Roni Rosenberg is a Senior Lecturer at the Law Faculty of Ono Academic College, Israel. His field of research is the philosophy of substantive criminal law and the relationship between ethics and criminal jurisprudence.

“Professor Rosenberg provides exceptionally thorough analyses of the legal and moral distinctions between acts and omissions. This book is a must-read by anyone reflecting on this topic and its policy implications in drawing sensible lines between our criminal laws and our moral judgments.”—Joshua Dressler, Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, Michael E. Moritz College of Law The Ohio State University“Roni Rosenberg has produced a comprehensive treatment of how the philosophical and legal complexity of the contrast between acts and omissions applies to substantive controversies, especially the permissibility of euthanasia. But his book is so much more. It also contains a sophisticated examination of several of the most foundational issues in all of moral and legal philosophy.”—Douglas Husak, Distinguished Professor (Emeritus), Rutgers University“This book provides an enlightening, thorough, and original analysis of one of the challenging issues in moral and legal philosophy – the distinction between acts and omissions. Through a fascinating exploration of various rationales for this prevailing distinction, Roni Rosenberg sharply unpacks fundamental theoretical issues in substantive criminal law and demonstrates the practical implications of his analysis.”—Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg [no relation to the author], Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan University; Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law (2023-2024) `The book offers a sophisticated analysis that advances our understanding of fundamental questions in criminal law theory. Rosenberg's work will reward careful study by anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of criminal responsibility, and it deserves a prominent place in ongoing debates about the act/omission distinction.’—Keele Law Review, Volume 5 (2024/25), 111-119 ISSN 2732-5679 `The book serves as a rich source of knowledge for researchers, judges, attorneys, and even legislators seeking to confront the complexity of the distinction between act and omission. It offers theoretical and practical tools that can illuminate the intricate path to the important distinction between act and omission. Reading the book invites the reader to not only re-examine age-old assumptions of criminal law and morality but also to courageously reflect on the normative and institutional structures that have the power to shape the boundaries of criminal liability. This work deserves a place in the canon of scholarship on the subject and stands as a central point of reference for anyone seeking to engage with it.—NUJS Law Review, 18 NUJS L.Rev 3 (2025); ISSN-L (Online): 0975-0207; ISSN (Print): 0975-0029 `[This] is a distinctive and ambitious work that places at its center one of the most challenging questions in criminal law: the distinction between “act” and “omission.” …This inquiry exposes the tension between moral and legal justifications for imposing liability and clarifies that the distinction between act and omission reflects not a formal dichotomy, but a conceptual framework for balancing individual liberty and criminal responsibility. In this way, the book not only sharpens theoretical understanding but also equips practitioners with tools to avoid over-expansion of liability, preserving liberty and justice alike.’—Crime, Law and Social Change (2025) 83:60; https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-025-10243-4

• Introduction. PART I: The Distinction between Act and Omission: Rationales and Classifications 1. The Skeptical Theory 2. The Moral Rationales 3. The Legal Rationales 4. The Autonomy-Based Theory. PART II: The Judicial Stance and the Implications of Various Rationales for Practical Questions Regarding the Act vs. Omission Distinction 5. The Judicial Standpoint Regarding the Definition of Acts and Omissions 6. Types of Duties that Can Serve as a Basis for Criminal Liability in Omissions 7. Differences in the Level of Punishment between Acts and Omissions 8. Distinguishing between Result and Conduct Crimes 9. Distinguishing between Active and Passive Euthanasia. Summary and Future Outlook

Roni Rosenberg is a Senior Lecturer at the Law Faculty of Ono Academic College, Israel. His field of research is the philosophy of substantive criminal law and the relationship between ethics and criminal jurisprudence.

“Professor Rosenberg provides exceptionally thorough analyses of the legal and moral distinctions between acts and omissions. This book is a must-read by anyone reflecting on this topic and its policy implications in drawing sensible lines between our criminal laws and our moral judgments.”—Joshua Dressler, Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, Michael E. Moritz College of Law The Ohio State University“Roni Rosenberg has produced a comprehensive treatment of how the philosophical and legal complexity of the contrast between acts and omissions applies to substantive controversies, especially the permissibility of euthanasia. But his book is so much more. It also contains a sophisticated examination of several of the most foundational issues in all of moral and legal philosophy.”—Douglas Husak, Distinguished Professor (Emeritus), Rutgers University“This book provides an enlightening, thorough, and original analysis of one of the challenging issues in moral and legal philosophy – the distinction between acts and omissions. Through a fascinating exploration of various rationales for this prevailing distinction, Roni Rosenberg sharply unpacks fundamental theoretical issues in substantive criminal law and demonstrates the practical implications of his analysis.”—Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg [no relation to the author], Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan University; Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law (2023-2024) `The book offers a sophisticated analysis that advances our understanding of fundamental questions in criminal law theory. Rosenberg's work will reward careful study by anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of criminal responsibility, and it deserves a prominent place in ongoing debates about the act/omission distinction.’—Keele Law Review, Volume 5 (2024/25), 111-119 ISSN 2732-5679 `The book serves as a rich source of knowledge for researchers, judges, attorneys, and even legislators seeking to confront the complexity of the distinction between act and omission. It offers theoretical and practical tools that can illuminate the intricate path to the important distinction between act and omission. Reading the book invites the reader to not only re-examine age-old assumptions of criminal law and morality but also to courageously reflect on the normative and institutional structures that have the power to shape the boundaries of criminal liability. This work deserves a place in the canon of scholarship on the subject and stands as a central point of reference for anyone seeking to engage with it.—NUJS Law Review, 18 NUJS L.Rev 3 (2025); ISSN-L (Online): 0975-0207; ISSN (Print): 0975-0029 `[This] is a distinctive and ambitious work that places at its center one of the most challenging questions in criminal law: the distinction between “act” and “omission.” …This inquiry exposes the tension between moral and legal justifications for imposing liability and clarifies that the distinction between act and omission reflects not a formal dichotomy, but a conceptual framework for balancing individual liberty and criminal responsibility. In this way, the book not only sharpens theoretical understanding but also equips practitioners with tools to avoid over-expansion of liability, preserving liberty and justice alike.’—Crime, Law and Social Change (2025) 83:60; https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-025-10243-4

