Christoph Möllers – författare

The idea of the separation of powers is still popular in much political and constitutional discourse, though its meaning for the modern state remains unclear and contested. This book develops a new, comprehensive, and systematic account of the principle. It then applies this new concept to legal problems of different national constitutional orders, the law of the European Union, and international institutional law. It connects an argument from normative politicaltheory with phenomena taken from comparative constitutional law. The book argues that the conflict between individual liberty and democratic self-determination that is characteristic of modern constitutionalism is proceduralized through the establishment of different governmental branches.A close analysis of the relation between individual and collective autonomy on the one hand and the ways lawmaking through public institutions can be established on the other hand helps us identify criteria for determining how legislative, administrative, and judicial lawmaking can be distinguished and should be organized. These criteria define a common ground in the confusing variety of western constitutional traditions and their diverse use of the notion of separated powers. They also enableus to establish a normative framework that throws a fresh perspective on problems of constitutional law in different constitutional systems: constitutional judicial review of legislation, limits of legislative delegation, parliamentary control of the executive, and standing. Linking arguments fromcomparative constitutional law and international law, the book then uses this framework to offer a new perspective on the debate on constitutionalism beyond the state. The concept permits certain institutional insights of the constitutional experiences within states to be applied at the international level without falling into any form of methodological nationalism.

The idea of the separation of powers is still popular in much political and constitutional discourse, though its meaning for the modern state remains unclear and contested. This book develops a new, comprehensive, and systematic account of the principle. It then applies this new concept to legal problems of different national constitutional orders, the law of the European Union, and international institutional law. It connects an argument from normative politicaltheory with phenomena taken from comparative constitutional law. The book argues that the conflict between individual liberty and democratic self-determination that is characteristic of modern constitutionalism is proceduralized through the establishment of different governmental branches.A close analysis of the relation between individual and collective autonomy on the one hand and the ways lawmaking through public institutions can be established on the other hand helps us identify criteria for determining how legislative, administrative, and judicial lawmaking can be distinguished and should be organized. These criteria define a common ground in the confusing variety of western constitutional traditions and their diverse use of the notion of separated powers. They also enableus to establish a normative framework that throws a fresh perspective on problems of constitutional law in different constitutional systems: constitutional judicial review of legislation, limits of legislative delegation, parliamentary control of the executive, and standing. Linking arguments fromcomparative constitutional law and international law, the book then uses this framework to offer a new perspective on the debate on constitutionalism beyond the state. The concept permits certain institutional insights of the constitutional experiences within states to be applied at the international level without falling into any form of methodological nationalism.

The idea of the separation of powers is still popular in much political and constitutional discourse, though its meaning for the modern state remains unclear and contested. This book develops a new, comprehensive, and systematic account of the principle. It then applies this new concept to legal problems of different national constitutional orders, the law of the European Union, and international institutional law. It connects an argument from normative political theory with phenomena taken from comparative constitutional law. The book argues that the conflict between individual liberty and democratic self-determination that is characteristic of modern constitutionalism is proceduralized through the establishment of different governmental branches. A close analysis of the relation between individual and collective autonomy on the one hand and the ways lawmaking through public institutions can be established on the other hand helps us identify criteria for determining how legislative, administrative, and judicial lawmaking can be distinguished and should be organized. These criteria define a common ground in the confusing variety of western constitutional traditions and their diverse use of the notion of separated powers. They also enable us to establish a normative framework that throws a fresh perspective on problems of constitutional law in different constitutional systems: constitutional judicial review of legislation, limits of legislative delegation, parliamentary control of the executive, and standing. Linking arguments from comparative constitutional law and international law, the book then uses this framework to offer a new perspective on the debate on constitutionalism beyond the state. The concept permits certain institutional insights of the constitutional experiences within states to be applied at the international level without falling into any form of methodological nationalism.

This translation into English of the leading German-language work on the Federal Constitutional Court gives an overview of the court's history and role as one of the most influential constitutional courts in recent years. The book consists of four extended, free-standing essays written by each of the authors. The essays cover the historical development and political context of the Court; the Court and the constitution; the Court's approach to judicial reasoning; and the Court in contemporary constitutional theory.

