Edited by Gianluca Fiorentini, Associate Professor of Economics and Stefano Zamagni, Professor of Economics, University of Bologna and Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center, Italy

• Contents:Acknowledgements • Introduction Volume I:Part I: Corruption and Allocation of Resources1. Jeans Christopher Andvig (1991), ‘The Economics of Corruption: A Survey’2. Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene (1990), ‘How Corruption May Corrupt’3. Francis T. Lui (1985), ‘An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery’4. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1975), ‘The Economics of Corruption’5. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993), ‘Corruption’6. Mehmet Bac (1996), ‘Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies’7. Mehmet Bac (1996), ‘Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies’Part II: Corruption and Game Theory8. Paul J. Beck and Michael W. Maher (1986), ‘A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets’9. Olivier Cadot (1987), ‘Corruption as a Gamble’10. Leonard Kleinrock (1967), ‘Optimum Bribing for Queue Position’11. Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1986), ‘A Note on Competitive Bribery Games’12. Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1987), ‘Asymmetric Information in Competitive Bribery Games’13. Jean Tirole (1996), ‘A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)’Part III: Corruption, Bureaucracy and Public Intervention14. Edward C. Banfield (1975), ‘Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization’15. Bruce L. Benson and John Baden (1985), ‘The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government’16. Parkash Chander and Louis Wilde (1992), ‘Corruption in Tax Administration’17. Frank Flatters and W. Bentley Macleod (1995), ‘Administrative Corruption and Taxation’18. Melanie Manion (1996), ‘Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing’ and ‘Correction to “Corruption by Design”’19. S. Rottenberg (1960), ‘A Theory of Corruption in Trade Unions’20. Barbara N. Sands (1990), ‘Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China’s Economic Reforms’21. Robert Wade (1985), ‘The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development’Part IV: The Social Costs of Corruption22. P. Bardhan (1997), ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’23. Michael Beenstock (1979), ‘Corruption and Development’24. Arye L. Hilman and Eliakim Katz (1987), ‘Hierarchical Structure and the Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers’25. Mushtaq H. Khan (1996), ‘The Efficiency Implications of Corruption’26. Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1990), ‘Corruption and Allocation Efficiency’27. Leong H. Liew (1992), ‘Corruption as a Form of Insurance’28. Oskar Kurer (1993), ‘Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources’Part V: Corruption, Development and Growth29. M.S. Alam (1990), ‘Some Economic Costs of Corruption in LDC’s’30. M.S. Alam (1995), ‘A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications’31. N. Vijay Jagannathan (1986), ‘Corruption, Delivery Systems, and Property Rights’32. Omotunde E.G. Johnson (1975), ‘An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, with Special Application to Less Developed Countries’33. John Macrae (1992), ‘Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach’34. Paolo Mauro (1995), ‘Corruption and Growth’35. Oluwole Owoye and Ibrahim Bendardaf (1996), ‘The Macroeconomic Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth of Developing Economies’36. Salim Rashid (1981), ‘Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC’s: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency’Name Index Volume II: Part I: Productive and Destructive Economic Activities1. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1982), ‘Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities’2. William J. Baumol (1990), ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’3. Herschel I. Grossman and Suk JaeNoh (1990), ‘A Theory of Kleptocracy With Probabilistic Survival and Reputation’4. Herschel I. Grossman and Minseong Kim (1995), ‘Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property’5. Jack Hirschleifer (1991), ‘The Paradox of Power’6. Anne O. Krueger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’7. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993), ‘Why is Rent-seeking so Costly to Growth?’8. Stergios Skaperdas (1992), ‘Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights’Part II: The Economic Theory of Illegal Activities9. Gary S. Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’10. Michael K. Block and Robert C. Lind (1975), ‘Crime and Punishment Reconsidered’11. M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke (1975), ‘A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice’12. Samuel Cameron (1988), ‘The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence’13. William T. Dickens (1986), ‘Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach with a Psychological Twist’14. Isaac Ehrlich (1973), ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’15. Isaac Ehrlich (1996), ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses’16. Richard B. Freeman (1996), ‘Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?’17. Stephan M. Panther (1995), ‘The Economics of Crime and Criminal Law: An Antithesis to Sociological Theories?’Part III: Law Enforcement and Deterrence Policies18. