This study describes the U.S. lack of support for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, its abandonment of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in the 1950s, and its disregard for Anastasio Somoza in the 1970s. The authors often say with conviction that American leaders usually have good intentions of standing by a friendly ally. Yet confusion in strategic planning may occur and sometimes disrupts the carrying out of a policy. This was especially true when U.S. policymakers withdrew support from flawed allies and favored uncritically their would-be successors in the hope that Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and the Sandinistas would be better for Americans. In the case of China, for example, the study reveals that the optimistic view of Washington policymakers at the time were inclined to favor Mao Zedong. A strong voice in opposition was that of General Albert C. Wedemeyer who predicted "A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States." He was right. The preface by the Honorable J. William Middendorf adds a personal and revealing touch to these cases.
