Anne van Aaken – författare

The European Court of Human Rights is one of the main players in interpreting international human rights law where issues of general international law arise. While developing its own jurisprudence for the protection of human rights in the European context, it remains embedded in the developments of general international law. However, because the Court does not always follow general international law closely and develops its own doctrines, which are, in turn, influential for national courts as well as other international courts and tribunals, a feedback loop of influence occurs.This book explores the interaction, including the problems arising in the context of human rights, between the European Convention on Human Rights and general international law. It contributes to ongoing debates on the fragmentation and convergence of international law from the perspective of international judges as well as academics. Some of the chapters suggest reconciling methods and convergence while others stress the danger of fragmentation. The focus is on specific topics which have posed special problems, namely sources, interpretation, jurisdiction, state responsibility and immunity.

The European Court of Human Rights is one of the main players in interpreting international human rights law where issues of general international law arise. While developing its own jurisprudence for the protection of human rights in the European context, it remains embedded in the developments of general international law. However, because the Court does not always follow general international law closely and develops its own doctrines, which are, in turn, influential for national courts as well as other international courts and tribunals, a feedback loop of influence occurs.This book explores the interaction, including the problems arising in the context of human rights, between the European Convention on Human Rights and general international law. It contributes to ongoing debates on the fragmentation and convergence of international law from the perspective of international judges as well as academics. Some of the chapters suggest reconciling methods and convergence while others stress the danger of fragmentation. The focus is on specific topics which have posed special problems, namely sources, interpretation, jurisdiction, state responsibility and immunity.

The European Court of Human Rights is one of the main players in interpreting international human rights law where issues of general international law arise. While developing its own jurisprudence for the protection of human rights in the European context, it remains embedded in the developments of general international law. However, because the Court does not always follow general international law closely and develops its own doctrines, which are, in turn, influential for national courts as well as other international courts and tribunals, a feedback loop of influence occurs.This book explores the interaction, including the problems arising in the context of human rights, between the European Convention on Human Rights and general international law. It contributes to ongoing debates on the fragmentation and convergence of international law from the perspective of international judges as well as academics. Some of the chapters suggest reconciling methods and convergence while others stress the danger of fragmentation. The focus is on specific topics which have posed special problems, namely sources, interpretation, jurisdiction, state responsibility and immunity.

This handbook provides a comprehensive account of how international law is understood and practiced in Europe, which is defined for the purposes of the book as Council of Europe countries, in the past and in the present. It is separated into parts covering Europe's values, intellectual traditions, and institutions, as well as examinations of European countries and regions.A diverse group of leading scholars and practitioners of international law are led by three overarching focus points: the success and failures of the pacifying effect of international law, the diversity of international legal experiences and traditions within Europe, and the impact of European ideas on international law globally. By examining these areas, the book also analyses Europe's changing role in the world, and the impact of global influences on the understanding of international law in European countries.The book is a study of regionalism in international law, but also a study of the impact of a region which, at least historically, has had an overwhelming influence on the development and interpretations of international law.