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler (1974), ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’19. John R. Lott, Jr. and Russell D. Roberts (1989), ‘Why Comply: One Sided Enforcement of Price Controls and Victimless Crime Laws’20. Arun S. Malik (1990), ‘Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement’21. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1992), ‘Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines’22. Steven Shavell (1991), ‘Specific versus General Enforcement of Law’23. George J. Stigler (1970), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’Part IV: Deterrence Policies Against Corruption24. Kaushik Basu, Sudipto Bhattacharya and Ajit Mishra (1992), ‘Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption’25. Timothy Besley and John McLaren (1993), ‘Taxes and Bribery: the Role of Wage Incentives’26. Roger Bowles and Nuno Garoupa (1997), ‘Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime’27. Francis T. Lui (1986), ‘A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence’28. D. Mookherjee and I.P.L. Png (1995), ‘Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?’29. Eric Rasmusen and J. Mark Ramseyer (1994), ‘Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators’Name IndexVolume III:Part I: The Underground Economy1. Bruno Contini (1981), ‘Labor Market Segmentation and the Development of the Parallel Economy – The Italian Experience’2. Arne Jon Isachsen and Steinar Strøm (1980), ‘The Hidden Economy: The Labor Market and Tax Evasion’3. Edgar L. Feige (1994), ‘The Underground Economy and the Currency Enigma’4. Bruno S. Frey and Werner W. Pommerehne (1984), ‘The Hidden Economy: State and Prospects for Measurement’5. P. Reuter (1984), ‘The Economic Significance of Illegal Markets in the United States: Some Observations’6. Friedrich Schneider (1994), ‘Can the Shadow Economy be Reduced Through Major Tax Reforms? An Empirical Investigation for Austria’7. Vito Tanzi (1983), ‘The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates, 1930–80’Part II: Victimless Activities and Illegal Markets8. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1981), ‘Alternative Theories of Illegal Trade: Economic Consequences and Statistical Detection’9. Christopher S. Koper and Peter Reuter (1996), ‘Suppressing Illegal Gun Markets: Lessons from Drug Enforcement’10. Mary E. Lovely and Douglas R. Nelson (1994), ‘Illegal Trade and Endogenous Tariff Formation’11. Harold C. Nathan (1980), ‘Economic Analysis of Usury Laws’12. Chris Paul and Al Wilhite (1994), ‘Illegal Markets and the Social Costs of Rent-Seeking’13. Richard L. Peterson (1983), ‘Usury Laws and Consumer Credit: A Note’14. Marie Thursby, Richard Jensen and Jerry Thursby (1991), ‘Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure’15. Daniel J. Villegas (1989), ‘The Impact of Usury Ceilings on Consumer Credit’16. Rodney T. Smith (1976), ‘The Legal and Illegal Markets for Taxed Goods: Pure Theory and an Application to State Government Taxation of Distilled Spirits’17. John D. Wolken and Frank J. Navratil (1981), ‘The Economic Impact of the Federal Credit Union Usury Ceiling’Part III: The Economics of the Organized Crime18. Diego Gambetta (1988), ‘Fragments of an Economic Theory of the Mafia’19. William P. Jennings (1984), ‘A Note on the Economics of the Organized Crime’20. Riccardo Marselli and Marco Vannini (1997), ‘Estimating a Crime Equation in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Italy’21. Thomas C. Schelling (1967), ‘Economics and Criminal Enterprise’22. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), ‘What Is the Business of the Organized Crime?’Part IV: The Market for Drugs and Public Policy23. Susan L. Averett and Harold M. Hochman (1994), ‘Addictive Behavior and Public Policy’24. Gary S. Becker, Michael Grossman and Kevin M. Murphy (1991), ‘Rational Addiction and the Effects of Price on Consumption’25. Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘A Theory of Rational Addiction’26. Roger D. Blair and Ronald J. Vogel (1973), ‘Heroin Addiction and Urban Crime’27. Billy J. Eatherly (1974), ‘Drug-Law Enforcement: Should We Arrest Pushers or Users?’28. John Holahan (1973), ‘The Economics of Control of the Illegal Supply of Heroin’29. John R. Lott, Jr. (1992), ‘An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convinctions: The Importance of an Individual's Reputation’30. Richard B. McKenzie (1991), ‘Rational Addiction, Lagged Demands and the Efficiency of Excise Taxes: Revisions of Standard Theory’31. Mark H. Moore (1973), ‘Policies To Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin’32. Peter Reuter (1988), ‘Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Intervention into Vice Policy’33. Simon Rottenberg (1968), ‘The Clandestine Distribution of Heroin, Its Discovery and Suppression’34. George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker (1977), ‘De Gustibus non Est Disputandum’35. Michael D. White and William A. Luksetich (1983), ‘Heroin: Price Elasticity and Enforcement Strategies’Name Index

