Game Theory and Decision Theory in Agent-Based Systems

Häftad, Engelska, 2012

Del 5 i serien Multiagent Systems, Artificial Societies, and Simulated Organizations

2 174 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Beskrivning

Game Theory And Decision Theory In Agent-Based Systems is a collection of papers from international leading researchers, that offers a broad view of the many ways game theory and decision theory can be applied in agent-based systems, from standard applications of the core elements of the theory to more cutting edge developments. The range of topics discussed in this book provide the reader with the first comprehensive volume that reflects both the depth and breadth of work in applying techniques from game theory and decision theory to design agent-based systems. Chapters include: Selecting Partners; Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an IPD Exercise; Dynamic Desires; Emotions and Personality; Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory; Shopbot Economics; Finding the Best Way to Join in; Shopbots and Pricebots in Electronic Service Markets; Polynomial Time Mechanisms; Multi-Agent Q-learning and Regression Trees; Satisficing Equilibria; Investigating Commitment Flexibility in Multi-agent Contracts; Pricing in Agent Economies using Multi-agent Q-learning; Using Hypergames to Increase Planned Payoff and Reduce Risk; Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information; Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2012-10-31
Mått:155 x 235 x 23 mm
Vikt:628 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Multiagent Systems, Artificial Societies, and Simulated Organizations
Antal sidor:379
Förlag:Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
ISBN:9781461353980

Utforska kategorier

Optimering inom Naturvetenskap och teknik
Artificiell intelligens inom Data och IT

Innehållsförteckning

1 Game Theory and Decision Theory.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Decision Theory.- 3 Game Theory.- 4 The Prisoner’s Dilemma.- 5 Summary.- 2 Selecting Partners.- 1 Introduction.- 2 A Sample Problem.- 3 Coalition Formation.- 4 Payoff-structures of Partnerships.- 5 Selecting the Potentially most Beneficial Partnership for Limited Interactions.- 6 An Example Evaluation.- 7 Comparative Evaluation with a Decision Mechanism for Infinite Interactions.- 8 Evaluation Scenario.- 9 Experimental Results.- 10 Conclusions.- 3 Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an IPD Exercise.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Moral Sentiments in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.- 3 The Unwitting Benefits of Altruism.- 4 An Evolutionary Setting for the Simulations.- 5 Playing with Moral Sentiments Secures the Survival of the Group.- 6 A Case for Benevolence in Agents.- 7 Conclusions.- 4 Dynamic Desires.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Utilities, Desires and Goals.- 3 An Example from Negotiation.- 4 Dynamic Logic.- 5 Future Research.- 6 Concluding Remarks.- 5 Emotions and Personality.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Decision—Theoretic Preliminaries.- 3 Emotional States and Personality.- 4 Conclusions and Future Work.- 5 Acknowledgements.- 6 Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory.- 1 Background on Decision—Theoretic Approach to Game Theory.- 2 Knowledge Base Design.- 3 RMM’s Solution Method.- 4 Rational Communication 109 5 Experiments in Air Defense Domain.- 6 Conclusions.- 7 Shopbot Economics.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Model.- 3 Sellers.- 4 Buyers.- 5 Shopbot.- 6 Related Work.- 7 Conclusions and Future Work.- Appendix: No Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- 8 Finding the Best Way to Join in.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Game Theoretic Foundations.- 3 The Accession Game.- 4 Solving More General Games.- 5 Conclusions.- 9 Shopbots and Pricebots inElectronic Service Markets.- 1 Introduction and Definitions.- 2 Our Model of an Electronic Service Market.- 3 Comparisons.- 4 Related Literature.- 5 Conclusions.- Appendix: The Derivation of Equilibrium for the XX Market Configuration.- 10 Polynomial Time Mechanisms.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Mechanism Design.- 3 Polynomial Time Mechanisms.- 4 Dominant Strategy Implementation.- 5 Nash Implementation.- 6 Upper Bounds on Approximability.- 7 Conclusions.- 11 Multi-Agent Q-learning and Regression Trees.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Model Agent Economies.- 3 Single and Multi-Agent Q-learning.- 4 Q-learning with Regression Trees.- 5 Results.- 6 Conclusions.- 12 Satisficing Equilibria.- 1 Introduction.- 2 A Comparative Paradigm.- 3 Praxeic Utility.- 4 Multi-Agent Systems.- 5 Satisficing Games.- 6 Summary and Discussion.- 13 Investigating Commitment Flexibility in Multi-agent Contracts.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Scenario.- 3 Some Analysis of Special Cases.- 4 Empirical Work.- 5 Conclusions and Further Work.- 14 Pricing in Agent Economies using Multi-agent Q-learning.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Model Agent Economies.- 3 Single-agent Q-learning.- 4 Multi-agent Q-learning.- 5 Conclusions.- 15 Using Hypergames to Increase Planned Payoff and Reduce Risk.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Discussion.- 3 Results.- 4 Conclusions.- 16 Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Application Area.- 3 The Negotiation Mechanism.- 4 Evaluation.- 5 Related Work on Negotiation.- 6 Conclusions.- 17 Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Generalized Vickrey Auction Protocol (GVA).- 3 Robust Protocol against False-name Bids.- 4 Proof of Incentive Compatibility.- 5 Evaluation.- 6 Discussion.- 7 Conclusions.