Cognitive and behavioural studies are making inroads into international law, international policy, and literature. Firstly, international practice is drawing increasingly on behavioural studies. The United Nations (UN) and its agencies have turned to behavioural science to confront new challenges faced by the international community, including the Sustainable Development Goals, climate change, and gender equality. Similarly, the World Bank and World Health Organization have created teams of experts to advise on the incorporation of behavioural insights to support their operations. Other international organizations are likewise following suit. Secondly, the cognitive-behavioural turn is generating innovative research work in disciplines neighbouring international law and is gaining similar traction in international legal scholarship.Yet, despite this, the implications of cognitive-behavioural studies for international legal theory remain under-explored. With few exceptions, international legal theories have long failed to explicitly address the cognitive-behavioural assumptions of their respective theoretical approaches. To fill this gap, this book systematically examines the impact of the cognitive-behavioural turn on the main theoretical schools within international legal scholarship. Across thirteen chapters, the contributors uncover the cognitive bases of their respective theories, exploring both the cognitive similarities underlying the assumptions of different theories of international law, as well as the limitations of the use of behavioural science in international law theories. International Legal Theory and the Cognitive Turn makes explicit the relationship between cognitive-behavioral methodologies and other ways of thinking about international law, including TWAIL, feminist, and legal realist approaches, and more.This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Cognitive and behavioural studies are making inroads into international law, international policy, and literature. Firstly, international practice is drawing increasingly on behavioural studies. The United Nations (UN) and its agencies have turned to behavioural science to confront new challenges faced by the international community, including the Sustainable Development Goals, climate change, and gender equality. Similarly, the World Bank and World Health Organization have created teams of experts to advise on the incorporation of behavioural insights to support their operations. Other international organizations are likewise following suit. Secondly, the cognitive-behavioural turn is generating innovative research work in disciplines neighbouring international law and is gaining similar traction in international legal scholarship.Yet, despite this, the implications of cognitive-behavioural studies for international legal theory remain under-explored. With few exceptions, international legal theories have long failed to explicitly address the cognitive-behavioural assumptions of their respective theoretical approaches. To fill this gap, this book systematically examines the impact of the cognitive-behavioural turn on the main theoretical schools within international legal scholarship. Across thirteen chapters, the contributors uncover the cognitive bases of their respective theories, exploring both the cognitive similarities underlying the assumptions of different theories of international law, as well as the limitations of the use of behavioural science in international law theories. International Legal Theory and the Cognitive Turn makes explicit the relationship between cognitive-behavioral methodologies and other ways of thinking about international law, including TWAIL, feminist, and legal realist approaches, and more.This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Cognitive and behavioural studies are making inroads into international law, international policy, and literature. Firstly, international practice is drawing increasingly on behavioural studies. The United Nations (UN) and its agencies have turned to behavioural science to confront new challenges faced by the international community, including the Sustainable Development Goals, climate change, and gender equality. Similarly, the World Bank and World Health Organization have created teams of experts to advise on the incorporation of behavioural insights to support their operations. Other international organizations are likewise following suit. Secondly, the cognitive-behavioural turn is generating innovative research work in disciplines neighbouring international law and is gaining similar traction in international legal scholarship.Yet, despite this, the implications of cognitive-behavioural studies for international legal theory remain under-explored. With few exceptions, international legal theories have long failed to explicitly address the cognitive-behavioural assumptions of their respective theoretical approaches. To fill this gap, this book systematically examines the impact of the cognitive-behavioural turn on the main theoretical schools within international legal scholarship. Across thirteen chapters, the contributors uncover the cognitive bases of their respective theories, exploring both the cognitive similarities underlying the assumptions of different theories of international law, as well as the limitations of the use of behavioural science in international law theories. International Legal Theory and the Cognitive Turn makes explicit the relationship between cognitive-behavioral methodologies and other ways of thinking about international law, including TWAIL, feminist, and legal realist approaches, and more.This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

Deliberation and Decision explores ways of bridging the gap between two rival approaches to theorizing about democratic institutions: constitutional economics on the one hand and deliberative democracy on the other. The two approaches offer very different accounts of the functioning and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Although both highlight the importance of democratic consent, their accounts of such consent could hardly be more different. Constitutional economics models individuals as self-interested rational utility maximizers and uses economic efficiency criteria such as incentive compatibility for evaluating institutions. Deliberative democracy models individuals as communicating subjects capable of engaging in democratic discourse. The two approaches are disjointed not only in terms of their assumptions and methodology but also in terms of the communication - or lack thereof - between their respective communities of researchers. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the recent debate between the two approaches and makes new and original contributions to that debate.

Die ökonomische Theorie des Öffentlichen Rechts ist - im Gegensatz zur ökonomischen Theorie des Zivilrechts - in Deutschland bisher vernachlässigt worden. Eine direkte Übertragung der in der ökonomischen Theorie des Zivilrechts genutzten Methoden auf den Bereich des Öffentlichen Rechts erscheint außerordentlich problematisch. Daher ist die Suche nach geeigneten ökonomischen Untersuchungsmethoden für das Öffentliche Recht und ihre Anwendung dringend notwendig.Dieser Band präsentiert Aufsätze, die exemplarisch Anknüpfungspunkte zwischen der ökonomischen Theorie des Rechts und der Rechtswissenschaft im Öffentlichen Recht aufgreifen. Es werden Themen aus dem Internationalen Völkerrecht, dem Europarecht und dem Steuerrecht behandelt. Darüber hinaus gehen die Autoren auf methodische Fragen ein, die mögliche Anknüpfungspunkte zwischen Ökonomik und Öffentlichem Recht aufzeigen, insbesondere in der normativen ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts. Dazu zählen Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse, rationales Abwägen und die Konsensökonomik.