Emiliano Trizio – författare

This book offers a systematic interpretation of the relation between natural science and metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology. It shows that Husserl’s account of scientific knowledge is a radical alternative to established methods and frameworks in contemporary philosophy of science.The author’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy offers a critical reconstruction of the historical context from which his phenomenological approach developed, as well as new interpretations of key Husserlian concepts such as metaphysics, idealization, life-world, objectivism, crisis of the sciences, and historicity. The development of Husserl’s philosophical project is marked by the tension between natural science and transcendental phenomenology. While natural science provides a paradigmatic case of the way in which transcendental phenomenology, ontology, empirical science, and metaphysics can be articulated, it has also been the object of philosophical misunderstandings that have determined the current cultural and philosophical crisis. This book demonstrates the ways in which Husserl shows that our conceptions of philosophy and of nature are inseparable.Philosophy’s Nature will appeal to scholars and advanced students who are interested in Husserl and the relations between phenomenology, natural science, and metaphysics.

This book offers a systematic interpretation of the relation between natural science and metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology. It shows that Husserl’s account of scientific knowledge is a radical alternative to established methods and frameworks in contemporary philosophy of science.The author’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy offers a critical reconstruction of the historical context from which his phenomenological approach developed, as well as new interpretations of key Husserlian concepts such as metaphysics, idealization, life-world, objectivism, crisis of the sciences, and historicity. The development of Husserl’s philosophical project is marked by the tension between natural science and transcendental phenomenology. While natural science provides a paradigmatic case of the way in which transcendental phenomenology, ontology, empirical science, and metaphysics can be articulated, it has also been the object of philosophical misunderstandings that have determined the current cultural and philosophical crisis. This book demonstrates the ways in which Husserl shows that our conceptions of philosophy and of nature are inseparable.Philosophy’s Nature will appeal to scholars and advanced students who are interested in Husserl and the relations between phenomenology, natural science, and metaphysics.

Edmund Husserl between Platonism and AristotelianismAim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.Contributors: Thomas Arnold, Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, Michael Barber, Irene Breuer, Steven G. Crowell, John Drummond, Clevis Headley, George Heffernan, Burt Hopkins, Arun Iyer, Adam Konopka ,Carlos Lobo, Claudio Majolino, Danilo Manca, Emanuele Mariani, Ignacio Quepons, Daniele De Santis, Biagio G. Tassone, Emiliano Trizio, William Tullius, Marta Ubiali, and Fotini Vassiliou.Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors (bhopkins@seattleu.edu and drummond@fordham.edu) electronically via e-mail attachments.

Edmund Husserl between Platonism and AristotelianismAim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.Contributors: Thomas Arnold, Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray, Michael Barber, Irene Breuer, Steven G. Crowell, John Drummond, Clevis Headley, George Heffernan, Burt Hopkins, Arun Iyer, Adam Konopka ,Carlos Lobo, Claudio Majolino, Danilo Manca, Emanuele Mariani, Ignacio Quepons, Daniele De Santis, Biagio G. Tassone, Emiliano Trizio, William Tullius, Marta Ubiali, and Fotini Vassiliou.Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors (bhopkins@seattleu.edu and drummond@fordham.edu) electronically via e-mail attachments.

Mature sciences have been long been characterized in terms of the “successfulness”, “reliability” or “trustworthiness” of their theoretical, experimental or technical accomplishments. Today many philosophers of science talk of “robustness”, often without specifying in a precise way the meaning of this term. This lack of clarity is the cause of frequent misunderstandings, since all these notions, and that of robustness in particular, are connected to fundamental issues, which concern nothing less than the very nature of science and its specificity with respect to other human practices, the nature of rationality and of scientific progress; and science’s claim to be a truth-conducive activity. This book offers for the first time a comprehensive analysis of the problem of robustness, and in general, that of the reliability of science, based on several detailed case studies and on philosophical essays inspired by the so-called practical turn in philosophy of science.