Chronicle of a People's War: The Military and Strategic History of the Cambodian Civil War, 1979–1991

Brigadier General Boraden Nhem currently serves as assistant to General Tea Banh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense of Cambodia. He previously served as Deputy Director of the Institute of Military History. He is also an adjunct lecturer at the Department of International Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh. He received his PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Delaware (United States) in 2014 after previous studies in Cambodia and France. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, class of 14–02, where he also graduated with an MMAS in Military History. He has authored a previous book, which examined the entire military history of the Khmer Rouge (1950s–1999).

• 1. INTRODUCTION: THE CHRONIC WAR1.1 The living chronicles of a People’s War1.2 What makes this book unique1.3 Notes on sources1.4 Military jargon survival kit1.4.1 People’s War1.4.2 Politics and war1.4.3 The role of the tank in the Cambodian civil war1.4.4 A note on modern military organization1.5 Plan of the book1.6 Acknowledgments 2. ROAD TO WAR2.1 The colonial heritage2.2 The Radical Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK)2.3 Cambodia leaned right: policy shift towards the US2.4 Full-scale war: the coup of 19702.5 Democratic Kampuchea: Cambodia’s dark age 2.5.1 Prince Sihanouk: much vanity but no power2.5.2 Disaster of the Four-Year Plan (1977-1980)2.5.3 Comrades at war: Vietnam’s southern march must be stopped!2.6 Kampuchea Solidarity Front for National Salvation: birth of a revolution2.6.1 The East Zone put to the sword2.6.2 Prince Sihanouk became useful to the Khmer Rouge once more: adding one more insult to injury3. THE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA: THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS NOT NECESSARILY MY FRIEND3.1 The Khmer Rouge: from guerrillas to regulars, from regulars to guerrillas 3.1.1 The post-1979 reorganization: strategic and operational doctrine3.1.2 Logistics3.1.3 Tactics: military and political concept of guerrilla war3.2 The non-communist resistance (NCR)3.2.1 "What have we to lose?": life of an ordinary Cambodian amid chaos 3.2.2 Non-communist resistance 1: Khmer People’s National Liberation Front3.2.2.1 Revenge of the Khmer Republic3.2.2.2 Organization3.2.2.3 Thailand’s check-and-balance policy bites its tail: KPNLF’s internal rift3.2.3 Non-communist resistance 2: Samdech Oeuv’s (king father’s) army3.3 PAVN’s response to the one-country-two-administrations: the 1982-1983 dry season offensive3.3.1 One country, two states: military angle3.3.2 One country, two states: political and diplomatic angles3.3.3 1983: The PAVN flexed its muscles3.3.4 PAVN’s 1984-1985 dry season offensive: The 16-Camps Campaign3.3.5 Aftermath of the PAVN’s 1985 dry season offensive4. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA: WHEN IN DOUBT, APPLY PEOPLE’S WAR4.1 The PAVN’s Cambodian contingent: the Vietnamese Volunteer Army4.2 The Kampuchea People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA)4.2.1 Mobilization strategy and concept of operations4.2.2 The armed propaganda units and the dual-duty companies4.2.3 Indoctrination4.2.3.1 Indoctrination in action4.2.3.2 1980: the military governed4.2.3.3 1985: war on the fringes, indoctrination in the interior 4.2.3.4 1989: time’s up for indoctrination4.2.4 Result of indoctrination 1: the KPRA’s provincial military commands (PMC)4.2.4.1 History of the Battambang PMC4.2.4.2 History of Banteay Meanchey PMC4.2.4.3 History of Kampong Thom PMC4.2.5 Result of indoctrination 2: Region 4, Military Region 4 and 54.3 Territory-centric versus population-centric strategy4.4 The KPRA mobile divisions went to war along the border4.5 Summary and discussion: a war of numbers5. WHEN THE SKY FALLS AND MOUNTAINS FLATTENED: THE CGDK MADE OPERATION GRADUATION5.1 Diplomacy with (huge) armies: prelude to the 1989 CGDK’s combined offensive5.2 Battambang province: easy picking, hard swallowing5.3 The defense of Traeng5.4 Banteay Meanchey: the locals who dared say no to the central5.4.1 Phase 1, first axis of the KPNLAF onslaught—Svay Chek5.4.2 Phase 1, second axis of the KPNLAF onslaught—Phnom Srok5.4.3 Phase 2: "My home, my war"—the KPRA’s counteroffensive5.5 Kampong Thom Province: "If I flee, where do you suggest I go?"5.5.1 The political context5.5.2 Military operations5.6 Diplomacy without an army6. PARTING OFFENSIVES: RESIDUAL BATTLES OF THE CAMBODIAN CIVIL WAR6.1 Counterargument: stealing the KPRA’s thunder—Pailin and the return of the PAVN 6.2 Forgotten victories: the PRK’s pre-emption and counteroffensive6.2.1 Pursat province6.2.2 Siem Reap-Ouddar Meanchey provincial military command6.2.3 The 286th division6.3 Operation X-91 and Kampot Operation: the KPRA on a rampage 6.4 Peace!CONCLUSION: THE ELUSIVE PEACE7.1 People’s War and operational graduation7.2 Territorial forces, strategy, and morale7.3 Morale is about location, location, location7.4 Winners and losers7.5 PostscriptAppendix AAppendix BBibliography