Institutional and Organizational Economics

A Behavioral Game Theory Introduction

AvTore Ellingsen

Häftad, Engelska, 2023

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Beskrivning

Why do some countries succeed while others struggle? Why are some firms profitable while rivals fail? Why do some marriages thrive and others end in divorce? These questions seem unrelated, but societies, companies, and marriages have one important thing in common: they involve more than one individual. They thus face the same fundamental challenges. How can people be made to help rather than hurt each other? How can they use sacrifice, cooperation, and coercion to promote the common good?In this introductory text, Tore Ellingsen equips readers to answer essential questions around the success and failure of humans in groups, drawing on behavioral game theory, psychology, and sociology. He emphasizes how other-regarding preferences such as altruism and dutifulness matter for societies’ prosperity, and analyzes the role of culture in the form of shared values and understandings. One lesson is that cooperation is facilitated when people anticipate that they will hold common memories of past behavior, especially if agreements take precedence over leaders’ authority.A groundbreaking text, Institutional and Organizational Economics is essential reading for students and scholars of economics, political science, sociology, and public administration.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2023-10-06
Mått:137 x 216 x 18 mm
Vikt:295 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:240
Förlag:John Wiley and Sons Ltd
ISBN:9781509559008

Utforska kategorier

Mikroekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Nationalekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Organisationsteori inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

Tore Ellingsen is the Ragnar Söderberg Chair in Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics.

Recensioner i media

“Institutional and Organizational Economics not only provides a superb development of the ideas of organizational economics, using the tools of basic game theory, but also offers fascinating connections to history, sociology, and literature. A tour de force.”Oliver D. Hart, Harvard University“This slim volume offers an amazing wealth of ideas about institutions and organizations. The exposition nicely combines historical and experimental evidence with clear and simple behavioral game theoretic explanations. A book to instruct and delight students and scholars alike.”Avinash Dixit, Princeton University

Innehållsförteckning

Preface1 The Organizational Challenge2 Sacrifice3 Selfishness, Rationality, and Utility4 Situations, Games, and Cooperation5 Shared Understandings and Values6 Predicting Behavior in Games7 A Model of Anarchy8 Changing the Game9 Coordination10 Authority’s Limitations11 Relationships12 Third-party Punishment13 Coercion: Costs and Benefits14 Contracts and Governance15 Limited Liability and Corporate Finance16 Asymmetric Information17 Application: The Oil-Pool Problem18 Conclusion19 More Food for Thought20 Further ReadingPostfaceAnswers to ExercisesNotesReferencesIndex