What defines the social practices we currently call norms? They make theft forbidden, eating with a fork advisable, and paintings beautiful. Norms are commonly thought of as moral justifications for doing one thing and not doing another. They are also described in terms of their outcomes or effects, serving as mere causal explanations.The Possibility of Norms proposes a broader view of how norms function, how they are articulated, and how they are realized. It may be asking too much if we expect norms to be effective or morally right. Many norms are simply ineffective and many are at most ineffectively justifiable. Drawing upon a rich array of texts - from law and jurisprudence to philosophy, aesthetics, and the social sciences - Möllers argues for conceiving of social norms as positively marked possibilities. Positively marking a possibility indicates that it should be realized. Normativity thus hinges on judging the world from a distance and acknowledging the possibility of divergent states of the world. Hence, it is no longer theoretically problematic that there are morally unjustified norms, nor that norms can be broken. On the contrary, allowing for breaches may be an important feature of normativity.Möllers's conceptual study sheds new light on a range of paradigms in the humanities, social sciences, and cultural studies, reframing several aspects of norm theory and questioning the theoretical assumptions underlying existing empirical work on normativity.

The idea of the separation of powers is still popular in much political and constitutional discourse, though its meaning for the modern state remains unclear and contested. This book develops a new, comprehensive, and systematic account of the principle. It then applies this new concept to legal problems of different national constitutional orders, the law of the European Union, and international institutional law. It connects an argument from normative political theory with phenomena taken from comparative constitutional law. The book argues that the conflict between individual liberty and democratic self-determination that is characteristic of modern constitutionalism is proceduralized through the establishment of different governmental branches. A close analysis of the relation between individual and collective autonomy on the one hand and the ways lawmaking through public institutions can be established on the other hand helps us identify criteria for determining how legislative, administrative, and judicial lawmaking can be distinguished and should be organized. These criteria define a common ground in the confusing variety of western constitutional traditions and their diverse use of the notion of separated powers. They also enable us to establish a normative framework that throws a fresh perspective on problems of constitutional law in different constitutional systems: constitutional judicial review of legislation, limits of legislative delegation, parliamentary control of the executive, and standing. Linking arguments from comparative constitutional law and international law, the book then uses this framework to offer a new perspective on the debate on constitutionalism beyond the state. The concept permits certain institutional insights of the constitutional experiences within states to be applied at the international level without falling into any form of methodological nationalism.

Warum sind Staatsorganisationen traditionell in drei Gewalten gegliedert? Auf diese Frage gibt Christoph Möllers eine legitimationstheoretisch begründete Antwort und macht diese juristisch nutzbar: Moderne Verfassungen legitimieren sich durch den Schutz individueller Freiheit und die Ermöglichung demokratischer Selbstbestimmung, lassen jedoch den Vorrang zwischen beiden Legitimationsformen offen. Statt einer materiellen Vorrangregel dient das Prinzip der Gewaltengliederung dem Ausgleich beider Legitimationsansprüche durch Organisation und Verfahren. Auf Grundlage dieser Einsicht leitet der Autor Kriterien zur Bestimmung der drei Gewalten her, die die Auslegung von Art. 20 Abs. 2. S. 2 GG präzisieren, und im Vergleich mit dem Verfassungsrecht der USA auf Einzelprobleme Anwendung finden: Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, gerichtliche Kontrolle der Verwaltung und Delegation der Rechtsetzung. In einem zweiten Argumentationsgang bewährt sich dieses Modell auch bei föderalen Rechtsordnungen und übernationale Organisationen wie der EU, der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) und der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO). Probleme der Kompetenzbestimmung zwischen Ebenen, der Verbundverwaltung oder der Anwendbarkeit von internationalem Recht werden durch das Modell auf eine systematische Grundlage gestellt.

Die unveränderte Neuauflage ist mit einer aktuellen Einleitung versehen, die die einschlägigen Entwicklungen des letzten Jahrzehnts darstellt und analysiert. "Staat als Argument" fragt nach der argumentativen Bedeutung des Staatsbegriffs im deutschen Verfassungsrecht. Christoph Möllers untersucht zunächst fünf Autoren der staatsrechtlichen Tradition vor Inkrafttreten des Grundgesetzes: Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen, Carl Schmitt, Rudolf Smend und Hermann Heller. Im zweiten Teil geht er anhand ausgesuchter staatstheoretischer Begrifflichkeiten - Staat als Einheit, als Träger des Gewaltmonopols, als Verfassungsvoraussetzung, Staatszwecke - methodisch zulässigen und problematischen Verwendungsweisen des Staatsbegriffs im Verfassungsrecht des Grundgesetzes nach. Abschließend widmet er sich Rechtsproblemen, in denen der Staatsbegriff Verwendung findet: Staatlichkeit als Schranke der Grundrechtsgeltung, als Eigenschaft föderaler Glieder und als Grenze der europäischen IntegrationDie erste Auflage ist bei C.H. Beck, München erschienen.