Is nature’s value only instrumental value for human beings or does nature also have intrinsic value? Can traditional anthropocentrism be defended or must we move to a new, physiocentric moral position? This study develops a critical taxonomy or “map” of thirteen arguments for the conservation of nature. It defends the moral intrinsic value of sentient animals, but not of nonsentient nature. The arguments are phrased in a simple, plastic, and concise language.

Is nature’s value only instrumental value for human beings or does nature also have intrinsic value? Can traditional anthropocentrism be defended or must we move to a new, physiocentric moral position? This study develops a critical taxonomy or “map” of thirteen arguments for the conservation of nature. It defends the moral intrinsic value of sentient animals, but not of nonsentient nature. The arguments are phrased in a simple, plastic, and concise language.

Is nature’s value only instrumental value for human beings or does nature also have intrinsic value? Can traditional anthropocentrism be defended or must we move to a new, physiocentric moral position? This study develops a critical taxonomy or “map” of thirteen arguments for the conservation of nature. It defends the moral intrinsic value of sentient animals, but not of nonsentient nature. The arguments are phrased in a simple, plastic, and concise language.