Paul D. Miller is a political scientist in the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation. He is also an Adjunct Professor of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

In recognizing the complex nature of the subject matter, the author does a commendable job in advancing the body of knowledge in a meaningful way. His efforts certainly enhance the ongoing debate on how to best address conflict and post-conflict state building. Of special note, in appendix A of the book, Miller does an exceptional job in summarizing all United Nations- and U.S.-led state building interventions since 1898. This appendix alone is of value to a wide array of readers. As a complete body of work, this book is best read by conflict theory scholars, military and interagency professionals, international relations/affairs scholars and practicioners, developmental economists, and military historians.- Dr. David A. Anderson (Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, retired) and William E. Odom (Military Review) In this excellent study, Miller brings to bear scholarly rigor and his recent experience as the U.S. National Security Council's director for Afghanistan and Pakistan to assess U.S. and UN efforts to rebuild failed states through armed intervention. Drawing on evidence from such missions in Germany after World War II and more recent attempts in Nicaragua, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Miller argues there is no master strategy that will work in all instances.... His book displays an admirable clarity in its evidence and analysis, although it is worth wondering whether powerful Western states can reliably behave as carefully as Miller advises.- G. John Ikenberry (Foreign Affairs)

• 1. Introduction2. The Myth of Sequencing3. Statehood4. State Failure5. State Building6. Strategies of State Building7. Five State-Building Case Studies8. ConclusionAppendix A: Case SelectionAppendix B: Measuring Success and FailureBibliographyIndex

Paul D. Miller is a political scientist in the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation. He is also an Adjunct Professor of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

In recognizing the complex nature of the subject matter, the author does a commendable job in advancing the body of knowledge in a meaningful way. His efforts certainly enhance the ongoing debate on how to best address conflict and post-conflict state building. Of special note, in appendix A of the book, Miller does an exceptional job in summarizing all United Nations- and U.S.-led state building interventions since 1898. This appendix alone is of value to a wide array of readers. As a complete body of work, this book is best read by conflict theory scholars, military and interagency professionals, international relations/affairs scholars and practicioners, developmental economists, and military historians.- Dr. David A. Anderson (Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, retired) and William E. Odom (Military Review) In this excellent study, Miller brings to bear scholarly rigor and his recent experience as the U.S. National Security Council's director for Afghanistan and Pakistan to assess U.S. and UN efforts to rebuild failed states through armed intervention. Drawing on evidence from such missions in Germany after World War II and more recent attempts in Nicaragua, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Miller argues there is no master strategy that will work in all instances.... His book displays an admirable clarity in its evidence and analysis, although it is worth wondering whether powerful Western states can reliably behave as carefully as Miller advises.- G. John Ikenberry (Foreign Affairs)

• 1. Introduction2. The Myth of Sequencing3. Statehood4. State Failure5. State Building6. Strategies of State Building7. Five State-Building Case Studies8. ConclusionAppendix A: Case SelectionAppendix B: Measuring Success and FailureBibliographyIndex

Paul D. Miller is a political scientist in the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation. He is also an Adjunct Professor of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.

In recognizing the complex nature of the subject matter, the author does a commendable job in advancing the body of knowledge in a meaningful way. His efforts certainly enhance the ongoing debate on how to best address conflict and post-conflict state building. Of special note, in appendix A of the book, Miller does an exceptional job in summarizing all United Nations- and U.S.-led state building interventions since 1898. This appendix alone is of value to a wide array of readers. As a complete body of work, this book is best read by conflict theory scholars, military and interagency professionals, international relations/affairs scholars and practicioners, developmental economists, and military historians.- Dr. David A. Anderson (Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, retired) and William E. Odom (Military Review) In this excellent study, Miller brings to bear scholarly rigor and his recent experience as the U.S. National Security Council's director for Afghanistan and Pakistan to assess U.S. and UN efforts to rebuild failed states through armed intervention. Drawing on evidence from such missions in Germany after World War II and more recent attempts in Nicaragua, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, Miller argues there is no master strategy that will work in all instances.... His book displays an admirable clarity in its evidence and analysis, although it is worth wondering whether powerful Western states can reliably behave as carefully as Miller advises.- G. John Ikenberry (Foreign Affairs)

• 1. Introduction2. The Myth of Sequencing3. Statehood4. State Failure5. State Building6. Strategies of State Building7. Five State-Building Case Studies8. ConclusionAppendix A: Case SelectionAppendix B: Measuring Success and FailureBibliographyIndex