligence in National Security2. Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations3. Policy Oversell and Politicization4. The Johnson Administration and the Vietnam Estimates5. The Nixon Administration and the Soviet Strategic Threat6. The Ford Administration and the Team B Affair7. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq8. Politics, Politicization, and the Need for SecrecyAppendix A: Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy RelationsAppendix B: Varieties of PoliticizationNotesIndex

Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he also serves as Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies.

"Fixing the Facts is an insightful exploration of how relations between intelligence officers and policymakers too often go sour. Joshua Rovner convincingly shows that politicization has been a persistent phenomenon and that many of the best-known errors and controversies involving intelligence are rooted in politics and in efforts by leaders to sell their policies to the public."

• Preface1. A Basic Problem: The Uncertain Role of Intelligence in National Security2. Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations3. Policy Oversell and Politicization4. The Johnson Administration and the Vietnam Estimates5. The Nixon Administration and the Soviet Strategic Threat6. The Ford Administration and the Team B Affair7. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq8. Politics, Politicization, and the Need for SecrecyAppendix A: Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy RelationsAppendix B: Varieties of PoliticizationNotesIndex