Edited by Gianluca Fiorentini, Associate Professor of Economics and Stefano Zamagni, Professor of Economics, University of Bologna and Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center, Italy

• Contents:Acknowledgements • Introduction Volume I:Part I: Corruption and Allocation of Resources1. Jeans Christopher Andvig (1991), ‘The Economics of Corruption: A Survey’2. Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene (1990), ‘How Corruption May Corrupt’3. Francis T. Lui (1985), ‘An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery’4. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1975), ‘The Economics of Corruption’5. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993), ‘Corruption’6. Mehmet Bac (1996), ‘Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies’7. Mehmet Bac (1996), ‘Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies’Part II: Corruption and Game Theory8. Paul J. Beck and Michael W. Maher (1986), ‘A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets’9. Olivier Cadot (1987), ‘Corruption as a Gamble’10. Leonard Kleinrock (1967), ‘Optimum Bribing for Queue Position’11. Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1986), ‘A Note on Competitive Bribery Games’12. Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1987), ‘Asymmetric Information in Competitive Bribery Games’13. Jean Tirole (1996), ‘A Theory of Collective Reputations (With Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)’Part III: Corruption, Bureaucracy and Public Intervention14. Edward C. Banfield (1975), ‘Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization’15. Bruce L. Benson and John Baden (1985), ‘The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of Underground Government’16. Parkash Chander and Louis Wilde (1992), ‘Corruption in Tax Administration’17. Frank Flatters and W. Bentley Macleod (1995), ‘Administrative Corruption and Taxation’18. Melanie Manion (1996), ‘Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing’ and ‘Correction to “Corruption by Design”’19. S. Rottenberg (1960), ‘A Theory of Corruption in Trade Unions’20. Barbara N. Sands (1990), ‘Decentralizing an Economy: The Role of Bureaucratic Corruption in China’s Economic Reforms’21. Robert Wade (1985), ‘The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at Development’Part IV: The Social Costs of Corruption22. P. Bardhan (1997), ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’23. Michael Beenstock (1979), ‘Corruption and Development’24. Arye L. Hilman and Eliakim Katz (1987), ‘Hierarchical Structure and the Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers’25. Mushtaq H. Khan (1996), ‘The Efficiency Implications of Corruption’26. Da-Hsiang Donald Lien (1990), ‘Corruption and Allocation Efficiency’27. Leong H. Liew (1992), ‘Corruption as a Form of Insurance’28. Oskar Kurer (1993), ‘Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources’Part V: Corruption, Development and Growth29. M.S. Alam (1990), ‘Some Economic Costs of Corruption in LDC’s’30. M.S. Alam (1995), ‘A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications’31. N. Vijay Jagannathan (1986), ‘Corruption, Delivery Systems, and Property Rights’32. Omotunde E.G. Johnson (1975), ‘An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, with Special Application to Less Developed Countries’33. John Macrae (1992), ‘Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach’34. Paolo Mauro (1995), ‘Corruption and Growth’35. Oluwole Owoye and Ibrahim Bendardaf (1996), ‘The Macroeconomic Analysis of the Effects of Corruption on Economic Growth of Developing Economies’36. Salim Rashid (1981), ‘Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC’s: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency’Name Index Volume II: Part I: Productive and Destructive Economic Activities1. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1982), ‘Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities’2. William J. Baumol (1990), ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’3. Herschel I. Grossman and Suk JaeNoh (1990), ‘A Theory of Kleptocracy With Probabilistic Survival and Reputation’4. Herschel I. Grossman and Minseong Kim (1995), ‘Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property’5. Jack Hirschleifer (1991), ‘The Paradox of Power’6. Anne O. Krueger (1974), ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’7. Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993), ‘Why is Rent-seeking so Costly to Growth?’8. Stergios Skaperdas (1992), ‘Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights’Part II: The Economic Theory of Illegal Activities9. Gary S. Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’10. Michael K. Block and Robert C. Lind (1975), ‘Crime and Punishment Reconsidered’11. M.K. Block and J.M. Heineke (1975), ‘A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice’12. Samuel Cameron (1988), ‘The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence’13. William T. Dickens (1986), ‘Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach with a Psychological Twist’14. Isaac Ehrlich (1973), ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’15. Isaac Ehrlich (1996), ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses’16. Richard B. Freeman (1996), ‘Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?’17. Stephan M. Panther (1995), ‘The Economics of Crime and Criminal Law: An Antithesis to Sociological Theories?’Part III: Law Enforcement and Deterrence Policies18. