This paper investigates the impact of political interventions made by Beijing and Taipei in recent years on the development of cross-Straits economic relations. The study finds little evidence that either the missile firings carried out by Beijing in 1995 and 1996 or the mainland policy review conducted by Taipei since 1996 has slowed down the growth of trade and investment activities between mainland China and Taiwan. In fact, the trade dependence ratios for the two economies have continued to increase since 1995. Although the level of Taiwans committed investment in the mainland has dropped considerably in recent years, it has moved largely in line with the general trend of total FDI in China. The synchronism between Taiwan investment and other foreign investment suggests that the Taiwan investors, like other foreign investors, responded mainly to macroeconomic conditions and policies in the mainland, rather than to the directives from the Taiwan authorities, when they made their investment decisions. This is due to the fact that the economic logic of pursuing cross-Straits economic activities is so powerful that Taipei's restrictive policy toward investment in the mainland has often been ignored or diluted by the Taiwanese private business community.

This paper investigates the impact of political interventions made by Beijing and Taipei in recent years on the development of cross-Straits economic relations. The study finds little evidence that either the missile firings carried out by Beijing in 1995 and 1996 or the mainland policy review conducted by Taipei since 1996 has slowed down the growth of trade and investment activities between mainland China and Taiwan. In fact, the trade dependence ratios for the two economies have continued to increase since 1995. Although the level of Taiwans committed investment in the mainland has dropped considerably in recent years, it has moved largely in line with the general trend of total FDI in China. The synchronism between Taiwan investment and other foreign investment suggests that the Taiwan investors, like other foreign investors, responded mainly to macroeconomic conditions and policies in the mainland, rather than to the directives from the Taiwan authorities, when they made their investment decisions. This is due to the fact that the economic logic of pursuing cross-Straits economic activities is so powerful that Taipei's restrictive policy toward investment in the mainland has often been ignored or diluted by the Taiwanese private business community.

This paper investigates the impact of political interventions made by Beijing and Taipei in recent years on the development of cross-Straits economic relations. The study finds little evidence that either the missile firings carried out by Beijing in 1995 and 1996 or the mainland policy review conducted by Taipei since 1996 has slowed down the growth of trade and investment activities between mainland China and Taiwan. In fact, the trade dependence ratios for the two economies have continued to increase since 1995. Although the level of Taiwans committed investment in the mainland has dropped considerably in recent years, it has moved largely in line with the general trend of total FDI in China. The synchronism between Taiwan investment and other foreign investment suggests that the Taiwan investors, like other foreign investors, responded mainly to macroeconomic conditions and policies in the mainland, rather than to the directives from the Taiwan authorities, when they made their investment decisions. This is due to the fact that the economic logic of pursuing cross-Straits economic activities is so powerful that Taipei's restrictive policy toward investment in the mainland has often been ignored or diluted by the Taiwanese private business community.