• Introduction. PART I: The Distinction between Act and Omission: Rationales and Classifications 1. The Skeptical Theory 2. The Moral Rationales 3. The Legal Rationales 4. The Autonomy-Based Theory. PART II: The Judicial Stance and the Implications of Various Rationales for Practical Questions Regarding the Act vs. Omission Distinction 5. The Judicial Standpoint Regarding the Definition of Acts and Omissions 6. Types of Duties that Can Serve as a Basis for Criminal Liability in Omissions 7. Differences in the Level of Punishment between Acts and Omissions 8. Distinguishing between Result and Conduct Crimes 9. Distinguishing between Active and Passive Euthanasia. Summary and Future Outlook

Roni Rosenberg is a Senior Lecturer at the Law Faculty of Ono Academic College, Israel. His field of research is the philosophy of substantive criminal law and the relationship between ethics and criminal jurisprudence.

“Professor Rosenberg provides exceptionally thorough analyses of the legal and moral distinctions between acts and omissions. This book is a must-read by anyone reflecting on this topic and its policy implications in drawing sensible lines between our criminal laws and our moral judgments.”—Joshua Dressler, Distinguished University Professor Emeritus, Michael E. Moritz College of Law The Ohio State University“Roni Rosenberg has produced a comprehensive treatment of how the philosophical and legal complexity of the contrast between acts and omissions applies to substantive controversies, especially the permissibility of euthanasia. But his book is so much more. It also contains a sophisticated examination of several of the most foundational issues in all of moral and legal philosophy.”—Douglas Husak, Distinguished Professor (Emeritus), Rutgers University“This book provides an enlightening, thorough, and original analysis of one of the challenging issues in moral and legal philosophy – the distinction between acts and omissions. Through a fascinating exploration of various rationales for this prevailing distinction, Roni Rosenberg sharply unpacks fundamental theoretical issues in substantive criminal law and demonstrates the practical implications of his analysis.”—Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg [no relation to the author], Professor of Law, Bar-Ilan University; Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law (2023-2024) `The book offers a sophisticated analysis that advances our understanding of fundamental questions in criminal law theory. Rosenberg's work will reward careful study by anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of criminal responsibility, and it deserves a prominent place in ongoing debates about the act/omission distinction.’—Keele Law Review, Volume 5 (2024/25), 111-119 ISSN 2732-5679 `The book serves as a rich source of knowledge for researchers, judges, attorneys, and even legislators seeking to confront the complexity of the distinction between act and omission. It offers theoretical and practical tools that can illuminate the intricate path to the important distinction between act and omission. Reading the book invites the reader to not only re-examine age-old assumptions of criminal law and morality but also to courageously reflect on the normative and institutional structures that have the power to shape the boundaries of criminal liability. This work deserves a place in the canon of scholarship on the subject and stands as a central point of reference for anyone seeking to engage with it.—NUJS Law Review, 18 NUJS L.Rev 3 (2025); ISSN-L (Online): 0975-0207; ISSN (Print): 0975-0029 `[This] is a distinctive and ambitious work that places at its center one of the most challenging questions in criminal law: the distinction between “act” and “omission.” …This inquiry exposes the tension between moral and legal justifications for imposing liability and clarifies that the distinction between act and omission reflects not a formal dichotomy, but a conceptual framework for balancing individual liberty and criminal responsibility. In this way, the book not only sharpens theoretical understanding but also equips practitioners with tools to avoid over-expansion of liability, preserving liberty and justice alike.’—Crime, Law and Social Change (2025) 83:60; https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-025-10243-4

• Introduction. PART I: The Distinction between Act and Omission: Rationales and Classifications 1. The Skeptical Theory 2. The Moral Rationales 3. The Legal Rationales 4. The Autonomy-Based Theory. PART II: The Judicial Stance and the Implications of Various Rationales for Practical Questions Regarding the Act vs. Omission Distinction 5. The Judicial Standpoint Regarding the Definition of Acts and Omissions 6. Types of Duties that Can Serve as a Basis for Criminal Liability in Omissions 7. Differences in the Level of Punishment between Acts and Omissions 8. Distinguishing between Result and Conduct Crimes 9. Distinguishing between Active and Passive Euthanasia. Summary and Future Outlook