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler (1974), ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’19. John R. Lott, Jr. and Russell D. Roberts (1989), ‘Why Comply: One Sided Enforcement of Price Controls and Victimless Crime Laws’20. Arun S. Malik (1990), ‘Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement’21. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1992), ‘Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines’22. Steven Shavell (1991), ‘Specific versus General Enforcement of Law’23. George J. Stigler (1970), ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’Part IV: Deterrence Policies Against Corruption24. Kaushik Basu, Sudipto Bhattacharya and Ajit Mishra (1992), ‘Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption’25. Timothy Besley and John McLaren (1993), ‘Taxes and Bribery: the Role of Wage Incentives’26. Roger Bowles and Nuno Garoupa (1997), ‘Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime’27. Francis T. Lui (1986), ‘A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence’28. D. Mookherjee and I.P.L. Png (1995), ‘Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?’29. Eric Rasmusen and J. Mark Ramseyer (1994), ‘Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game Among Rational Legislators’Name IndexVolume III:Part I: The Underground Economy1. Bruno Contini (1981), ‘Labor Market Segmentation and the Development of the Parallel Economy – The Italian Experience’2. Arne Jon Isachsen and Steinar Strøm (1980), ‘The Hidden Economy: The Labor Market and Tax Evasion’3. Edgar L. Feige (1994), ‘The Underground Economy and the Currency Enigma’4. Bruno S. Frey and Werner W. Pommerehne (1984), ‘The Hidden Economy: State and Prospects for Measurement’5. P. Reuter (1984), ‘The Economic Significance of Illegal Markets in the United States: Some Observations’6. Friedrich Schneider (1994), ‘Can the Shadow Economy be Reduced Through Major Tax Reforms? An Empirical Investigation for Austria’7. Vito Tanzi (1983), ‘The Underground Economy in the United States: Annual Estimates, 1930–80’Part II: Victimless Activities and Illegal Markets8. Jagdish N. Bhagwati (1981), ‘Alternative Theories of Illegal Trade: Economic Consequences and Statistical Detection’9. Christopher S. Koper and Peter Reuter (1996), ‘Suppressing Illegal Gun Markets: Lessons from Drug Enforcement’10. Mary E. Lovely and Douglas R. Nelson (1994), ‘Illegal Trade and Endogenous Tariff Formation’11. Harold C. Nathan (1980), ‘Economic Analysis of Usury Laws’12. Chris Paul and Al Wilhite (1994), ‘Illegal Markets and the Social Costs of Rent-Seeking’13. Richard L. Peterson (1983), ‘Usury Laws and Consumer Credit: A Note’14. Marie Thursby, Richard Jensen and Jerry Thursby (1991), ‘Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure’15. Daniel J. Villegas (1989), ‘The Impact of Usury Ceilings on Consumer Credit’16. Rodney T. Smith (1976), ‘The Legal and Illegal Markets for Taxed Goods: Pure Theory and an Application to State Government Taxation of Distilled Spirits’17. John D. Wolken and Frank J. Navratil (1981), ‘The Economic Impact of the Federal Credit Union Usury Ceiling’Part III: The Economics of the Organized Crime18. Diego Gambetta (1988), ‘Fragments of an Economic Theory of the Mafia’19. William P. Jennings (1984), ‘A Note on the Economics of the Organized Crime’20. Riccardo Marselli and Marco Vannini (1997), ‘Estimating a Crime Equation in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Italy’21. Thomas C. Schelling (1967), ‘Economics and Criminal Enterprise’22. Thomas C. Schelling (1971), ‘What Is the Business of the Organized Crime?’Part IV: The Market for Drugs and Public Policy23. Susan L. Averett and Harold M. Hochman (1994), ‘Addictive Behavior and Public Policy’24. Gary S. Becker, Michael Grossman and Kevin M. Murphy (1991), ‘Rational Addiction and the Effects of Price on Consumption’25. Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘A Theory of Rational Addiction’26. Roger D. Blair and Ronald J. Vogel (1973), ‘Heroin Addiction and Urban Crime’27. Billy J. Eatherly (1974), ‘Drug-Law Enforcement: Should We Arrest Pushers or Users?’28. John Holahan (1973), ‘The Economics of Control of the Illegal Supply of Heroin’29. John R. Lott, Jr. (1992), ‘An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convinctions: The Importance of an Individual's Reputation’30. Richard B. McKenzie (1991), ‘Rational Addiction, Lagged Demands and the Efficiency of Excise Taxes: Revisions of Standard Theory’31. Mark H. Moore (1973), ‘Policies To Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin’32. Peter Reuter (1988), ‘Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Intervention into Vice Policy’33. Simon Rottenberg (1968), ‘The Clandestine Distribution of Heroin, Its Discovery and Suppression’34. George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker (1977), ‘De Gustibus non Est Disputandum’35. Michael D. White and William A. Luksetich (1983), ‘Heroin: Price Elasticity and Enforcement Strategies’Name Index