Adam Przeworski - Böcker

The political institutions under which we live today evolved from a revolutionary idea that shook the world in the second part of the eighteenth century: that a people should govern itself. Yet if we judge contemporary democracies by the ideals of self-government, equality and liberty, we find that democracy is not what it was dreamt to be. This book addresses central issues in democratic theory by analyzing the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world. With attention throughout to historical and cross-national variations, the focus is on the generic limits of democracy in promoting equality, effective participation, control of governments by citizens, and liberty. The conclusion is that although some of this dissatisfaction has good reasons, some is based on an erroneous understanding of how democracy functions. Hence, although the analysis identifies the limits of democracy, it also points to directions for feasible reforms.

This is a study of the choices faced by socialist movements as they developed within capitalist societies. Professor Przeworski examines the three principal choices confronted by socialism: whether to work through elections; whether to rely exclusively on the working class; and whether to try to reform or abolish capitalism. He brings to his analysis a number of abstract models of political and economic structure, and illustrates the issues in the context of historical events, tracing the development of socialist strategies since the mid-nineteenth century. Several of the conclusions are novel and provocative. Professor Przeworski argues that economic issues cannot justify a socialist programme, and that the workers had good reasons to struggle for the improvement of capitalism. Therefore, the project of a socialist transformation, and the fight for economic advancement, were separate historical phenomena.

The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a dramatic, worldwide reform of political and economic systems. Never have so many people enjoyed, or at least experimented with democratic institutions. However, many strategies for economic development in Eastern Europe and Latin America have failed with the result that entire economic systems on both continents are being transformed. This major book analyzes recent transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Drawing in a quite distinctive way on models derived from political philosophy, economics, and game theory, Professor Przeworski also considers specific data on individual countries. Among the questions raised by the book are: What should we expect from these experiments in democracy and market economy? What new economic systems will emerge? Will these transitions result in new democracies or old dictatorships?

This 1993 book assesses differing experiences of the transition to democracy in the countries of Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The authors try to determine what the conditions for successful transitions are. They argue against the 'big bang' approach, espoused by many advisors to reforming countries, on the grounds that this approach bypasses the newly formed institutions of democracy and, ultimately, may undermine the necessary consensus to support painful economic reforms. The most successful reforms, they argue, have been those agreed upon through a process of democratic negotiation. A new democracy must offer politically important groups incentives to process their demands within the democratic institutional framework; otherwise, their support will be tenuous and the system may collapse under the strains incurred by painful economic reforms.

This 1993 book assesses differing experiences of the transition to democracy in the countries of Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The authors try to determine what the conditions for successful transitions are. They argue against the 'big bang' approach, espoused by many advisors to reforming countries, on the grounds that this approach bypasses the newly formed institutions of democracy and, ultimately, may undermine the necessary consensus to support painful economic reforms. The most successful reforms, they argue, have been those agreed upon through a process of democratic negotiation. A new democracy must offer politically important groups incentives to process their demands within the democratic institutional framework; otherwise, their support will be tenuous and the system may collapse under the strains incurred by painful economic reforms.

Sustainable Democracy is a joint report of twenty one social scientists, from eleven countries and four academic disciplines, who collaborated over the period of two years under the name of the Group on East-South Systems Transformations (ESST). Their report identifies the principal political and economic choices confronting new democracies in Southern and Eastern Europe and South America, while evaluating their merits and feasibility in the light of current social science knowledge. The scientists explore the social, political and economic conditions under which democracy is likely to generate desirable and politically desired objectives, as well as, whether it is likely to last. It is argued that the state has an essential role in promoting universal citizenship and in creating conditions for a sustained economic growth. Special emphasis is placed on the interdependence between political and economic reforms.

This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.

Political economy is the study of decentralized and centralized mechanisms for allocating resources and distributing incomes: markets and states. Both markets and states can be organized and combined in a variety of ways and they jointly determine what the economy produces as well as who gets what. The purpose of this book is to introduce the reader to the concepts and tools for studying relations between states and markets. The focus is methodological. Both the economy and the state are analyzed as networks of relations between principals and agents, occupying particular places in the institutional structure. Having introduced the principal-agent framework, the book analyzes systematically the effect of the organization of the state on the functioning of the economy. The central question is under what conditions government will do what they should be doing and not do what they should not.

This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.

