Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.'--From the foreword by Eric Maskin'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France

• Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin1. IntroductionLuis C. Corchón and Marco A. MariniPART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS2. Horizontal mergers in oligopolyRamon Faulí‐Oller and Joel Sandonis3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated marketsMarco A. Marini 4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learntCatarina Marvão and Giancarlo Spagnolo5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger casesNatalia Fabra and Massimo MottaPART II CONTESTS 6. Contest theoryLuis C. Corchón and Marco Serena7. Endogenous timing in contestsMagnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota‐GraziosiPART III SPECIAL TOPICS8. Firm pricing with consumer searchSimon P. Anderson and Régis Renault9. Market structure, liability, and product safetyAndrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum 10. Strategic delegation in oligopolyMichael Kopel and Mario Pezzino11. Platforms and network effectsPaul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz12. AuctionsÁngel Hernando-Veciana 13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economicsLuca Lambertini 14. Intellectual propertyMiguel González‐Maestre 15. Healthcare and health insurance marketsPau Olivella 16. The microeconomics of corruptionRoberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza and José G. MontalvoPART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 17. Experimental industrial organizationJordi Brandts and Jan Potters 18. Empirical models of firms’ R&DAndrés Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto López and Lourdes Moreno Index

Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.'--From the foreword by Eric Maskin'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France

• Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin1. IntroductionLuis C. Corchón and Marco A. MariniPART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS2. Horizontal mergers in oligopolyRamon Faulí‐Oller and Joel Sandonis3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated marketsMarco A. Marini 4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learntCatarina Marvão and Giancarlo Spagnolo5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger casesNatalia Fabra and Massimo MottaPART II CONTESTS 6. Contest theoryLuis C. Corchón and Marco Serena7. Endogenous timing in contestsMagnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota‐GraziosiPART III SPECIAL TOPICS8. Firm pricing with consumer searchSimon P. Anderson and Régis Renault9. Market structure, liability, and product safetyAndrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum 10. Strategic delegation in oligopolyMichael Kopel and Mario Pezzino11. Platforms and network effectsPaul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz12. AuctionsÁngel Hernando-Veciana 13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economicsLuca Lambertini 14. Intellectual propertyMiguel González‐Maestre 15. Healthcare and health insurance marketsPau Olivella 16. The microeconomics of corruptionRoberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza and José G. MontalvoPART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 17. Experimental industrial organizationJordi Brandts and Jan Potters 18. Empirical models of firms’ R&DAndrés Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto López and Lourdes Moreno Index

Edited by Luis C. Corchón, Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain and Marco A. Marini, Department of Social and Economic Sciences, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

'The publication of this Handbook, bringing together game theory and industrial organization, is an occasion worth celebrating. . . . I am truly delighted that there is now a Handbook devoted to this transformative partnership.'--From the foreword by Eric Maskin'With these two volumes, Professors Corchon and Marini have provided an invaluable public good to our profession. Corchon and Marini have gathered leading scholars to present a broad and deep overview of the definitive impact that game theory had and still continues to have on the field of industrial organization over the recent years. Any serious researcher willing to take stock of advances in the field should certainly consider to study the material covered in these volumes, from the more fundamental issues in Volume 1 to the more applied topics presented in Volume 2.'--David Martimort, Paris School of Economics, France

• Contents: Foreword by Eric Maskin1. IntroductionLuis C. Corchón and Marco A. MariniPART I COLLUSION AND MERGERS2. Horizontal mergers in oligopolyRamon Faulí‐Oller and Joel Sandonis3. Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated marketsMarco A. Marini 4. Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learntCatarina Marvão and Giancarlo Spagnolo5. Assessing coordinated effects in merger casesNatalia Fabra and Massimo MottaPART II CONTESTS 6. Contest theoryLuis C. Corchón and Marco Serena7. Endogenous timing in contestsMagnus Hoffmann and Grégoire Rota‐GraziosiPART III SPECIAL TOPICS8. Firm pricing with consumer searchSimon P. Anderson and Régis Renault9. Market structure, liability, and product safetyAndrew F. Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum 10. Strategic delegation in oligopolyMichael Kopel and Mario Pezzino11. Platforms and network effectsPaul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz12. AuctionsÁngel Hernando-Veciana 13. Differential oligopoly games in environmental and resource economicsLuca Lambertini 14. Intellectual propertyMiguel González‐Maestre 15. Healthcare and health insurance marketsPau Olivella 16. The microeconomics of corruptionRoberto Burguet, Juan-José Ganuza and José G. MontalvoPART IV EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 17. Experimental industrial organizationJordi Brandts and Jan Potters 18. Empirical models of firms’ R&DAndrés Barge-Gil, Elena Huergo, Alberto López and Lourdes Moreno Index