Francis Jeffry Pelletier – författare

The Handbook of the History of Logic is a multi-volume research instrument that brings to the development of logic the best in modern techniques of historical and interpretative scholarship. It is the first work in English in which the history of logic is presented so extensively. The volumes are numerous and large. Authors have been given considerable latitude to produce chapters of a length, and a level of detail, that would lay fair claim on the ambitions of the project to be a definitive research work. Authors have been carefully selected with this aim in mind. They and the Editors join in the conviction that a knowledge of the history of logic is nothing but beneficial to the subject''s present-day research programmes. One of the attractions of the Handbook''s several volumes is the emphasis they give to the enduring relevance of developments in logic throughout the ages, including some of the earliest manifestations of the subject.- Covers in depth the notion of logical consequence- Discusses the central concept in logic of modality- Includes the use of diagrams in logical reasoning

A generic statement is a type of generalization that is made by asserting that a "kind" has a certain property. For example we might hear that marshmallows are sweet. Here, we are talking about the "kind" marshmallow and assert that individual instances of this kind have the property of being sweet. Almost all of our common sense knowledge about the everyday world is put in terms of generic statements. What can make these generic sentences be true even when there are exceptions? A mass term is one that does not "divide its reference;" the word water is a mass term; the word dog is a count term. In a certain vicinity, one can count and identity how many dogs there are, but it doesn''t make sense to do that for water--there just is water present. The philosophical literature is rife with examples concerning how a thing can be composed of a mass, such as a statue being composed of clay. Both generic statements and mass terms have led philosophers, linguists, semanticists, and logicians to search for theories to accommodate these phenomena and relationships. The contributors to this interdisciplinary volume study the nature and use of generics and mass terms. Noted researchers in the psychology of language use material from the investigation of human performance and child-language learning to broaden the range of options open for formal semanticists in the construction of their theories, and to give credence to some of their earlier postulations--for instance, concerning different types of predications that are available for true generics and for the role of object recognitions in the development of count vs. mass terms. Relevant data also is described by investigating the ways children learn these sorts of linguistic items: children can learn how to sue generic statements correctly at an early age, and children are adept at individuating objects and distinguishing them from the stuff of which they are made also at an early age.

A generic statement is a type of generalization that is made by asserting that a "kind" has a certain property. For example we might hear that marshmallows are sweet. Here, we are talking about the "kind" marshmallow and assert that individual instances of this kind have the property of being sweet. Almost all of our common sense knowledge about the everyday world is put in terms of generic statements. What can make these generic sentences be true even when there are exceptions? A mass term is one that does not "divide its reference;" the word water is a mass term; the word dog is a count term. In a certain vicinity, one can count and identity how many dogs there are, but it doesn't make sense to do that for water--there just is water present. The philosophical literature is rife with examples concerning how a thing can be composed of a mass, such as a statue being composed of clay. Both generic statements and mass terms have led philosophers, linguists, semanticists, and logicians to search for theories to accommodate these phenomena and relationships. The contributors to this interdisciplinary volume study the nature and use of generics and mass terms. Noted researchers in the psychology of language use material from the investigation of human performance and child-language learning to broaden the range of options open for formal semanticists in the construction of their theories, and to give credence to some of their earlier postulations--for instance, concerning different types of predications that are available for true generics and for the role of object recognitions in the development of count vs. mass terms. Relevant data also is described by investigating the ways children learn these sorts of linguistic items: children can learn how to sue generic statements correctly at an early age, and children are adept at individuating objects and distinguishing them from the stuff of which they are made also at an early age.

The concept of linguistic relativity (or Whorfianism) has its roots in the linguistic anthropology of Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf in the early twentieth century. However, questions over the relationship between natural language and human cognition go much further and deeper. Unfortunately, linguistic relativity has about as many misinterpretations as it does labels (linguistic relativity, linguistic relativism, linguistic determinism, Whorfianism, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis - weak and strong). The idea that language determines thought through an environmentally constrained feedback system is at the heart of most concepts associated with linguistic relativity. The real philosophical questions, however, only seem to present themselves at a level beyond the trivial truism that linguistic structure has an effect on thought, i.e. different languages might encode environmental information differently resulting in variation in things like processing times, measured in psycholinguistic experiments.These questions are important for a number of related disciplines, yet the concept itself is one of the most misunderstood in modern anthropology, sociology, philosophy of language, linguistics, and cognitive science. This book contributes much needed clarity to a theoretical landscape at the centre of insights into what makes us human, both linguistically and cognitively.

