Georg Von Wangenheim – författare

This book comprises nine papers approaching designed institutions and their interplay with spontaneous institutions from various angles. While the evolution of spontaneous institutions is quite well understood in economic thinking, the development of consciously designed institutions has been examined much less. In new institutional economics, public choice, and law and economics the interaction between changing preferences and spontaneously evolving institutions on the one hand and the evolution of designed institutions (as, e.g., legal systems) on the other hand has largely been ignored. A number of top class international contributors have been assembled to study this phenomenon including Viktor Vanberg, Bruno Frey, Elinor Ostrom and Francesco Parisi.

This book comprises nine papers approaching designed institutions and their interplay with spontaneous institutions from various angles. While the evolution of spontaneous institutions is quite well understood in economic thinking, the development of consciously designed institutions has been examined much less. In new institutional economics, public choice, and law and economics the interaction between changing preferences and spontaneously evolving institutions on the one hand and the evolution of designed institutions (as, e.g., legal systems) on the other hand has largely been ignored. A number of top class international contributors have been assembled to study this phenomenon including Viktor Vanberg, Bruno Frey, Elinor Ostrom and Francesco Parisi.

Despite the increasing trend towards deregulation, the public regulation of private activities remains a common phenomenon in industrialized countries. However, it is frequently claimed that slow and costly regulatory licensing procedures impede economic growth. This book investigates the strategic and adaptive interaction between citizen-applicants and administrators in regulatory licensing bodies, and studies the effects of policies to accelerate and simplify these processes.Based on a variation and extension of the enforcement game, the author demonstrates that amendments to procedural rules which aim to speed-up and improve licensing procedures may have the effect of reducing social welfare. He illustrates that the failure of a policy to increase the number of applications implies a failure to increase the number of licenses granted. This in turn causes a reduction of social welfare. Importantly, he shows that the reverse implications are not true and that despite an increase in the number of applications or licenses granted, social welfare may still decline. Therefore, he argues that any evaluation of procedural reforms on purely theoretical grounds is impossible. Only the measurement of real improvements in social welfare will verify the success of a policy. To establish failure, however, it is simply necessary to observe a decrease in the number of applications or licenses granted.This book is a rare combination of game theoretic modeling and microeconomic analysis on the effects of variations in the procedural rules of licensing. The conclusions drawn will interest and inform a wide variety of academics and researchers working in the fields of law and economics, regulation, administrative law and game theory.

This edited volume brings together international experts to address one of today's most urgent challenges: how blockchain technology can support climate action and improve the transparency and integrity of voluntary carbon markets (VCM).By analyzing the tokenization of Voluntary Carbon Credits (VCCs), this book provides a holistic view of the economic, legal, and technical issues at play. It explores how blockchain's unique attributes - immutability, security, and digital accessibility - can help build trust in the respective data and carbon offset claims across global supply chains.From international carbon regulation to real-world pilot projects and digital asset standards, this book speaks to a rapidly evolving landscape. With insights from leading scholars and cutting-edge research, it offers valuable guidance for academics, policymakers, legal professionals, fintech innovators, and sustainability leaders alike.

Am 25. Mai 2008 vollendet Hans-Bernd Schäfer sein 65. Lebensjahr. Damit endet nach 32 Jahren seine aktive Zeit an der Universität Hamburg. In diesen 32 Jahren hat Hans-Bernd Schäfer in einer beispiellosen Kraftanstrengung die Entwicklung der „ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts“ – einer Forschungsrichtung, die sich Anfang der siebziger Jahre in den USA e- wickelt hat – in Europa vorangetrieben und in den Köpfen einer zunehmenden Anzahl von Juristen und Ökonomen verankert. In dem 1986 zusammen mit Claus Ott in erster Auflage verfassten „Lehrbuch der ö- nomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts“ wird der Ansatz der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, der ursprünglich anhand des angelsächsischen „common law“ entwickelt wurde, erstmals systematisch auf das kontinentaleuropäische „civil law“ angewendet. Das große Interesse an diesem Buch im In- und Ausland wird dadurch eindrucksvoll belegt, dass die deutsche A- gabe in der vierten Auflage vorliegt und dass inzwischen eine englische, eine spanische und eine chinesische Ausgabe zur Verfügung stehen. Hans-Bernd Schäfer hat sein Interesse an der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts nicht nur durch eine Vielzahl von Veröffentlichungen zu den unterschiedlichsten rechtspolitischen Problemen in angesehenen juristischen und öko- mischen Fachzeitschriften sowie durch die Herausgabe zahlreicher Konferenzbände do- mentiert. Als gelernter Ökonom hat er systematisch den Dialog mit den juristischen Fa- kollegen gesucht und gemeinsam mit diesen immer wieder interdisziplinäre Lehrv- anstaltungen angeboten. Gemeinsam mit Claus Ott hat er vor etwa zwanzig Jahren das alle zwei Jahre stattfindende Travemünder Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts ins Leben gerufen.