Adam N. Stulberg – författare

The decline in central financing for Russia's nuclear complex and the known interest of terrorist groups in acquiring fissile material and technologies, has made the state of Russia's far-flung nuclear enterprises a pressing international issue. In this important volume, a group of leading US and Russian policy experts - drawing on extensive interviews with officials, facility personnel, and analysts in Russia's regions - explores the intersecting problems of Russian nuclear insecurity and decentralization, including the growing influence of regional, political and economic forces. The work presents insights into both nuclear safety issues and post-Soviet intra-agency governance, as well as detailed case studies of critical nuclear regions: the Far East, the Urals, Siberia, and the Volga area. The volume also offers major new findings on the interface linking Russia's evolving center-periphery relations, its ailing nuclear facilities, and the role played by foreign assistance providers.

Why are some military organizations more adept than others at reinventing themselves? Why do some efforts succeed rapidly while others only gather momentum over time or become sidetracked or even subverted? This book explicates the conditions under which military organizations have both succeeded and failed at institutionalizing new ideas and forms of warfare. Through comparative analysis of some classic cases - US naval aviation during the interwar period; German and British armour development during the same period; and the US Army's experience with counter-insurgency during the Vietnam War - the authors offer a novel explanation for change rooted in managerial strategies for aligning service incentives and norms. With contemporary policy makers scrambling to digest the lessons of recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to meet the unfolding challenges of the new revolution in military affairs (RMA), understanding the sources and impediments to transformation has become critical.

Examines Russia's energy policy with rival Eurasian supplier states from 1992 to 2002.As a window into understanding the relationship between globalization and the pursuit of national security, Adam N. Stulberg examines Russia's mixed success at leveraging energy advantages in Eurasia from 1992 to 2002. Stulberg supplements traditional analyses of statecraft by highlighting indirect market and regulatory mechanisms for altering the behavior of foreign and subnational actors, as well as by demonstrating the usability of "soft power" and global networks. The power of this new theory of "strategic manipulation" is illustrated in several case studies, including Russia's successful natural gas diplomacy toward Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Russia's troubled oil diplomacy toward Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and Russia's mixed success with commercial nuclear diplomacy toward Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Examines Russia's energy policy with rival Eurasian supplier states from 1992 to 2002.As a window into understanding the relationship between globalization and the pursuit of national security, Adam N. Stulberg examines Russia's mixed success at leveraging energy advantages in Eurasia from 1992 to 2002. Stulberg supplements traditional analyses of statecraft by highlighting indirect market and regulatory mechanisms for altering the behavior of foreign and subnational actors, as well as by demonstrating the usability of "soft power" and global networks. The power of this new theory of "strategic manipulation" is illustrated in several case studies, including Russia's successful natural gas diplomacy toward Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Russia's troubled oil diplomacy toward Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and Russia's mixed success with commercial nuclear diplomacy toward Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Interest in nuclear energy has surged in recent years, yet there are risks that accompany the global diffusion of nuclear power—especially the possibility that the spread of nuclear energy will facilitate nuclear weapons proliferation. In this book, leading experts analyze the tradeoffs associated with nuclear energy and put the nuclear renaissance in historical context, evaluating both the causes and the strategic effects of nuclear energy development. They probe critical issues relating to the nuclear renaissance, including if and how peaceful nuclear programs contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation, whether the diffusion of nuclear technologies lead to an increase in the trafficking of nuclear materials, and under what circumstances the diffusion of nuclear technologies and latent nuclear weapons capabilities can influence international stability and conflict. The book will help scholars and policymakers understand why countries are pursuing nuclear energy and evaluate whether this is a trend we should welcome or fear.

The decline in central financing for Russia's nuclear complex and the known interest of terrorist groups in acquiring fissile material and technologies, has made the state of Russia's far-flung nuclear enterprises a pressing international issue. In this important volume, a group of leading US and Russian policy experts - drawing on extensive interviews with officials, facility personnel, and analysts in Russia's regions - explores the intersecting problems of Russian nuclear insecurity and decentralization, including the growing influence of regional, political and economic forces. The work presents insights into both nuclear safety issues and post-Soviet intra-agency governance, as well as detailed case studies of critical nuclear regions: the Far East, the Urals, Siberia, and the Volga area. The volume also offers major new findings on the interface linking Russia's evolving center-periphery relations, its ailing nuclear facilities, and the role played by foreign assistance providers.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today’s international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.