Obtaining knowledge on whether and how aid contributes to results is considered important for decision making and planning, but also for continuous public support for aid. This dissertation examines how a public aid agency, Sida, has operationalized the demand to demonstrate results since the 1960s. Why has there been an increased demand for results at some times in history? And why does there seem to be a greater acceptance at other times that demonstrating exact results might not be possible? This dissertation contributes to knowledge on the reasons behind the quest to report on results but also on what happens when results are not reportable. Four similar ‘results initiatives’, launched and implemented within Sida in 1971, 1981, 1998 and 2012 are studied. It is shown that despite that all four initiatives have encountered difficulties with non-use of the results information, the initiatives have been a way to show that the organization is doing the best it can to demonstrate results. Since the mere feeling of doing, or wish to do, good for someone else is for many people sufficient “payment” of aid, it is argued that in the end it is not only the knowledge of exact results that matters for continuous trust and support for aid.