The political institutions under which we live today evolved from a revolutionary idea that shook the world in the second part of the eighteenth century: that a people should govern itself. Yet if we judge contemporary democracies by the ideals of self-government, equality and liberty, we find that democracy is not what it was dreamt to be. This book addresses central issues in democratic theory by analyzing the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world. With attention throughout to historical and cross-national variations, the focus is on the generic limits of democracy in promoting equality, effective participation, control of governments by citizens, and liberty. The conclusion is that although some of this dissatisfaction has good reasons, some is based on an erroneous understanding of how democracy functions. Hence, although the analysis identifies the limits of democracy, it also points to directions for feasible reforms.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several most surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Political regimes have no impact on the growth of total national incomes, while political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes grow faster in democracies since population increases faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have more of an effect on demography than on economics.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development and other aspects of material welfare. The findings, several most surprising, dispel any notion of a trade-off between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies. Political regimes have no impact on the growth of total national incomes, while political instability affects growth only in dictatorships. Per capita incomes grow faster in democracies since population increases faster under dictatorships. In general, political regimes have more of an effect on demography than on economics.

It is widely believed that autocratic regimes cannot limit their power through institutions of their own making. This book presents a surprising challenge to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean armed forces were constrained by institutions of their own design. Based on extensive documentation of military decision-making, much of it long classified and unavailable, this book reconstructs the politics of institutions within the recent Chilean dictatorship (1973-1990). It examines the structuring of institutions at the apex of the military junta, the relationship of military rule with the prior constitution, the intra-military conflicts that led to the promulgation of the 1980 constitution, the logic of institutions contained in the new constitution, and how the constitution constrained the military junta after it went into force in 1981. This provocative account reveals the standard account of the dictatorship as a personalist regime with power concentrated in Pinochet to be grossly inaccurate.

This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.

Political economy is the study of decentralized and centralized mechanisms for allocating resources and distributing incomes: markets and states. Both markets and states can be organized and combined in a variety of ways and they jointly determine what the economy produces as well as who gets what. The purpose of this book is to introduce the reader to the concepts and tools for studying relations between states and markets. The focus is methodological. Both the economy and the state are analyzed as networks of relations between principals and agents, occupying particular places in the institutional structure. Having introduced the principal-agent framework, the book analyzes systematically the effect of the organization of the state on the functioning of the economy. The central question is under what conditions government will do what they should be doing and not do what they should not.

Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.

What can we learn about democracy from the experience of post-Soviet Russia? What can we learn about the prospects for democracy in Russia from the experience of 'really existing democracies'? Must some 'pre-requisites', cultural or material, be fulfilled for democracy to become possible? This book examines the current state of Russia and the prospects for democracy, posing several challenges to our understanding of democracy. Thirteen contributors expand the debate over these questions, offering a variety of insights, interpretations, and conclusions vital to understanding the conditions of emergence and survival of successful democracies.

Is democracy in crisis? The current threats to democracy are not just political: they are deeply embedded in the democracies of today, in current economic, social, and cultural conditions. In Crises of Democracy, Adam Przeworski presents a panorama of the political situation throughout the world of established democracies, places it in the context of past misadventures of democratic regimes, and speculates on the prospects. Our present state of knowledge does not support facile conclusions. 'We should not believe the flood of writings that have all the answers'. Avoiding technical aspects, this book is addressed not only to professional social scientists, but to everyone concerned about the prospects of democracy.

With the collapse of traditional parties around the world and with many pundits predicting a "crisis of democracy", the value of elections as a method for selecting by whom and how we are governed is being questioned. What are the virtues and weaknesses of elections? Are there limitations to what they can realistically achieve? In this deeply informed book world-renowned democratic theorist Adam Przeworski offers a warts-and-all analysis of elections and the ways in which they affect our lives. Elections, he argues, are inherently imperfect but they remain the least bad way of choosing our rulers. According to Przeworski, the greatest value of elections, by itself sufficient to cherish them, is that they process whatever conflicts may arise in society in a way that maintains relative liberty and peace. Whether they succeed in doing so in today's turbulent political climate remains to be seen.

With the collapse of traditional parties around the world and with many pundits predicting a "crisis of democracy", the value of elections as a method for selecting by whom and how we are governed is being questioned. What are the virtues and weaknesses of elections? Are there limitations to what they can realistically achieve? In this deeply informed book world-renowned democratic theorist Adam Przeworski offers a warts-and-all analysis of elections and the ways in which they affect our lives. Elections, he argues, are inherently imperfect but they remain the least bad way of choosing our rulers. According to Przeworski, the greatest value of elections, by itself sufficient to cherish them, is that they process whatever conflicts may arise in society in a way that maintains relative liberty and peace. Whether they succeed in doing so in today's turbulent political climate remains to be seen.