The problem of other minds has widely been considered as a special problem within the debate about scepticism. If one cannot be sure that there is a world existing independent ly of one''s mind, how can we be sure that there are minds - minds which we cannot even experience the way we experience material objects?
This book shows, through a detailed examination of David Hume''s A Treatise of Human Nature, that these concerns are unfounded. By focusing on Hume''s discussion of sympathy - the ability to connect with the mental contents of other persons - Anik Waldow demonstrates that belief in other minds can be justified by the same means as belief in material objects.
The book thus not only provides the first large-scale treatment of the function of the belief in other minds within the Treatise, thereby adding a new dimension to Hume''s realism, but also serves as an invaluable guide to the complexity of the problem of other minds and its various responses in contemporary debate.
