The monograph provides coverage of an extensive history of Western thought by distinguishing two kinds of ‘legal monsters’: those as objects of legal regulations, as well as those as a source of criticism. The claim in this volume is twofold. On the one hand, drawing on the Roman law’s notion of ‘monstrum vel prodigium’, the assumption is that the formula should be considered as legally defunct nowadays. On the other, it represents a powerful metaphor of legal criticism insofar as it is supported by a strong philosophical framework and robust arguments from positive law. The book’s analysis both provides this framework and makes it operational. The idea of ‘legal monsters’ remains a powerful tool of criticism that, as handed down by a thousand-year-old tradition, demands attention even today. This is becoming all the more apparent in that there is no shortage of such legal cases. This volume appeals to students and researchers working in philosophy, law, and political science.
