Ray S. Cline – författare

This book, the final report of the Soviet Global Strategy Project, describes the USSR's basic approach to the many states in Asia and the Pacific Basin, including nations stretching from Japan to Australia.

This book, the final report of the Soviet Global Strategy Project, describes the USSR's basic approach to the many states in Asia and the Pacific Basin, including nations stretching from Japan to Australia.

Soviet global strategy, long established and well understood by the Kremlin leaders, is to intimidate weak and fearful governments, exploit indigenous difficulties, disrupt social order, and promote communist revolutions. In this volume, European and American scholars describe the USSR's land and sea targets on and surrounding West Europe, where t

Soviet global strategy, long established and well understood by the Kremlin leaders, is to intimidate weak and fearful governments, exploit indigenous difficulties, disrupt social order, and promote communist revolutions. In this volume, European and American scholars describe the USSR's land and sea targets on and surrounding West Europe, where t

This book, based on information consolidated to cover the calendar years 1978 and 1979, assesses the power of nations in the international context as a basis for planning American defense and foreign policy. It suggests a realistic way of thinking about the balance of power in the 1980s.

This study is a strategic assessment of the power of nations in the world of the 1990s and recommendations as to the U.S. strategic role appropriate to that world. Cline has created a formula that describes territorial size, population, economic capability, and military power for strategic purpose and national will. He advocates that in the international arena, the United States should take a defensive strategy, acting overseas only in incidents of overt aggression, and then only in concert with a core group of approximately twenty strategic associate states. The study presents the United States as the only remaining superpower, with the heavy responsibility of keeping democracy alive. Co-published with the United States Global Strategy Council.

This study is a strategic assessment of the power of nations in the world of the 1990s and recommendations as to the U.S. strategic role appropriate to that world. Cline has created a formula that describes territorial size, population, economic capability, and military power for strategic purpose and national will. He advocates that in the international arena, the United States should take a defensive strategy, acting overseas only in incidents of overt aggression, and then only in concert with a core group of approximately twenty strategic associate states. The study presents the United States as the only remaining superpower, with the heavy responsibility of keeping democracy alive. Co-published with the United States Global Strategy Council.

This study of Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), the late President of the Republic of China on Taiwan, is a unique slice of history. It is based on experience of close Chinese-American intelligence cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s, when the author was representing his government as CIA station chief in Taipei. It begins with the author's visit to Taiwan over thirty years ago and ends at President Chiang's funeral in January 1988. Dr. Cline describes not only CCK the man but his political legacy of economic and political progress in the Republic of China. The Taiwan experience is a developmental model for all Asia. The book, printed by Arcata Graphics, is richly illustrated with contemporary photographs and includesóin its first publication in the United Statesóthe candid diary that CCK kept when he was virtually a hostage in the Soviet Union (1925-1937) and learned to hate communism as it really existed under Stalin. Altogether, this book provides an authentic account of a man relatively little known in the Western world, yet one who contributed enormously to democracy in Asia. His place in history as a great Chinese political leader deserves to be put on the record. Originally published in 1989.

This study describes the U.S. lack of support for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, its abandonment of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in the 1950s, and its disregard for Anastasio Somoza in the 1970s. The authors often say with conviction that American leaders usually have good intentions of standing by a friendly ally. Yet confusion in strategic planning may occur and sometimes disrupts the carrying out of a policy. This was especially true when U.S. policymakers withdrew support from flawed allies and favored uncritically their would-be successors in the hope that Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and the Sandinistas would be better for Americans. In the case of China, for example, the study reveals that the optimistic view of Washington policymakers at the time were inclined to favor Mao Zedong. A strong voice in opposition was that of General Albert C. Wedemeyer who predicted "A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States." He was right. The preface by the Honorable J. William Middendorf adds a personal and revealing touch to these cases.