The concept of linguistic relativity (or Whorfianism) has its roots in the linguistic anthropology of Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf in the early twentieth century. However, questions over the relationship between natural language and human cognition go much further and deeper. Unfortunately, linguistic relativity has about as many misinterpretations as it does labels (linguistic relativity, linguistic relativism, linguistic determinism, Whorfianism, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis - weak and strong). The idea that language determines thought through an environmentally constrained feedback system is at the heart of most concepts associated with linguistic relativity. The real philosophical questions, however, only seem to present themselves at a level beyond the trivial truism that linguistic structure has an effect on thought, i.e. different languages might encode environmental information differently resulting in variation in things like processing times, measured in psycholinguistic experiments.These questions are important for a number of related disciplines, yet the concept itself is one of the most misunderstood in modern anthropology, sociology, philosophy of language, linguistics, and cognitive science. This book contributes much needed clarity to a theoretical landscape at the centre of insights into what makes us human, both linguistically and cognitively.

The concept of linguistic relativity (or Whorfianism) has its roots in the linguistic anthropology of Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf in the early twentieth century. However, questions over the relationship between natural language and human cognition go much further and deeper. Unfortunately, linguistic relativity has about as many misinterpretations as it does labels (linguistic relativity, linguistic relativism, linguistic determinism, Whorfianism, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis - weak and strong). The idea that language determines thought through an environmentally constrained feedback system is at the heart of most concepts associated with linguistic relativity. The real philosophical questions, however, only seem to present themselves at a level beyond the trivial truism that linguistic structure has an effect on thought, i.e. different languages might encode environmental information differently resulting in variation in things like processing times, measured in psycholinguistic experiments. These questions are important for a number of related disciplines, yet the concept itself is one of the most misunderstood in modern anthropology, sociology, philosophy of language, linguistics, and cognitive science. This book contributes much needed clarity to a theoretical landscape at the center of insights into what makes us human, both linguistically and cognitively.

The concept of linguistic relativity (or Whorfianism) has its roots in the linguistic anthropology of Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf in the early twentieth century. However, questions over the relationship between natural language and human cognition go much further and deeper. Unfortunately, linguistic relativity has about as many misinterpretations as it does labels (linguistic relativity, linguistic relativism, linguistic determinism, Whorfianism, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis - weak and strong). The idea that language determines thought through an environmentally constrained feedback system is at the heart of most concepts associated with linguistic relativity. The real philosophical questions, however, only seem to present themselves at a level beyond the trivial truism that linguistic structure has an effect on thought, i.e. different languages might encode environmental information differently resulting in variation in things like processing times, measured in psycholinguistic experiments. These questions are important for a number of related disciplines, yet the concept itself is one of the most misunderstood in modern anthropology, sociology, philosophy of language, linguistics, and cognitive science. This book contributes much needed clarity to a theoretical landscape at the center of insights into what makes us human, both linguistically and cognitively.

A generic statement is a type of generalization that is made by asserting that a "kind" has a certain property. For example we might hear that marshmallows are sweet. Here, we are talking about the "kind" marshmallow and assert that individual instances of this kind have the property of being sweet. Almost all of our common sense knowledge about the everyday world is put in terms of generic statements. What can make these generic sentences be true even when there are exceptions? A mass term is one that does not "divide its reference;" the word water is a mass term; the word dog is a count term. In a certain vicinity, one can count and identity how many dogs there are, but it doesn''t make sense to do that for water--there just is water present. The philosophical literature is rife with examples concerning how a thing can be composed of a mass, such as a statue being composed of clay. Both generic statements and mass terms have led philosophers, linguists, semanticists, and logicians to search for theories to accommodate these phenomena and relationships. The contributors to this interdisciplinary volume study the nature and use of generics and mass terms. Noted researchers in the psychology of language use material from the investigation of human performance and child-language learning to broaden the range of options open for formal semanticists in the construction of their theories, and to give credence to some of their earlier postulations--for instance, concerning different types of predications that are available for true generics and for the role of object recognitions in the development of count vs. mass terms. Relevant data also is described by investigating the ways children learn these sorts of linguistic items: children can learn how to sue generic statements correctly at an early age, and children are adept at individuating objects and distinguishing them from the stuff of which they are made also at an early age.

This work consists of an introduction and 11 articles on important aspects of the interpretation of generic expressions. The introduction provides a clear overview of various issues and synthesizes the major analytical approaches to them. Taken together, the papers that follow reflect the current state of the art in the semantics of generics, and afford insight into various generic phenomena.

The Handbook of the History of Logic is a multi-volume research instrument that brings to the development of logic the best in modern techniques of historical and interpretative scholarship. It is the first work in English in which the history of logic is presented so extensively. The volumes are numerous and large. Authors have been given considerable latitude to produce chapters of a length, and a level of detail, that would lay fair claim on the ambitions of the project to be a definitive research work. Authors have been carefully selected with this aim in mind. They and the Editors join in the conviction that a knowledge of the history of logic is nothing but beneficial to the subject's present-day research programmes. One of the attractions of the Handbook's several volumes is the emphasis they give to the enduring relevance of developments in logic throughout the ages, including some of the earliest manifestations of the subject.

Covers in depth the notion of logical consequence Discusses the central concept in logic of modality Includes the use of diagrams in logical reasoning

A classical viewpoint claims that reality consists of both things and stuff, and that we need a way to discuss these aspects of reality. This is achieved by using +count terms to talk about things while using +mass terms to talk about stuff. Bringing together contributions from internationally-renowned experts across interrelated disciplines, this book explores the relationship between mass and count nouns in a number of syntactic environments, and across a range of languages. It both explains how languages differ in their methods for describing these two fundamental categories of reality, and shows the many ways that modern linguistics looks to describe them. It also explores how the notions of count and mass apply to 'abstract nouns', adding a new dimension to the countability discussion. With its pioneering approach to the fundamental questions surrounding mass-count distinction, this book will be essential reading for researchers in formal semantics and linguistic typology.

A classical viewpoint claims that reality consists of both things and stuff, and that we need a way to discuss these aspects of reality. This is achieved by using +count terms to talk about things while using +mass terms to talk about stuff. Bringing together contributions from internationally-renowned experts across interrelated disciplines, this book explores the relationship between mass and count nouns in a number of syntactic environments, and across a range of languages. It both explains how languages differ in their methods for describing these two fundamental categories of reality, and shows the many ways that modern linguistics looks to describe them. It also explores how the notions of count and mass apply to 'abstract nouns', adding a new dimension to the countability discussion. With its pioneering approach to the fundamental questions surrounding mass-count distinction, this book will be essential reading for researchers in formal semantics and linguistic typology.

A classical viewpoint claims that reality consists of both things and stuff, and that we need a way to discuss these aspects of reality. This is achieved by using +count terms to talk about things while using +mass terms to talk about stuff. Bringing together contributions from internationally-renowned experts across interrelated disciplines, this book explores the relationship between mass and count nouns in a number of syntactic environments, and across a range of languages. It both explains how languages differ in their methods for describing these two fundamental categories of reality, and shows the many ways that modern linguistics looks to describe them. It also explores how the notions of count and mass apply to ''abstract nouns'', adding a new dimension to the countability discussion. With its pioneering approach to the fundamental questions surrounding mass-count distinction, this book will be essential reading for researchers in formal semantics and linguistic typology.

A classical viewpoint claims that reality consists of both things and stuff, and that we need a way to discuss these aspects of reality. This is achieved by using +count terms to talk about things while using +mass terms to talk about stuff. Bringing together contributions from internationally-renowned experts across interrelated disciplines, this book explores the relationship between mass and count nouns in a number of syntactic environments, and across a range of languages. It both explains how languages differ in their methods for describing these two fundamental categories of reality, and shows the many ways that modern linguistics looks to describe them. It also explores how the notions of count and mass apply to ''abstract nouns'', adding a new dimension to the countability discussion. With its pioneering approach to the fundamental questions surrounding mass-count distinction, this book will be essential reading for researchers in formal semantics and linguistic typology.